HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
BOOK XVII.
CHAPTER I.
1812. Great and surprising as the winter campaign had been, its importance was not understood, and therefore not duly appreciated by the English ministers. But the French generals saw with anxiety that lord Wellington, having snapped the heavy links of the chain which bound him to Lisbon, had acquired new bases of operation on the Guadiana, the Agueda, and the Douro, that he could now choose his own field of battle, and Spain would feel the tread of his conquering soldiers. Those soldiers with the confidence inspired by repeated successes, only demanded to be led forward, but their general had still to encounter political obstacles, raised by the governments he served.
In Spain, the leading men, neglecting the war at hand, were entirely occupied with intrigues, with the pernicious project of reducing their revolted colonies, or with their new constitution. In Portugal, and in the Brazils, a jealous opposition to the general on the part of the native authorities had kept pace with the military successes. In England the cabinet, swayed by Mr. Perceval’s narrow policy, was still vacillating between its desire to conquer and its fear of the expense. There also the Whigs greedy of office and dexterous in parliamentary politics, deafened the country with their clamours, while the people, deceived by both parties as to the nature of the war, and wondering how the French should keep the field at all, were, in common with the ministers, still doubtful, if their commander was truly a great man or an impostor.
The struggle in the British cabinet having ended with the resignation of lord Wellesley, the consequent predominance of the Perceval faction, left small hopes of a successful termination to the contest in the Peninsula. Wellington had, however, carefully abstained from political intrigues, and his brother’s retirement, although a subject of regret, did not affect his own personal position; he was the General of England, untrammelled, undegraded by factious ties, and responsible to his country only for his actions. The ministers might, he said, relinquish or continue the war, they might supply his wants, or defraud the hopes of the nation by their timorous economy, his efforts must be proportioned to his means; if the latter were great, so would be his actions, under any circumstances he would do his best, yet he was well assured the people of England would not endure to forego triumph at the call of a niggard parsimony. It was in this temper that he had undertaken the siege of Badajos, in this temper he had stormed it, and meanwhile political affairs in England were brought to a crisis.