From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida.
On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from Pombal, and, the next morning, pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles, by a succession of parallel ravines, captain Somers Cocks took advantage of one, to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him until general Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base.
SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.
Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto.
During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient Appendix, [No. VIII.]refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands.
This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. He continued his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the British retreated.
Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles sent forward, nor any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt.
Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and, about four o’clock, observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers increased every moment, and they endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated.
Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy’s infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter.
The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that side. This information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before day-light on the 11th.