The Italian’s representations being unheeded, he advanced to the assault like a man of honour, and was killed, together with all his followers, excepting four, two of whom escaped back to their own side, the other two being spared by the English seamen, were drawn up with cords into the fort. The breach had, however, been practicable at first; but it was broken in an old gallery, which lord Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so cut off the opening. In the course of a few days, a second assault was made, but the French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false attack was commenced on the opposite side.
The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from the citadel, and with some success; but the walls were opened by the enemy’s fire, and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief, surrendered with about two thousand four hundred men, of which two hundred were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine, and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night, by the British shipping; but to embark two thousand five hundred men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by night or day, is not an easy operation; nevertheless, the censure seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been previously made.
The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord Cochrane’s efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and, if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A fruitless attack on Souham’s posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther progress Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS. of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of six or seven thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand; and his applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.
The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: yet the project, at first sight, would appear rather insane than hardy; for the roads, by which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras; and, these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France, remained disposable for the operation.
But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Cabanes. Two-thirds of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the contempt and suspicion of the people.
The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army on the left bank of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed that river, and, driving the Spaniards over the Ter, established his head-quarters at Mediñya, ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march, to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the army; but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, St. Cyr. hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up the blockade of Barcelona: and Cabanes. this succeeded; for the Spaniard remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos.
The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been described in the first volume; referring to that description, the reader will find that the only carriage-routes by which St. Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had also been broken up by lord Cochrane, in August; and, to use the second, it was necessary to take the fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the latter plan, trusting that rapidity and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession.
The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal; here he left the last of his carriages, delivered out four days’ biscuit and fifty rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march the 12th of December, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and beat some Migueletes that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the English ships; but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were high.
The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced march, reached Vidreras and Llagostera, and thus placed himself between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the heights of Casa de Selva.