2º. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga’s movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; but no general is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory: and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3º. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front: yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

4º. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuna, and Henares, only great rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow. So late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani, when the latter had only eight thousand men, now sought a battle, on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yebenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish general, who pretended, to treat his adversaries, as if they were blind men.

5º. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of Albuquerque’s and Del Parque’s operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga’s, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere’s former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on the 19th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, there were no mountains to hold; between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga’s army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6º. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced, to do ought but commend movements so eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga’s burst from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate; and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear and flank from Mora a week before. That is, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours march.

7º. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus; Areizaga only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched fifty thousand men about like a patrole of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary’s positions or his own line of operations.

8º. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralized the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops; why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general, or was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

9º. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga’s army exceeded fifty thousand men, Albuquerque’s ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, at Tamames had just overthrown the best corps in the French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of Cuença were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why then, was sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? “Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war.” He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had foresaw, to use his own expressions, “after one or Letter to Lord Liverpool. MS.two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by others, that all would have to retreat again:” yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy’s superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who, asserting Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame sir John Moore’s conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man’s toil has been the sport of fools!

1810.

Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and every where weak.