The city of Valencia, though nominally the seat of his power, was not so. He had razed all the defences constructed by the Spaniards, confining his hold to the old walls and to a small fortified post within the town sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable of keeping the population in awe; his real place of arms was Saguntum, and between that and Tortoza he had two fortresses, namely, Oropesa and Peniscola; he had also another line of communication, but for infantry only, through Morella, a fortified post, to Mequinenza. Besides these lines there were roads both from Valencia and Saguntum, leading through Segorbé to Teruel a fortified post, and from thence to Zaragoza by DarocaSee [Plan 6.] another fortified post. These roads were eastward of the Guadalaviar, and westward of that river Suchet had a line of retreat from Valencia to Madrid by Requeña, which was also a fortified post. Now if the whole of the French general’s command be looked to, his forces were very numerous, but that command was wide, and in the field his army was, as I have before shewn, not very numerous. Valencia was in fact a point made on hostile ground which, now that the French were generally on the defensive, was only maintained with a view of imposing upon the allies and drawing forth the resources of the country as long as circumstances would permit. The proper line for covering Valencia and the rich country immediately around it was on the Xucar, or rather beyond it, at San Felippe de Xativa and Moxente, where a double range of mountains afforded strong defensive positions, barring the principal roads leading to Valencia. On this position Suchet had formed his entrenched camp, much talked of at the time, but slighter than fame represented it; the real strength was in the natural formation of the ground.
February. Beyond his left flank the coast road was blocked by the castle of Denia, but his right could be turnedSee [Plan 7.] from Yecla and Almanza, through Cofrentes and Requeña, and he was forced to keep strict watch and strong detachments always towards the defile of Almanza, lest Elio’s army and Del Parque’s should march that way. This entrenched camp was Suchet’s permanent position of defence, but there were reasons why he should endeavour to keep his troops generally more advanced; the country in his front was full of fertile plains, or rather coves, within the hills, which run in nearly parallel ranges, and are remarkably rocky and precipitous, enclosing the plains like walls, and it was of great importance who should command their resources. Hence as the principal point in Suchet’s front was the large and flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and from thence threw off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla, Ibi, and Onil, which were on the same strong ridge as the position covering the cove of Alcoy. On his right there was another plain in which Fuente La Higuera, Villena, and Yecla were delineated at opposite points of a triangle, and as this plain and the smaller valleys ministered to Suchet’s wants because of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging districts of the Sicilian army were contracted: the outposts of the allied army were in fact confined to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains covering the towns of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa Joyosa which was on the sea-coast.
Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over an army more numerous than his own, but outward appearances are deceitful in war; the French general was really the strongest, because want, ignorance, dissention, and even treachery, were in his adversary’s camps. Del Parque’s army remained behind the Morena, Elio’s was at Tobarra and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the British only were available in the hour of danger, and they were few. When general Campbell quarrelled with Elio the latter retired for a time towards Murcia, but after Wellington’s journey to Cadiz he again came forward, and his cavalry entering La Mancha skirmished with general Soult’s and communicating with Bassecour and the Empecinado delayed the progress of Daricau towards Valencia. Meanwhile general Campbell remained quiet, in expectation that lord William Bentinck would come with more troops to Alicant, but in February fresh troubles broke out in Sicily, and in the latter end of that month sir John Murray arriving, assumed the command. Thus in a few months, five chiefs with different views and prejudices successively came to the command, and the army was still unorganized and unequipped for vigorous service. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and French belonging to it were eager to desert, one Italian regiment had been broken for misconduct by general Maitland, the British and Germans were humiliated in spirit by the part they[Appendix, No. 16], [17.] were made to enact, and the Spaniards under Whittingham and Roche were starving; for Wellington knowing by experience how the Spanish government, though receiving a subsidy, would, if permitted, throw the feeding of their troops entirely upon the British, forbade their being supplied from the British stores, and the Spanish intendants neglected them.
Murray’s first care was to improve the equipment of his troops, and with the aid of Elio he soon put them in a better condition. The two armies together furnished thirty thousand effective men, of which about three thousand were cavalry, and they had thirty-seven guns, yet very inadequately horsed, and Whittingham’s and Elio’s cavalry were from want of forage nearly unfit for duty. The transport mules were hired at an enormous price, the expense being at the rate of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds annually, and yet the supply was bad, forGeneral Donkin’s papers. here as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and misuse of authority prevailed. The rich sent their fine animals to Alicant for sanctuary and bribed the Alcaldes, the mules of the poor alone were pressed, the army was ill provided, and yet the country was harassed. In this state it was necessary to do something, and as the distress of Whittingham and Roche’s troops could not be removed, save by enlarging their cantonments, Murray after some hesitation resolved to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and he designed, as the first step, to surprise fifteen hundred men which they had placed in Alcoy. Now five roads led towards the French positions. 1º. On the left the great road from Alicant passing through Monforte, Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, where it joins the great road from Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. This way turned both the ridges occupied by the armies. 2º. A good road leading by Tibi to Castalla, from whence it sent off two branches, on the left hand, one leading to Sax, the other through the pass of Biar to Villena; two other branches on the right hand went, the one through Ibi to Alcoy, the other through Onil to the same place. 3º. The road from Alicant to Xixona, a bad road, leading over the very steep rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At Xixona also there was a narrow way on the right hand, through the mountains to Alcoy, which was followed by Roche when he attacked that place in the first battle of Castalla. 4º. A carriage-road running along the sea-coast as far as Villa Joyosa, from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of Alcoy and behind that town.
March. On the 6th of March the allied troops moved in four columns, one on the left by Elda, to watch the great Madrid road; one on the right composed of Spanish troops under colonel Campbell, from Villa Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a third, under lord Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right; the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and to pursue the remainder of Habert’s division, which was behind that town. Lord Frederick Bentinck attacked in due time, but as colonel Campbell did not appear the surprise failed, and when the French saw the main body winding down the Sierra in front of Alcoy, they retired, pursued by general Donkin with the second battalion of the twenty-seventh regiment. The head of lord Frederick Bentinck’s column was already engaged, but the rear had not arrived, and the whole of Habert’s division was soon concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, and there offered battle; yet sir John Murray, instead of pushing briskly forward, halted, and it was not until several demands for support had reached him, that he detached the fifty-eighth to the assistance of the troops engaged, who had lost about forty men, chiefly of the twenty-seventh. Habert, fearing to be cut off by Consentayna, and seeing the fifty-eighth coming on, retreated, and the allies occupied Alcoy, which greatly relieved their quarters; but the want of vigour displayed by sir John Murray when he had gained Alcoy did not escape the notice of the troops.
After this affair the armies remained quiet until the 15th, when Whittingham forced the French posts with some loss from Albayda, and general Donkin, taking two battalions and some dragoons from Ibi, drove back their outposts from Rocayrente and Alsafara, villages situated beyond the rangePlan 7. bounding the plain of Alcoy. He repassed the hills higher up with the dragoons and a company of the grenadiers of twenty-seventh, under captain Waldron, and returned by the main road to Alcoy, having in his course met a French battalion, through which the gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Meanwhile sir John Murray, after much vacillation, at one time resolving to advance, at another to retreat, thinking it impossible first to force Suchet’s entrenched camp, and then his second line behind the Xucar, a difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that the French general had his principal magazines at Valencia, conceived the idea of seizing the latter by a maritime expedition. He judged that the garrison which he estimated at eight hundred infantry, and one thousand cavalry, would be unable to resist, and that the town once taken the inhabitants would rise; Suchet could not then detach men enough to quell them without exposing himself to defeat on the Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could be closely followed by the allies and driven upon Requeña. In this view he made fresh dispositions.
On the 18th Roche’s division reinforced by some troops from Elio’s army and by a British grenadier battalion, was selected for the maritime attack, and the rest of the army was concentrated on the left at Castalla with the exception of Whittingham’s troops which remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be advancing, and Murray resolved to fight him. But to form a plan and to execute it vigorously, were with sir John Murray very different things. Although far from an incapable officer in the cabinet, he shewed none of the qualities of a commander in the field. His indecision was remarkable. On the morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front of Castalla, and in the evening he assumed a weaker position behind that town, abandoning the command of a road, running from Ibi in rear of Alcoy, by which Whittingham might have been cut off. And when the strong remonstrances of his quarter-master general induced him to relinquish this ground, he adopted a third position, neither so strong as the first nor so defective as the last.
In this manner affairs wore on until the 26th, when Roche’s division and the grenadier battalion marched to Alicant to embark, with orders, if they failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera at the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed to besiege Denia. But now the foolish ministerial arrangements about the Sicilian army worked out their natural result. Lord Wellington, though he was permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in Spain beyond the period lord William Bentinck had assigned for its stay, had not the full command given to him; he was clogged with reference to the state of Sicily, until the middle of March, and this new arrangement was still unknown to lord William Bentinck and to sir John Murray. Thus there were at this time, in fact, three commanding officers; Wellington for the general operations, Murray for the particular operations, and lord William Bentinck still empowered to increase or diminish the troops, and even upon emergency to withdraw the whole. And now in consequence of the continued dissentions in Sicily, the king of that country having suddenly resumed the government, lord William did recal two thousand of Murray’s best troops, and amongst them the grenadier battalion intended to attack Valencia. That enterprize instantly fell to the ground.