If the French attacked the left of the allies, a short movement would have sufficed to bring the bulk of the troops into action on the menaced point, because the whole extent of country occupied did not exceed ten or twelve miles: the communications also were good, and from Campo Mayor open plains, reaching to Badajos, exposed the French movements which could be distinguished both from Elvas, from Campo Mayor, and from the many atalayas or watch-towers on that frontier.
The chief merit of this position was the difficulty of recognizing it from the enemy’s side, and to protect the rear, the first division was retained at Portalegre: from thence it could intercept the enemy at Marvão or Castello de Vide if he should attempt to turn the allies by Albuquerque; and was ready to oppose Soult if he should move between Elvas and Estremos; but the march from Portalegre was too long to hope for the assistance of this division in a battle near Elvas or Campo Mayor.
The French cavalry, as I have said, passed the Guadiana on the 21st, both by the bridge of Badajos and by two fords, where the road of Olivenza crosses that river, below the confluence of the Caya. The right column after driving back the outposts of the allies, was opposed by the heavy dragoons, and by Madden’s Portuguese, and retired without seeing the position on the Campo Mayor side; but the horsemen of the left column, while patrolling towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the eleventh dragoons, and the second German hussars which were on the Guadiana escaped to Elvas with difficulty and loss. The cause of this misfortune in which nearly a hundred and fifty men were killed or taken is not very clear, for the French aver that colonel Lallemand, by a feigned retreat drew the cavalry into an ambuscade, and the rumours in the English camp were various and discordant.
After this action the French troops were quartered along the Guadiana above and below Badajos from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and proceeded to collect provisions for themselves and for the fortress, hence, with the exception of a vain attempt on the 26th to cut off the cavalry detachments on the side of Albuquerque, no farther operations took place.
All things had seemed to tend to a great and decisive battle, and, although the crisis glided away without any event of importance, this was one of the most critical periods of the war. For Marmont[Appendix, No. III.] Section 3. brought down, including a detachment of the army of the centre, thirty-one thousand infantry, four thousand five hundred cavalry, and fifty-four guns; Soult about twenty-five thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and thirty-six guns;—to effect this, Andalusia and Castile had been nearly stripped of troops. Bessieres had abandoned the Asturias, Bonnet united with general Mayer, who had succeeded Serras in Leon, was scarcely able, as we have seen, to keep the Gallicians in check on the Orbijo, the chief armies of the Peninsular were in presence, a great battle seemed to be the interest of the French, and it was in their option to fight or not. Their success at Badajos, and the surprise of the cavalry on the Caya had made ample amends for their losses at Los Santos and Usagre, and now, when Badajos was succoured, and the allied army in a manner driven into Portugal, Albuera seemed to be a victory. The general result of the Estremadura campaign had been favourable to them, and the political state of their affairs seemed to require some dazzling action to impose upon the peninsulars. Their army was powerful, and as they were especially strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground for that arm, there could scarcely be a better opportunity for a blow, which would, if successful, have revenged Massena’s disasters, and sent lord Wellington back to Lisbon, perhaps from the Peninsula altogether; if unsuccessful not involving any very serious consequences, because from their strength of horse and artillery, and nearness to Badajos, a fatal defeat was not to be expected. But the allied army was thought to be stronger by the whole amount of the Spanish troops, than it really was; the position very difficult to be examined was confidently held by lord Wellington, and no battle took place.
Napoleon’s estimation of the weight of moral over physical force in war was here finely exemplified. Both the French armies were conscious of recent defeats, Busaco, Sabugal, Fuentes, and the horrid field of Albuera, were fresh in their memory; the fierce blood there spilled, still reeked in their nostrils, and if Cæsar after a partial check at Dyrracchiaum held it unsafe to fight a pitched battle with recently defeated soldiers, however experienced or brave, Soult may well be excused, seeing that he knew there were divisions on the Caya, as good in all points, and more experienced, than those he had fought with on the banks of the Albuera. The stern nature of the British soldier had been often before proved by him, and he could now draw no hope from the unskilfulness of the general. Lord Wellington’s resolution to accept battle on the banks of the Caya, was nevertheless, one of as unmixed greatness, as the crisis was one of unmixed danger to the cause he supported. For the Portuguese government, following up the system which I have already described, had reduced their troops to the lowest degree of misery, and the fortresses were, at times, only not abandoned to the enemy. The British government had taken the native troops into pay, but it had not undertaken to feed them; yet such was the suffering of those brave men that Wellington, after repeatedly refusing to assist them from the English stores, unable longer to endure the sight of their misfortunes, and to prevent them from disbanding, at last fed the six brigades, or three-fourths of the whole army, the English commissariat charging the expense to the subsidy. He hoped that the government would then supply the remnant, but they starved it likewise, and during the siege of Badajos these troops were of necessity thrown for subsistence upon the magazines of Elvas, which were thus exhausted; and what with desertion, famine, and sickness, that flourishing army which had mustered more than forty thousand good soldiers in line, at the time of Massena’s invasion, could now scarcely produce fourteen thousand for a battle on which the fate of their country depended. The British troops, although large reinforcements had come out, and more were arriving, had so many sick and wounded, that scarcely twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets were in the field. The enemy had therefore a superiority, of one-fourth in artillery and infantry, and the strength of his cavalry was double that of the British.
To accept battle in such circumstances, military considerations only being had in view, would have been rash in the extreme, but the Portuguese government besides throwing the subsistence of the troops upon Elvas, had utterly neglected that place, and Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella, Aronches and Santa Olaya, which were the fortresses covering this frontier; neither had they drawn forth any means of transport from the country. The siege of Badajos had been entirely furnished from Elvas; but all the carts and animals of burthen that could be found in the vicinity, or as far as the British detachments could go; and all the commissariat means to boot, were scarcely sufficient to convey the ammunition, the stores, and the subsistence of the native troops, day by day, from Elvas to the camp; there was consequently no possibility of replacing these things from the British magazines at Abrantes and Lisbon.
When the allies crossed the Guadiana in retreat, Elvas had only ten thousand rounds of shot left, and not a fortnight’s provisions in store, even for her own garrison; her works were mouldering in many places, from want of care, houses and enclosures encumbered her glacis, most of her guns were rendered unserviceable by the fire at Badajos, the remainder were very bad, and her garrison was composed of untried soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was not better looked to; Olaya, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella had nothing but their walls. It would appear then, that if Soult had been aware of this state of affairs, he might under cover of the Guadiana, have collected his army below the confluence of the Caya, and then by means of the pontoon train from Badajos, and by the fords at which his cavalry did pass, have crossed the Guadiana, overpowered the right of the allies, and suddenly investing Elvas, have covered his army with lines, which would have ensured the fall of that place; unless the English general, anticipating such an attempt, had, with very inferior numbers, defeated him between the Caya and Elvas. But this, in a perfectly open country, offering no advantages to the weaker army, would not have been easy. Soult also, by marching on the side of Estremos, could have turned the right, and menaced the communications of the allies with Abrantes, which would have obliged him to retreat and abandon Elvas or fight to disadvantage. The position on the Caya was therefore taken up solely with reference to the state of political affairs. It was intended to impose upon the enemy, and it did so; Elvas and Jerumenha must otherwise have fallen.
While a front of battle was thus presented, the rear was cleared of all the hospitals and heavy baggage; workmen were day and night employed to restore the fortifications of the strong places, and guns, ammunition, and provisions were brought up from Abrantes, by means of the animals and carts before employed in the siege of Badajos. Until all this was effected Portugal was on the brink of perdition, but the true peninsular character was now displayed, and in a manner that proclaims most forcibly the difficulties overcome by the English general, difficulties which have been little appreciated in his own country. The danger of Elvas had aroused all the bustle of the Portuguese government, and the regency were at first frightened at the consequences of their own conduct; but when they found their own tardy efforts were forestalled by the diligence of lord Wellington, they with prodigious effrontery asserted, that he had exhausted Elvas for the supply of the British troops, and that they had replenished it!
His imperturbable firmness at this crisis was wonderful, and the more admirable, because Mr. Perceval’s policy, prevailing in the cabinet, had left him without a halfpenny in the military chest, and almost without a hope of support in his own country: yet his daring was not a wild cast of the net for fortune; it was supported by great circumspection, and a penetration and activity that let no advantages escape. He had thrown a wide glance over the Peninsula, knew his true situation, had pointed out to the Spaniards how to push their war to advantage, while the French were thus concentrated in Estremadura, and at this period had a right to expect assistance from them; for Soult and Marmont were united at Badajos, the army of the north and the army of the centre were paralysed by the flight of the king, and this was the moment, when Figueras having been surprised by Rovira, and Taragona besieged by Suchet, the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied with those places. Thus, nearly the whole of the Peninsula was open to the enterprizes of the Spaniards. They could have collected, of Murcians and Valencians only, above forty thousand regulars, besides partizans, with which they might have marched against Madrid, while the Gallicians operated in Castile, and the Asturian army supported the enterprizes of the northern partidas.