SIR,
I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town.
I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the general, commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy.
The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia; but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed population which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at Oporto, as far as I can get information of, that your excellency may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and insubordination,—and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the populace entirely govern the law, civil and military.
Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one before the other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able. To do this would be merely a matter of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leyria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leyria to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principle object, and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either the destruction of Cuesta’s army, to enter more securely into Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that Soult does not think that of his army from Gallicia and that from Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected co-operation,—whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably, satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating.
It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies; and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage to the common cause.
I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed, the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just received a second report and complaint, from general Miranda, would render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question to your excellency, &c.
I have the honour, &c.
W. C. Beresford.
SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD.
Lisbon, March 29, 1809.