“The Regulus with five transports including a victualler arrived with colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon colonel Skerrett putting questions to general Doyle and myself upon the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before the Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison, it was now too late, and that their being landed, if practicable, would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in perfect coincidence with that of captains Adam and White. In the evening the surf abated sufficiently for general Doyle, colonel Skerrett, and some of his officers, as well as the captains of the squadron and myself, to wait upon general Contreras, who repeated his determination to cut his way out and join the marquis of Campo Verde the instant the enemy’s breaching battery should open, and which he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town, although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie.”
Extracts from general Contreras’ report.
(Translated.)
“I saw myself reduced to my own garrison.” “I considered if my force was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves. I recollected however that I had still eight thousand of the best and most experienced troops in Spain.” “All conspired against this poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked and went to join Campo Verde.
“An English division came on the 26th, colonel Skerrett, who commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand what I wished him to do. I replied that if he would disembark and enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice, since I would neither command nor counsel him. The 27th the English commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the place they came to succour.
“This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the worst of all; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited and only resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my coolness and the confidence I had, that if they executed my orders the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours, the notion of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.”
Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton.
“12th July, 1811.
“The vacillating conduct of general Contreras regarding the defence of Taragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important fortress.”