June. Notwithstanding these successes Clauzel, whose troops were worn out with fatigue, declared that it would require fifty thousand men and three months’ time to quell the insurrection entirely. And Napoleon more discontented than ever with the king, complained that the happy enterprizes of Clauzel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about the posts and the infantry escorts had been neglected; that the reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in succession instead of at once; finally that the cautious movement of concentration by the other armies was inexcusable, since the inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport, their ordinary and even timid circumspection in any operation out of the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient manner. The growing dissentions between the English and the Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, and the changes in his army, were, he said, all favourable circumstances for the French, but the king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection continued, and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wellington soon vindicated Napoleon’s judgement, and the voice of controversy was smothered by the din of battle, for the English general was again abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms resounded through the Peninsula.
CHAPTER VI.
1813. While the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various circumstances related in the former chapter, Lord Wellington’s diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the Portuguese had been restored in a surprizing manner, and discipline had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary hand; rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were terrified, the zealous encouraged; in short every department was reformed with vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and dépôts, those asylums for malingerers, discovered and drove so many skulkers to their duty, that the second division alone recovered six hundred bayonets in one month; and this salutary scouring was rendered more efficient by the establishment of both permanent, and ambulent regimental hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on a principle which cannot be too widely extended; for it is certain that as the character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral force will always be brought to bear upon the execution of orders under regimental controul which it is in vain to look for elsewhere.
The Douro had been rendered navigable as high up as Castillo de Alva above the confluence of the Agueda; a pontoon train of thirty-five pieces had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction had been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat from Burgos, and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by emissaries who purchased them with English merchandize, even at Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and at the very time when Clauzel was unable for want of transport to fill the magazines of Burgos. The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined to carry tents instead; it is, however, doubtful if these tents were really useful on a march in wet weather, because when soaked they became too heavy for the animal, and seldom arrived in time for use at the end of a march. Their greatest advantage was found when the soldiers halted for a few days. Beside these amendments many other changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese troops conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by intelligence of the defection of the Prussians following on the disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend the condition of those Spanish troops which the Cortez had placed at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application of the subsidy he had kept them clothed and fed during the winter, and now reaped the benefit by having several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction with his own forces. Wherefore being thus prepared he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects of his Portuguese political difficulties as well as to keep pace with Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the field in April, but he could not concentrate before the green forage was fit for use, and deferred the execution of his plan until May. What that plan was and what the means for executing it shall now be shewn.
May. The relative strength of the contending armies in the Peninsula was no longer in favour of the French. Their force which at the termination of Wellington’s retreat into Portugal was above two hundred and sixty thousand men and thirty-two thousand horses, two hundred and sixteen thousand[Appendix, No. 18.] being present with the eagles, was by the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts for the army in Germany reduced in March, 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one thousand men and twenty-nine thousand horses. Thirty thousand of these were in hospital, and only one hundred and ninety-seven thousand men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with the eagles. Of this number sixty-eight thousand including sick, were in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The remainder with the exception of the ten thousand left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, and it has been already shewn how scattered and how occupied.
But Wellington had so well used the five months’ cessation of active operations that nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were ready to take the field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a more effective aid than before, because the French lines of retreat run parallel to, and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and every part opened by the advance of the allies would furnish a fresh dépôt for the subsistence of their armies. This mass of troops was composed in the following manner.
The first army under Copons nominally ten thousand, really about six thousand strong, was in Catalonia.
The second army under Elio was in Murcia about twenty thousand, including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and Empecinado.
The Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray, near Alicant, about sixteen thousand.