Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his master’s treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of gens d’armes, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and, thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others firing at him, and the gens d’armes, sword in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed, between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. The third day he reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent.
Appendix, [No. VII.]
Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes, disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of the Regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond the Agueda.
The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for a fortnight; but the operation formed no part of the plan which lord Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and he was even prepared to relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed.
The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers; and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool required the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain, occupied the general’s thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented themselves to his mind.—1º. Under the supposition Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.that it would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2º. If Almeida fell to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so fall, to besiege both together, and, when they were taken, march at once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken, the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain.
Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his design into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his proceedings to circumstances as they should arise.
His projects were however necessarily conditional upon whether Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new combinations; and before any other measure, it was essential to recapture Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy affected the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon the execution of both the above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling the enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously had he probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord Wellington left the command of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when Beresford commenced his memorable campaign.
Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, and confidence amongst the troops. Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbé, Mar. 25th.Both had been grievously shaken by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and gloom Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811. MSS.were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor; but the fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed Remond’s detachment. The French, were however soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D’Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, were called the fourth army. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, re-formed a weak corps, called the fifth army; during these proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, and carried on the
SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR.
This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he made such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores to Badajos.