On the east beyond the walls, a newly constructed line of defence was carried along the coast to the mouth of the Francoli, where it ended in a large redoubt, built to secure access to that river when the ancient aqueducts which furnished the city with water should be cut by the French. This line was strengthened by a second redoubt, called the Prince, half-way between that near the Francoli and the town; and it was supported by the mole which being armed with batteries, and nearly in a parallel direction, formed as it were a second sea-line.
The approach on the side of the Francoli river was of a level character, and exposed to the fire of the Olivo, a large outwork on the north, crowning a rocky table-land of an equal height with the upper town, but divided from it by a ravine nearly half-a-mile wide, across which the aqueducts of the place were carried. This Olivo was an irregular horn-work, four hundred yards long, with a ditch twenty-four feet deep and forty wide, but the covered way was not completed, and the gorge was only closed by a loop-holed wall; neither was this defence quite finished, as the steepness of the rock, and the fire of the city appeared to render it secure. The bastion on the left of the Olivo, was cut off by a ditch and a rampart from the body of the work, and on the right also within the rampart there was a small redoubt of refuge, with a high cavalier or bank, on which three guns were placed that overlooked all the country round. The ordinary garrison of the Olivo was from twelve to fifteen hundred men, and it contained fifty out of three hundred pieces of artillery which served the defence of Taragona.
The nature of the soil combined with the peculiarities of the works, determined Suchet’s line of attack. On the north and east side the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the approaches unfavourable for breaching batteries; and as all the guns and stores would have to be dragged over the hills on a great circuit, unless the Olivo was first taken, no difficulty could be avoided in an attack. Wherefore, on the side of the lower town the French resolved to approach, although the artificial defences were there accumulated, and the ground between the town and the Francoli river taken in reverse by the Olivo, which rendered it necessary first to reduce that outwork. But this part was chosen by the French, because the soil was deep and easily moved, their depôts and parks close at hand, the ground-plot of the works so salient that they could be easily embraced with fire, and because the attack would, it was supposed, cut off the garrison from fresh water, yet this last advantage was not realized.
On the 4th of May the French, passing the Francoli, drove in the outposts, took possession of two small detached redoubts, situated on the northern side, called the forts of Loretto, and invested the place. However the Spanish troops supported by the fire of the Olivo killed and wounded two hundred men, and the next day a fruitless attempt was made to retake the lost ground; at the same time the fleet under captain Codrington, consisting of three English ships of the line and three frigates, besides sloops and Spanish vessels of war, cannonaded the French right, and harassed their convoys, then coming by the coast-road from the Col de Balaguer. The investing troops whose posts were very close to the Olivo, were also greatly incommoded by the heavy fire from that outwork, yet the line was maintained and perfected.
Habert’s division, forming the right wing, extended from the sea to the bridge of the Francoli; general Frere’s division connected Habert with Harispe’s, whose troops occupied the ground before the Olivo; the Italian division prolonged Harispe’s left to the road of Barcelona which runs close to the sea on the east side of Taragona; three regiments were placed in reserve higher up on the Francoli, where a trestle bridge was cast, and the park, which was established on the right of that river, at the village of Canonja, contained sixty-six battering guns and mortars, each furnished with seven hundred rounds. There were also thirty-six field-pieces, two thousand artillery-men to serve the guns, seven hundred sappers and miners, fourteen hundred cavalry, and nearly fifteen thousand infantry. The head-quarters were fixed at the village of Constanti, a strong covering position, the depôt at Reus was secured by fortified convents, and the works at Mora were defended by several battalions. Other troops, placed at Falcet, guarded the communications, which were farther secured by the escorts belonging to the convoys; and the French had cut off the water of the aqueducts from the Olivo, but this water, whose source was ten or twelve miles off, was also necessary to the besiegers on that sterile land, and was again cut off by the Somatenes, which obliged the French to guard its whole course during the siege.
Meanwhile Campo Verde after his defeat at Figueras had sent Sarsfield and Eroles to their former posts near Valls, Momblanch, and Igualada, and embarking at Mattaro himself, with four thousand men, came on the 10th to Taragona, where the sudden appearance of the French had produced great consternation. Yet when Campo Verde arrived with[Appendix, No. II.] Section 1. this reinforcement, and when colonel Green, the English military agent, arrived on the 15th from Cadiz, in the Merope, bringing with him fifty thousand dollars and two transports laden with arms and stores, Spanish apathy again prevailed, and the necessary measures of defence were neglected. Beyond the walls, however, the French post at Momblanch was attacked by two thousand Miguelettes, and the Somatenes assembled in the vicinity of Reus.
Suchet detached general Frere with four battalions to relieve the former place, where the attack had failed; the commandant of Reus also dispersed the Somatenes, and meanwhile Harispe pushed his patroles over the Gaya as far as Torre de Barra, where he found some wounded Spaniards. These men were within the protection of a convention, made by St. Cyr with Reding, by which the wounded men of both armies were to be left in the civil hospitals of the different towns, and mutually taken care of, without being made prisoners; and it is remarkable that this compact was scrupulously executed on both sides, while beyond those hospitals the utmost ferocity and a total disregard of civilized usages prevailed.
Vol. 4 Plate 2.
Explanatory Sketch
OF THE
SIEGE of TARAGONA.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE.