3º. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be organised and armed about sixteen thousand.
Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego; and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.
4º. The militia and the ordenanzas, which may be denominated the insurgent force.
5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.
6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of the coast and river navigation for his supplies.
7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which amounted to thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five thousand were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio, close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s moral resources were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity; the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to the occasion.
In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be brought to bear against him.
On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto; and their desire to regain it was strongly expressed.
To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with Cuesta; but that general was ill disposed towards the British, and to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of defence in the northern provinces: and then, in conjunction with Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve Gallicia more effectually than by following the French into that province.
The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted with thorns: and to effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, and two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just disembarked, marched to the same places, where they were joined by three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.