Barcelona was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines supplied it for several months. There was no longer a Spanish army in the field; and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine thousand of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. Cabanes. The people rose tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if searching for something to vent their fury upon. The head of Vives was called for; and to save his life, he was cast into prison by Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief.
The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was as usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with furious menaces against traitors, but there were neither guns, nor ammunition, nor provisions; and during the first moment of anarchy, St. Cyr. St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona by a vigorous effort. But the opportunity soon passed away; the French general sought only to procure subsistence, and occupied himself in forming a train of field artillery; while Reding, who had been almost without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and place the town in a state of defence.
Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.
The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry were re-assembled at Tarragona and Reus; and a Swiss regiment from Majorca and two Spanish regiments from Granada, increased this force. Three thousand four hundred men arrived from Valencia on the 5th, and from thence also five thousand muskets, ammunition in proportion, and ten thousand pikes which had just been landed from England, were forwarded to Tarragona. A supply of money, obtained from the British agents at Seville, completed the number of fortuitous and fortunate events that combined to remedy the disaster of Molino del Rey. These circumstances, and the inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed suddenly paralyzed, restored the confidence of the Catalonians, but their system remained unchanged; for confidence among the Spaniards always led to insubordination, but never to victory.
Meanwhile, a part of the troops flying from Molino had taken refuge at Bruch, and being joined by the Somatenes, chose major Green, one of the English military agents, for their general, thinking to hold that strong country, which was considered as impregnable ever since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French arms, detached Chabran himself, on the 11th of January, to take his own revenge; but that general was still depressed by the recollection of his former defeat. St. Cyr. To encourage him, Chabot was directed from San Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile of Bruch was turned, and a permanent defence rendered impossible. The Spaniards, however, made little or no resistance; and eight guns were taken, and a considerable number of men killed. The French pursued to Igualada; and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat itself, and afterwards rejoined the main body without loss. Chabot was then recalled to San Sadurni, and Chabran was quartered at Martorel.
While these events were passing beyond the Llobregat, the marquis of Lazan was advancing, with seven or eight thousand men, towards Castellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back a battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable loss; but the next day general Reille, having assembled about three thousand men, intercepted Lazan’s communications, and attacked him in his position behind the Muga. The victory seems to have been undecided; but in the night, Lazan regained his communications, and returned to Gerona.
The battle of Molino del Rey checked, for a time, the ardour of the Catalans, and Reding at first avoided serious actions, leaving the Somatenes to harass the enemy. This plan being followed during the months of January and February, was exceedingly troublesome to St. Cyr, because he was obliged to send small parties continually to seek for subsistence, and the country people, hiding their provisions with great care, strove hard to protect their scanty stores. But in the beginning of February the country between the Llobregat and Tarragona was almost exhausted of food. The English ships continued to vex the coast-line; and the French, besides deserters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the innumerable petty skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. Still St. Cyr maintained his positions; and the country people, tired of a warfare in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured against Reding, that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and torn from their starving families. The townspeople, also feeling the burthen of supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general to fight; nor was this insubordination confined to the rude multitude.
Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand men, had remained perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona, and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey; and this difference was only terminated by Lazan’s marching, with five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. The result of his operations there has been already related in the narrative of that siege.
The army immediately under Reding was, however, very considerable: the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Every fifth man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat of Molino del Rey; and, although the people, averse to serve as regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the forces under Reding were so augmented that, in the beginning of February, it was not less than twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards were also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand Somatenes assisted the regular troops; but there was more show than real power, for Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; and the Migueletes being ill armed, without clothing and insubordinate, devastated the country equally with the enemy.