Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with the remainder of the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose Mr. Frere’s wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments for his force could be procured; but he observed, that the plan was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the English government, and liable, in part, to the objections against the first proposition.
His letter was written the 18th of February, and on the 22d a popular tumult commenced in Cadiz.
The supreme junta, to prove that that city did not require an English garrison, had ordered two regiments, composed of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, prisoners or deserters from the French, to march there. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended to disarm the volunteers, were offended that deserters should be trusted in preference to themselves. They arose, and stopped the courier, with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons suspected of favouring the French, he had been harsh, or rather brutal, in his conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz.
The populace, proceeding from one violence to another, endeavoured to kill the state prisoners; and being prevented in this bloody object, committed several excesses, and murdered don Joseph Heredia, the collector of the public rents. During the tumult, which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was repeatedly called for by the mob; and two British officers being sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by sir George Smith.
The 24th, tranquillity was restored; and the 25th, general Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, suggested, that of the three English battalions then in the harbour, [Appendix, No. 9]. two should be placed in Cadiz; and that the third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta.
Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The object was one that England had a right to seek, and the Spanish rulers no right to refuse; for the people wished to further it, and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government; but Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, was pressing and discussing, with the secretary of the junta, a variety of trifling points, as if to shew his epistolary dexterity; and, finally, when his opponent had conceded the point of admitting troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, as to whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand men, as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost.
Self baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. “Although I do not,” said he, “discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, which should Parl. Papers, 1810. prevent his British majesty’s troops from garrisoning Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency proposes; I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important a measure, unless they should consult me. With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance we speak of.”
This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult’s, addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned; and immediately concluding that general Mackenzie’s troops would be wanted for the defence of that kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the last extremity, observed, that “the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important.”
General Mackenzie’s reply was written the 26th of February. On the 3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and the [Appendix, No. 9]. danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer’s mind, and were unnoticed; but entering into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate Portugal by the Minho, it was impossible, from the position of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan. Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately [Appendix, No. 8]. to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon.