History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5

by William Francis Patrick Napier

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS—RETREAT FROM MADRID.

1812. October. King Joseph’s first intention was to unite a greatSee [Plan 6.] part of Suchet’s forces as well as Soult’s with his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing that Valencia must be defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicant, and the more so that, until the French army could cross the Tagus and open a new line of communication with Zaragoza, Valencia would be the only base for the king’s operations. Joseph then resolved to incorporate a portion of the army of the south with the army of the centre, giving the command to Drouet, who was to move by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the Tagus; but this arrangement, which seems to have been dictated by a desire to advance Drouet’s authority, was displeasing to Soult. He urged that his army, so powerfully constituted, physically and morally, as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar organization and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was there any good reason for this change; for if Joseph only wished to have a strong body of troops on the Cuenca road, the army of the centre could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole could unite again on the Tagus without injury to the army of the south. It would however be better, he said, to incorporate the army of the centre with the army of the south and march altogether by the road of San Clemente, leaving only a few troops on the Cuenca road, who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the king’s plan arose from a desire to march in person with a large body he could do so with greater dignity by joining the army of the south, which was to act on the main line of operations. Joseph’s reply was a peremptory order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuenca.

Soult’s army furnished thirty-five thousand infantry, six thousand excellent cavalry under arms with seventy-twoImperial muster-rolls, MSS. guns, making with the artillery-men a total of forty-six thousand veteran combatants. The army of the centre including the king’s guards furnished about twelve thousand, of which two thousand were good cavalry with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eightJoseph’s correspondence, MSS. thousand fighting men, eight thousand being cavalry, with eighty-four pieces of artillery, were put in motion to drive Hill from the Tagus. Joseph’s project was to pass that river, and operate against Wellington’s rear, if he should continue the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham was in like manner to operate on his rear by ArandaOfficial papers from the Bureau de la Guerre, MSS. de Duero, and the Somosierra, sending detachments towards Guadalaxara to be met by other detachments, coming from the king through Sacedon. Finally if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and Madrid, the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal. The conveying of Soult’s convoys of sick men to Valencia and other difficulties, retarded the commencement of operations to the king’s great discontent, and meanwhile he became very uneasy for his supplies, because the people of La Mancha, still remembering Montbrun’s devastations, were flying with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition, were become exceedingly expert in evading the researches of the foragers. Such however is the advantage of discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolated from fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia.

However on the 18th of October Joseph marched from Requeña upon Cuenca, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult’s infantry and some cavalry. He then proceeded to Tarancon, which was the only artillery road, on that side, leading to the Tagus, and during this time Soult marched by San Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. General Hill immediately sent that notice to Lord Wellington which caused the retreat, from Burgos, but he was in no fear of the enemy, for he had withdrawn all his outposts and united his whole force behind the Tagus. His right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente Dueñas, and there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus extending as far as Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable, from its junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez, upwards; and moreover, this part of the line, weak from its extent, could not easily be supported, and the troops guarding it, would have been too distant from the point of action if the French should operate against Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna which is a branch of the Jarama, and running nearly parallel to the Tagus. His right occupied very strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elio’s troops forming the extreme left were directed to march upon Arganda, and the head-quarters were fixed at Cienpozuelos.

The bulk of the troops were thus held in hand, ready to move to any menaced point, and as Skerrit’s brigade had just arrived from Cadiz, there was, including the Spanish regulars, forty thousand men in line, and a multitude of partidas were hovering about. The lateral communications were easy and the scouts passing over the bridge of Toledo covered all the country beyond the Tagus. In this state of affairs the bridges at each end of the line furnished the means of sallying upon the flanks of any force attacking the front; the French must have made several marches to force the right, and on the left the Jarama with its marshy banks, and its many confluents, offered several positions, to interpose between the enemy and Madrid.

Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique, and the king, with his guards, repaired to Zarza de la Cruz. Meanwhile Soult whose divisions were coming fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed the Tagus also with his advanced guard. On the 30th he attacked general Cole who commanded at the Puente Larga with several regiments and some guns, but though the mines failed and the French attempted to carry the bridge with the bayonet they were vigorously repulsed by the forty-seventh under Colonel Skerrit. After a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost the allies sixty men, Soult relinquished the attempt and awaited the arrival of his main body. Had the Puente Larga been forced, the fourth division which was atSoult’s official correspondence with the king, MSS. Añover would have been cut off from Madrid, but the weather being thick and rainy, Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land of Valdemoro behind the bridge and was afraid to push forward too fast.

The king discontented with this cautious mode of proceeding now designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, and Soult, being still in doubt of Hill’s real object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and Chinchon, throwing bridges for retreat at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill’s movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced twenty-four hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the combat at the Puente Larga. Wellington’s orders had reached him at the moment when Soult first appeared on the Tagus, and the affair was so sudden, that the light division, which had just come from Alcala to Arganda to close the left of the position, was obliged, without halting, to return again in the night, the total journey being nearly forty miles.

Wellington, foreseeing that it might be difficult for Hill to obey his instructions, had given him a discretionary power to retire either by the valley of the Tagus, or by the Guadarama; and a position taken up in the former, on the flank of the enemy, would have prevented the king from passing the Guadarama, and at the same time have covered Lisbon; whereas a retreat by the Guadarama exposed Lisbon. Hill, thinking the valley of the Tagus, in that advanced season, would not support the French army, and knowing Wellington to be pressed by superior forces in the north, chose the Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons, and causing La China and the stores remaining there to be destroyed in the night of the 30th, he retreated by different roads, and united his army on the 31st of October near Majadahonda. Meanwhile the magazines along the line of communication to Badajos were, as I have already noticed, in danger if the enemy had detached troops to seize them, neither were the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a singular nature.

The municipality had demanded all the provision remaining there as if they wanted them for the enemy, and when this was refused, they excited a mob to attack the magazines; some firing even took place, and the assistance of the fourth division was required to restore order; a portion of wheat was finally given to the poorest of the people, and Madrid was abandoned. It was affecting to see the earnest and true friendship of the population. Men and women, and children, crowded around the troops bewailing their departure. They moved with them in one vast mass, for more than two miles, and left their houses empty at the very instant when the French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, because there was a very strong French party in Madrid; and amongst the causes of wailing the return of the plundering and cruel partidas, unchecked by the presence of the British, was very loudly proclaimed. The “Madrileños” have been stigmatized as a savage and faithless people, the British army found them patient, gentle, generous, and loyal; nor is this fact to be disputed, because of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines, for the provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around Madrid, under an agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the end of the war; and it was natural for the people, excited as they were by the authorities, to endeavour to get their own flour back, rather than have it destroyed when they were starving.

With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched Penne Villemur, Morillo, and Carlos D’España, and it was Wellington’s wish that Elio, Bassecour, and Villa Campa should now throw themselves into the valley of the Tagus, and crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, join Ballesteros’s army, now under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon, and if the enemy neglected this line, the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio, however, being cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the bridge of Auñion, near Sacedon, and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado.