Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his orders; and the British general [Appendix, No. 3], section 6. refused to furnish him with troops, but supplied him with arms, very ample stores of powder, and sent artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a reasonable system of operations. The people were, however, become too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination, universal and hopeless confusion prevailed.
Don Bernadim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the [Appendix, No. 3], section 1. generals claimed an equal and independent authority each over his own force; and this was, perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor were, at that period, almost synonymous; and to obey the orders of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death: nor were there wanting men who found it profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and to direct their blind vengeance against innocent persons; for the prelate’s faction, although the most powerful, was not without opponents even in Oporto.
Such was the unhappy state of affairs when the undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the ordenanzas and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful insubordination; and there were not any arrangements made for the regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply.
Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed and well equipped; they were commanded by baron Eben, a native of Prussia, who, without any known services to recommend him, had suddenly attained the rank of major in the British service. This man, destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been left by sir Robert Wilson in Oporto, when that officer marched to Almeida. Eben’s orders were to follow with the second battalion of the legion, when the men’s clothing and equipment should be completed; but he, retaining the troops, remained, to push his own fortune under the prelate’s auspices.
General Freire having reached the Cavado, with a small body of regular troops, was immediately joined by fourteen or fifteen thousand militia and ordenanzas. Fixing his head-quarters at Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde and Ruivaens in his front; and, unfortunately for himself, endeavoured to restrain his [Appendix, No. 3], section 6. troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command was heinously resented; for Freire, being willing to uphold the authority of the regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the bishop’s faction, and already he was pointed to as a suspected person; and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him.
Meanwhile, general Sylveira, assuming the command of the Tras os Montes, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication with the marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of nine or ten thousand men. Sylveira’s force consisted of about two thousand regulars and as many militia, and his army was accompanied by many of the ordenanzas; but here, as elsewhere, the Portuguese were licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; and the national enmity between them and the Spaniards overcoming the sense of a common cause and [Appendix, No. 6], section 3. common danger, the latter were evilly entreated, both officers and men; and a deadly feud subsisted between the two armies.
The generals, however, agreed to act in concert, offensively and defensively; but neither of them were the least acquainted with the numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists: and it is a proof of Romana’s unfitness for command that he, having the whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of every thing relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of the French force in Gallicia, at this period, was about forty-five thousand men, Romana estimated it at twenty-one thousand. The number under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed it to be twelve thousand; and among these he included general Marchand’s division of the sixth corps, which he always imagined to be a part of the duke of Dalmatia’s army.
The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of the peasants about Ribidavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory. He knew that on the Arosa, an estuary, running up towards St. Jago de Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had also risen, and, being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy; and partly from his Spanish temperament, partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that the French [Appendix, No. 6], section 3. only thought of making their escape out of Gallicia, and that even in that they would be disappointed. But to effect their destruction more certainly, he also, Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. as we have seen, pestered sir John Cradock for succours in money and ammunition, and desired that, the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with a thousand British soldiers. Cradock anxious to support the cause, although he refused the troops, sent ammunition, and five thousand pounds in money; but, before it arrived, Romana was beaten and in flight.
The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to sixteen thousand regulars and militia, besides ordenanzas, were posted in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, and extended from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of defence for Portugal.
Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the Cavado, and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova: but of these twenty-five thousand men, only six thousand were armed with muskets; and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fitter for battle.