3º. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular descent of sixteen feet, and the bottom was planted with sharp spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all loop-holed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide and the French had left the temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully defended that it was said the third division could never have carried them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an assertion perhaps easier made than proved.
4º. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion, has been contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blameable to have spared labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti also had a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms, and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless his neglect of the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high, that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning of the 19th that the light division was come up, out of its turn, he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it. Moreover the small breach was flanked at a very short distance, by a demi-bastion with a parapet, which, though little injured, was abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external operations, and it was not until it fell, that the error of Marmont at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of five thousand the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men the engineer’s art cannot be overcome by mere courage.
5º. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. “The soldiers were not to be controuled.” That excuse will however scarcely suffice here, because colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man of a most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and did constrainCaptain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i. p. 122. his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.
CHAPTER IV.
In Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which1812. January. it appeared, that many of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these people Carlos d’España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained.
When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision the place quickly, for Marmont’s army was gathering at Valladolid; that general was however still ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating the fact had indeed spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun recommenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at Salamanca.
On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to concentrate at Salamanca, Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad, was four marches.
On the 23d Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate of the fortress, but meanwhile five thousand of Hill’s troops had reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence if the siege had even lasted twenty-four days, the place might still have been taken.