To ensure a superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general Graham perseveringly Graham’s Despatches MSS.urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; but neither their entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the apathy of the Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body from Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from being assisted, were vexatiously impeded; it was the end of December, and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state Appendix, [No. III.] Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.of defence, although, by a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might enter it from the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city. But while the duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of attack, the events in Portugal prevented the execution of his design.
When Massena passed the frontier, his communications with France became so uncertain, that the emperor’s principal source of information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then that the army of the north was directed to support the army of Portugal; that the ninth corps was made a component part of the latter; that the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; and to expect the duke of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move through the Alemtejo, to his assistance. The emperor seems The King’s Correspondence, captured at Vittoriaeven to have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold any particular province.
Massena’s instructions reached him in due time, Soult’s were intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive before the end of December; a delay affording proof that thirty thousand men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz, the duke of Dalmatia repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour Maubourg’s cavalry and five thousand infantry from the first corps. His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined any specific operation; the prince of Esling was to communicate his plan to which Soult’s was to be subordinate. But no certain intelligence even of Massena’s early proceedings had reached Seville, and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and situation of the other.
The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full, and that the blockade of Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the side of Neibla Marshal Soult’s Correspondence. MSS.and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more than twenty thousand men, represented to the emperor that with such a force, he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and Badajos, and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) on his rear; while Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could bring ten thousand men against his front; hence he demanded leave to besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. Meanwhile, order was taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles’ division had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation was posted under general Digeon at Ecija; Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla, was given over to general Daricau, and a detachment under Remond was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of sixteen thousand infantry, artillery, sappers and miners, and about four thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen hundred carts, for stores and provisions were also prepared, and King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.Soult’s administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy of five thousand young Spaniards, called “escopeteros” (fuzileers) to maintain the police of the province.
SOULT’S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.
1811.
Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which moved on Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of the mountains, and to cover it, Gazan marching from Zafra, drove Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult’s intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling Appendix, [No. II.] Sect. 5, 6.at Seville at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were the Spaniards. Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura, terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos was ill provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and, in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment of invasion.
Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, and while Latour Maubourg’s dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the side of Badajos, Briche’s light horsemen collected cattle on the side of Estremadura; Gazan’s division, still posted near Frejenal, protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye’s brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo, marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to Alcantara.
FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.
This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little importance to the French, yet, as containing four thousand troops, it was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former; but Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into the place.