But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the Partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas, in each province, enjoining them, diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act in mass.
The first burst of these bands, occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, in concert with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia; Franquisette and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad Real, and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, and Juan Abril, descending from the Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried off small French posts, close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of that town.
On the other side of Madrid, the Empecinado, with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain of communication, between these great bands and the Empecinado, was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia, the two first acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Gallicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, slew numbers of the Guerillas, and suppressed others. Many were robbers who, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; and few were really formidable, though all were vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon this point!
But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of expecting Napoleon’s innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors, by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions, to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, at three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.
England.—The contentions of party were vehement, and the ministers’ policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1º. The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2º. The furnishing money for the expenses; and, 3º. The recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition, in parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers, were, indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the contest in Portugal, were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy of Beresford’s report of the numbers and efficiency of the native forces, was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful resistance, assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English general.
On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained, his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing, that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle reason, was neglected.
But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold; Napoleon’s continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a fictitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter, made early in the following session, a report in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Paper against Gold.Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. The government endeavoured to stave off the discussion of the bullion question, but lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, proved the hollowness of the system, and drove the ministers to the alternative, of abandoning the prosecution of the war, or of denying the facts adduced in the bullion report. They adopted the latter; and at the instance of Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, the house voted in substance, that a pound-note and a shilling, were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the moment when light guineas were openly selling at twenty-eight shillings. This vote, although well calculated to convince the minister’s opponents, that no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in the existing parliament, did not, however, remove the difficulties of raising money, and no resource remained, but that of the desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world’s commerce by sea, and the ministers affirming, that, the country, was in a state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might have extinguished for ever.
State of Portugal.—In this country, three parties were apparent. That of the people ready to peril body and goods for independence. That of the fidalgos, who thought to profit from the nation’s energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the disaffected, who desired the success of the French; some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed; for those noblemen, in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot’s time, under the authority of the prince regent’s edict to that effect. Freire more honourable than his companions, refused to bear arms against his country, but the two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in the military archives at Paris.
The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but the fidalgos, or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and supported by the regency, were a powerful body, and their political proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock, demand notice. The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and the marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, and they and every other member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses; and as the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited by its degeneracy. This, together with the unavoidable difficulties in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia, and ordenança, nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few, nor inactive, gathered. The times, obliged the government, to permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon; it naturally followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.
After Das Minas’ resignation, four new members were added to the regency, namely, Antonio, commonly called, Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, the marquis de Olhao, and doctor Noguiera. The two last were men of some discretion, but the first, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals. He was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable.