Lord Liverpool’s intimation, that neither corn nor1811. May. specie could be had from England, threw lord Wellington on his own resources for feeding his troops. He had before created a paper money by means of commissariat bills, which, being paid regularly at certain periods, passed current with the people when the national bonds called “Apolocies” were at an enormous discount. He now in concert with Mr. Stuart, entered into commerce to supply his necessities. For having ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially in South America, could be bought by bills, cheaper than it sold for hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt, although only to be bought with specie, it was at a reduced price; they employed mercantile agents to purchase it for the army account, and after filling the magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was, however, greatly impeded by the disputes with North America, which were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; the American ships which frequented the Tagus being prevented by the non-importation act from bringing back merchandize, were forced to demand coin, which helped to drain the country of specie.
As Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English merchants of Lisbon, to aid him in a traffic which interfered with their profits, he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills; to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new bills, to be invested in such articles of British manufacture as the non-importation law still permitted to go to America. By this complicated process he contrived to keep something in the military chest; and this commerce, which lord Wellington truly observed, was not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the army, and the people, when the proceedings of Mr. Perceval would have destroyed both. Yet it was afterwards cavilled at and censured by the ministers, on the representations of the merchants who found their exorbitant gains interrupted by it.
Pressed by such accumulated difficulties, and not supported in England as he deserved, the general, who had more than once intimated his resolution to withdraw from the Peninsula, now seriously thought of executing it. Yet when he considered, that the cause was one even of more interest to England than to the Peninsula; that the embarrassments of the French might be even greater than his own, and that Napoleon himself, gigantic as his exertions had been, and were likely to be, was scarcely aware of the difficulty of conquering the Peninsula while an English army held Portugal; when he considered also, that light was breaking in the north of Europe, that the chances of war are many, even in the worst of times, and above all, when his mental eye caught the beams of his own coming glory, he quelled his rising indignation, and re-tempered his mighty energies to bear the buffet of the tempest.
But he could not remove the obstacles that choked his path, nor could he stand still, lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he moved in the north, Marmont’s army and the army under Bessieres were ready to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade it before he could even advance against them. To take that place required a battering-train, to be brought up through a mountainous country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the army during the siege. To blockade and pass it, would so weaken his forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing effectual; meanwhile Soult would have again advanced from Llerena, and perhaps have added Elvas to his former conquests.
To act on the defensive in Beira, and follow up the blow against Soult, by invading Andalusia, in concert with the Murcians and the corps of Blake, Beguines, and Graham, while Joseph’s absence paralysed the army of the centre; while the army of Portugal was being reorganized in Castile; and while Suchet was still engaged with Taragona, would have been an operation suitable to lord Wellington’s fame and to the circumstances of the moment. But then Badajos must have been blockaded with a corps powerful enough to have defied the army of the centre, and the conduct of the Portuguese government had so reduced the allied forces, that this would not have left a sufficient army to encounter Soult. Hence, after the battle of Albuera, the only thing to be done, was to renew the siege of Badajos, which, besides its local interest, contained the enemy’s bridge equipage and battering train; but which, on common military calculations, could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and Marmont would succour it: yet it was only by the taking of that town that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon, and a base for further operations obtained.
According to the regular rules of art, Soult should have been driven over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time to do this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side; wherefore lord Wellington could only try, as it were, to snatch away the fortress from between them, and he who, knowing his real situation, censures him for the attempt, is neither a general nor a statesman. The question was, whether the attempt should be made or the contest in the Peninsula be resigned. It failed, indeed, and the Peninsula was not lost, but no argument can be thence derived, because it was the attempt, rather than the success, which was necessary to keep the war alive; moreover the French did not push their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon, by private speculation, at the moment of failure, enabled the English general to support the crisis.
CHAPTER V.
SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.
There is no operation in war so certain as a1811. May. modern siege, provided the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient sieges in that particular, it is also different in this; that no operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required longer time, and better means, than were at his disposal, but he was forced to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The time that he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a force sufficient to disturb the operation; and this depended on the movements of the army of Portugal, whose march from Salamanca to Badajos, by the pass of Baños, or even through that of Gata, could not be stopped by general Spencer, because the mouths of those defiles were commanded by Marmont’s positions. It was possible also at that season, for an army to pass the Tagus by fords near Alcantara, and hence more than twenty days of free action against the place were not to be calculated upon.