BATTLE OF VALLS.
It was three o’clock when, Pino’s division being come up, St. Cyr’s recommenced the action. The banks of the Francoli were steep and rugged, and the Spanish position strong and difficult of access; but the French general, as he himself states, wishing to increase the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, forbad the artillery, although excellently placed for execution, to play upon Reding’s battalions, fearing that otherwise the latter would fly before they could be attained by the infantry, and, under this curious arrangement, the action was begun by the light troops.
The French, or rather the Italians, were superior in numbers to the Spaniards, and the columns, covered by the skirmishers, passed the river with great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until the attacking troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; but then both Swiss and Catalans began to waver, and, ere the assailants could close with them, broke, and were charged by the French cavalry. Reding, after receiving several sabre wounds, saved himself at Tarragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took refuge, but the remainder fled in the greatest disorder on the routes of Tortosa and Lerida.
The count of Castel d’Orius, general of the cavalry, many superior officers, and the whole of the artillery and baggage were taken, and four thousand men were killed or wounded; the loss of the French was about a thousand; and, during all these movements and actions, Reding received no assistance from the Somatenes; nor is this surprising, for it may be taken as an axiom in war, that armed peasants are only formidable to stragglers. When the regular forces engage, the peasant, sensible of his own weakness, gladly quits the field.
The 26th Souham’s division, descending into the plain of Tarragona, took possession of the large and rich town of Reus, from which, contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants had not fled. Pino’s division occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls; detachments were sent to Salou and Villaseca, on the sea-coast, west of Tarragona; and Chabot, being recalled from Igualada, was posted at the abbey of Santa Creus, to watch the troops under Wimpfen, who was still at St. Coloma de Querault.
The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare in Catalonia. Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off from the main body of the army, joined the Somatenes, and, acting as partizan corps, troubled the communications of the French; but St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field; and Tortosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condition, and without provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle any attempt had been made against it. But the whole country was filled with confusion; nor was the disorder momentary; for although Lazan, after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa, he declared himself independent of Reding’s command. The fall of Zaragoza, also, had stricken terror far and wide; and the neighbouring provinces feared and acted each for its own safety, without regard to any general plan.
The fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops already in Tarragona, crowded the latter place; and an infectious disorder breaking out, a great mortality ensued.
St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword, begirt the city, and resolved to hold his positions while food could be procured. In this policy he remained stedfast until the middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca; and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos and the Llobregat, cut the communication with Barcelona, and in conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that city. This plan was injudicious; for notwithstanding the sickness in Tarragona, the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded by the cessation of active hostilities. The object of the French general should have been, while the terror of his victories was fresh, to gain secure posts, such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, from whence he could issue out, and clear the country, from time to time, of the bands that might be assembled. His inactivity after the battle of Molino del Rey, and at this period, enabled the Catalonians to recover from their fears, and to put these towns in a state of defence.
Towards the middle of March the resources of the country being all exhausted, St. Cyr at last determined to abandon the plains of Tarragona, and take some position where he could feed his troops, cover the projected seige of Gerona, and yet be at hand to relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone offered all these advantages; but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino del Rey, he ordered Chabran to drive them from that point, that the sick and wounded men might be first transferred from Valls to Barcelona.
The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of artillery on that service. The Migueletes thinking it was the advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned the post; but being undeceived, returned, beat the battalion, and took the gun. The 12th, Chabran having received orders to march with his whole division, consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons, reached the bridge, St. Cyr. but returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr repeated his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently ashamed of their general’s irresolution, fell on vigorously, and, having carried the bridge, established themselves on the heights on both sides of the river.