“27th September, 1811.
“I take great shame to myself for having neglected so long writing to you, &c. but in truth I did not wish to write to you until I could give you some notion of the result of my mission and the measures which our government would have adopted in consequence of the information and opinion which I brought with me from Portugal, but God knows how long I am to wait if I do not write to you until I could give you the information which you must naturally be so anxious to receive. From week to week I have anxiously expected that something would be concluded, and I as regularly deferred writing; however I am now so much in your debt that I am afraid you will attribute my silence to inattention rather than to the uncertainty and indecision of our further proceedings. During the ten days agreeable voyage in the Armide I arranged all the papers of information which I had procured in Portugal, and I made out a paper on which I expressed in plain and strong terms all I thought regarding the state of affairs both in Portugal and Spain. These papers, together with the notes which I procured from lord Wellington and yourself, appeared to me to comprehend every thing which the ministers could possibly require, both to form a deliberate opinion upon every part of the subject and to shape their future measures. The letters which I had written to lord Wellesley during my absence from England, and which had been regularly submitted to the prince, had prepared them for most of the opinions which I had to enforce on my arrival. Lord Wellesley perfectly coincided in all the leading points, and a short paper of proposals was prepared for the consideration of the cabinet, supported by the most interesting papers which I brought from Portugal.”
Then followed an abstract of the proposals, after which Mr. Sydenham continues thus:—
“I really conceived that all this would have been concluded in a week, but a month has elapsed, and nothing has yet been done.” “Campbell will be able to tell you that I have done every thing in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money, money, money in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer ‘that the thing is impossible.’ The prince himself certainly appears to be à la hauteur des circonstances, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effort on our part to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power; that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious as we deserved. This feeling you will allow is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system, and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations.” “Nothing can be more satisfactory than the state of affairs in the north; all that I am afraid of is that we have not a ministry capable of taking advantage of so fine a prospect.”
Mr. Sydenham’s statement of the opinions of Lord Wellesley at the time of the negociations which ended in that lord’s retirement in February, is as follows:—
“1st. That Lord Wellesley was the only man in power who had a just view of affairs in the Peninsula, or a military thought amongst them.”
“2nd. That he did not agree with Perceval that they were to shut the door against the Catholics, neither did he agree with Grenville that they were to be conciliated by emancipation without securities.”
“3rd. That with respect to the Peninsula, he rejected the notion that we were to withdraw from the Peninsula to husband our resources at home, but he thought a great deal more both in men and money could be done than the Percevals admitted, and he could no longer act under Perceval with credit, or comfort, or use to the country.”
No. 22.