CHAPTER II.
CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.
In August, and the beginning of September,1811. August. Suchet, while preparing for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona vexed Aragon. He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large magazines in Morella and Tortoza. Eight thousand men had been left in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight thousand were placed under general Musnier, to protect Aragon, and twenty-four thousand of all arms remained for the invasion of Valencia, but this force Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a reinforcement from the army of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon, whose system of war, whatever has been said to the contrary, was eminently methodical, refused. He loved better to try a bold push, at a distant point, with a few men, than to make an overwhelming attack, if he thereby weakened his communications; he judged courage and enterprise fittest for the attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to aid Suchet’s operations vigorously when the decisive blow could be struck. Then not only the divisions of the reserve were to march, but combined movements, of detachments from nearly all the armies in the Peninsula, were arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington, by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, saved Gallicia, the French army of the north, in return, by menacing Gallicia, fixed the allies on the Agueda, and so protected Suchet’s invasion of Valencia.
Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from1811. Sept. Tortoza by the sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella and San Mateo. That from Tortoza, and that by Teruel, were carriage-roads, but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was blocked, partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the fort of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could move on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which were at Tortoza, could not pass until Oropesa was reduced. Nevertheless the French general, well knowing the value of boldness in war, resolved to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his field artillery by Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer battle to Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and Saguntum, trusting for subsistence to the “huerta” or garden of Valencia, until the arrival of his convoys.
He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From Morella and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in advance. This last plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite for the subsistence, and fighting of troops should be organized regimentally, and the persons employed wear the uniform of their different corps. Jealousies between the functionaries, of different branches of the service, would then be unknown; and the character of all subordinate persons, being under the guardianship of the battalions to which they belonged, would be equally praiseworthy, which cannot now be said.
While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey to disorder. About the period of the siege of Taragona, Palacios, notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the chief command at Valencia, Palacios’ faction opposed him, and endeavoured to drawCapt. Codrington’s papers, MSS. the soldiers and the populace to their side, by proposing to inundate the plain of Murviedro, and to defend the strong country in advance. Blake, however, resolved to act on the flanks of the French army by detachments, and, in this view, sent C. O’Donnel, with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa, to Albaracin, supporting them with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria. He charged Mahy, who commanded five thousand infantry, and seven hundred cavalry of the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the army of the centre, posted at Cuença. He detached Bassecour with two thousand men to Requeña, and the same time, directed Duran and the Empecinado, to unite, and invade Aragon; and it was to aid in this expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon.
Blake had, exclusive of Mahy’s and Bassecour’s divisions, about twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Three thousand five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned for three months; two hundred were in Oropesa, and fifteen hundred in Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas, that the whole country seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these peopleRoche, MSS. being very uncertain, Blake could not depend upon having a permanent partizan force, of more thanTupper, MSS. eight thousand. The Valencian army contained the Albuera divisions, St. Juan’s, Miranda’s, andMr. Wellesley, MSS. Villa Campa’s veterans; it was therefore, not only numerous, but the best Spain had yet produced; and Valencia itself was exceedingly rich in allDoyle, MSS. things necessary for its supply: but there was no real power, the building, though fair enough outside, had the dry rot within. The French had[Appendix, No. I.] Section 3. many secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the populace were not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather collected than organized his forces, and was quite incapable of leading them. He was unpopular, both at Cadiz and Valencia, and the regency of which he formed a part was tottering. The Cortes had quashed Mahy’s command of the Murcian army, and even recalled Blake himself; but the order, which did not reach him until he was engaged with Suchet, was not obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the Murcian army, which should have formed a reserve, after Mahy’s division had marched for Cuença, fell into the greatest disorder: above eight thousand men deserted in a few weeks, and those who remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus all interest became concentrated in the city of Valencia; which was in fact the key of all the eastern coast because Carthagena required an army to defend it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and Alicant was then quite defenceless.
It was in this state of affairs, that Suchet commenced the invasion. His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of September one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San Mateo, and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was established; but this latter columnSuchet. instead of proceeding directly to Segorbe, turned off to its left, and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to Castellon de la Plana, where the whole threeVacani. were united on the 20th. The main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had masked Peniscola on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a detachment on the 19th; but as the road run directly under the fire of the last place, the main body moved by the rugged route of Cabanes to Villa Franca, leaving the battering-train still at Tortoza.
During these operations Blake appeared inclinedRoche, MSS. to fight, for he brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro, and called in Obispo; Mahy, who had done nothing on the side of Cuença, was also in march to join him; but all these divisions marched slowly, and with confusion; and a slight skirmish at Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French dragoons put a great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake doubt the firmness of his troops. He therefore left O’Donnel with four thousand men on the side of Segorbe, and then retired himself with fifteen thousand behind the Guadalaviar. ValenciaTupper, MSS. was thus thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour’s division was at hand, and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an entrenched camp (which had cost two years to construct), while his own communication with Tortoza was intercepted, merely dispersed the armed peasants which had assembled on his flank, and then turned against Murviedro.