5th.—That they did not possess any superior courage is evident from the facts that the besieged, although twice the number of the besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and that they were unable to defend the breaches. In large masses, the standard of courage which is established by discipline may be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism, or any other peculiar excitement; but the latter never lasts long, neither is it equable, because men are of different susceptibility, following their physical and mental conformation. Hence a system of terror has always been the resource of those leaders who, engaged in great undertakings, have been unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the rear; and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.
6th.—It may be said that the majority of the besieged, not being animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be carried to any great length; but a close examination explains this seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct parties,—the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, and the citizens; but the citizens, who had most to lose, were naturally the fiercest, and, accordingly, amongst them, the system of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do; the soldiers meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the garrison of each island found it their own interest to keep those in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the longer staved off from themselves.
7th.—Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza, the laurels gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted, may be admired; the acts perpetrated by this ruling band were, in themselves, atrocious; and Palafox, although unable to arrest their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own conduct. For more than a month preceeding the surrender, he never came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells, and in which, there is too much reason to believe, he and others, of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.
1º. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the operations were conducted with little vigour. The want of unity, as to time, in the double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant error, that was not redeemed by any subsequent activity; but, after the arrival of that marshal, the siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and firmness. General Rogniat appears to disapprove of Suchet’s division having been sent to Calatayud, yet it seems to have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary,—
1st. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid.
2d. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet’s division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without losing the power of succouring Tudela, or, by a march on the side of Daroca, of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at Cuença was directed on Ucles, and that of the marquis of Lazan was gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly proper to recall Suchet.
2º.—It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of Infantado’s operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his depôts and places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined the marquis of Lazan’s troops to his own, he might have formed an entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand regular troops; the insurrections on the French flanks and line of communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable; and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege.
3º.—From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they did not lose above four thousand men; but their success was owing partly to the errors of their opponents, principally to the destruction caused by Rogniat. the pestilence within the town; for, of all that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only were slain in battle. Thirteen convents and churches had been taken; but, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced.
Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia.