This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on that plan which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga’s irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque’s forces with Albuquerque’s, at Talavera, was also certain to fail; because, the enemy’s masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque’s rear.
Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate; and permitted Areizaga to march, under the impression that it was so. Yet nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley Appendix, [No. II.] Section 1.being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even officially inform him of Areizaga’s march until the 18th of November, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque’s forces. Sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act; and he assured the Junta, that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.
OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.
Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the baron Crossard, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full of life and confidence; and being without impediments of any kind, made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.
Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to France; Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army S.
Journal of Operations. MSS.was principally posted towards Talavera; for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English; and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta.
The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn from Placentia, was, on the 5th of November, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar.
The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.
Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolle’s troops; and the other half, under general Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud’s cavalry at Ocaña.
Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.