Let any man observe the wide extent of country he had to maintain; the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, and a national government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon. Innumerable English and Spanish agents prodigal of money, and of arms, continually instigating the people of Andalusia to revolt; the coast covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost, few reinforcements, and all the material means to be created in the country. Let any man, I say, consider this, and he will be convinced that it was no common genius that could remain unshaken amidst such difficulties; yet Soult not only sustained himself, but contemplated the most gigantic offensive enterprises, and was at all times an adversary to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries; who can deny him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand perception, and admirable arrangement? It is this combination of high qualities that forms a great captain.
CHAPTER VII.
While Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of1811. July. Andalusia, Marmont retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the valley of the Tagus, with exception of one division which he left, at Truxillo. At the same time the fifth corps retired to Zafra, and thus lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the French, at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier, his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of the Guadiana, this was sufficient to prevent him from renewing the siege of Badajos, if Marmont’s position had not forbid that measure, he therefore resolved to adopt a new system of operations. But to judge of the motives which influenced his conduct we must again cast a hasty glance over the general state of the Peninsula, which was hourly changing.
In Catalonia Suchet had stormed Taragona, seized Montserrat, and dispersed the Catalan army. A division of the army of the centre had chased the Partidas from Guadalaxara and Cuença, and re-established the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in fear and confusion, both from internal intrigue and from the double disasters on each side of their frontier, at Baza and Taragona
The French emperor was pouring reinforcements into Spain by the northern line; these troops as usual scoured the country to put down the Guerillas on each side of their march, and nearly forty thousand fresh men, mostly old soldiers from the army of the reserve, were come, or coming into the north of Spain. The young guard which was at Burgos, under general Dorsenne, was increased to seventeen thousand men; and as no efforts, except those already noticed, were made by the Spaniards, to shake the French hold of the country while Soult and Marmont were on the Guadiana, the French generals were enabled to plan extensive measures of further conquest: and the more readily, because the king was now on his return from Paris, in apparent harmony with his brother, and the powers and duties of all parties were defined.
Suchet urged by Napoleon to hasten his preparations for the invasion of Valencia, was resolved to be under the walls of that city in the middle of September, and Soult was secretly planning a gigantic enterprise, calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. In the north when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed Valladolid, the imperial guards entered Leon; thirteen thousand men of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente on the 17th, and Santocildes retired into the mountains. Bessieres then sent a large convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, but following the treaty between Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself[Appendix, No. III.] Section 3. to France, and general Dorsenne taking the command of the army of the north, prepared to invade Gallicia.
Meanwhile Marmont was directed to resign the whole of Castile and Leon, to the protection of the army of the north, and to withdraw all his posts and depôts with the exception of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was to be changed at a more convenient time. His line of communication was to be with Madrid, and that city was to be his chief depôt and base; he was to take positions in the valley of the Tagus, and at Truxillo; to fortify either Alcantara or Almaraz, and to secure the communication across the river.
Thus posted, the emperor judged that Marmont could more effectually arrest the progress of the allies than in any other. The invasion of Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz, was, he said, the only object the allies had at the moment, but it could always be frustrated by Marmont’s moving against their flank; and with respect to the north, the allies having no object on that side, would be unlikely to make any serious attempt, because they must in time be overmatched, as the French fell back upon their resources. Marmont could also act against their right flank, as he could do against their left flank, if they marched upon Andalusia; and while stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the king’s administration.
In pursuance of these instructions, Marmont, who had remained in Estremadura, to cover Soult’s operations against Blake and the Murcians, now proceeded to occupy Talavera, and other posts in the valley of the Tagus; and he placed a division at Truxillo, the castle of which place, as well as that of Medellin, was repaired. Another division occupied Placentia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and Baños; Girard’s division of the fifth corps, remained at Zafra, to serve as a point of connexion between Marmont and Soult, and to support Badajos, which, by a wise provision of Napoleon’s, was now garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, of the centre, of Portugal and of the south. This gave each general a direct interest in moving to its succour, and in the same policy Ciudad Rodrigo was to be wholly garrisoned by the army of the north, that Marmont might have no temptation to neglect the army of the south, under pretence of succouring Ciudad.