Many of the French leaped into the water and were drowned, but the greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors, the panic spread to the other side of the river; the garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly safe, abandoned that fort also and fled with the others along the road to Naval Moral. Some grenadiers of the 92d immediately swam over and brought back several boats, with which the bridge was restored, and Fort Ragusa was gained. The towers and other works were then destroyed, the stores, ammunition, provisions, and boats were burned in the course of the day, and in the night the troops returned to the Sierra above, carrying with them the colours of the foreign regiment, and more than two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a commandant and sixteen other officers. The whole loss on the part of the British was about one hundred and eighty men, and one officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, placed for the destruction of the tower; but the only officer slain in the actual assault was captain Candler, a brave man, who fell while leading the grenadiers of the 50th on to the rampart of Fort Napoleon.
This daring attack was executed with a decision similar to that with which it had been planned. The first intention of general Hill was, to have directed a part of his column against the bridge-head, and so to have assailed both works together, but when the difficulties of the road marred this project, he attacked the nearest work with the leading troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. This rapidity was an essential cause of the success, for Foy hearing on the 17th that the allies were at Truxillo, had ordered D’Armagnac to reinforce Lugar Nueva with a battalion, which being at NavalFoy’s Official Correspondence, MSS. Moral the 18th, might have entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning of the 19th; but instead of marching before day-break, this battalion did not move until eleven o’clock, and meeting the fugitives on the road, caught the panic and returned.
The works at Mirabete being now cut off from the right bank of the Tagus, general Hill was preparing to reduce them with his heavy artillery, when a report, from sir William Erskine, caused him, in conformity with his instructions, to commence a retreat on Merida, leaving Mirabete blockaded by the guerillas of the neighbourhood. It appeared that Soult, being at Chiclana, heard of the allies’ march the 19th, and then only desired Drouet to make a diversion in Estremadura without losing his communication with Andalusia; for he did not perceive the true object of the enterprize, and thinking he had to check a movement, which the king told him was made for the purpose of reinforcing Wellington in the north, resolved to enforce Hill’s stay in Estremadura. In this view he recalled his own detachments from the Niebla, where they had just dispersed a body of Spaniards at Castillejos, and then forming a large division at Seville, he purposed to strengthen Drouet and enable him to fight a battle. But that general, anticipating his orders, had pushed an advanced guard of four thousand men to Dom Benito the 17th, and his cavalry patroles passing the Guadiana on the 18th had scoured the roads to Miajadas and Merida, while Lallemand’s dragoons drove back the British outposts from Ribera, on the side of Zafra.
Confused by these demonstrations, sir William Erskine immediately reported to Graham, and to Hill, that Soult himself was in Estremadura with his whole army, whereupon Graham came up to Badajos, and Hill, fearful of being cut off, retired, as I have said, from Mirabete on the 21st, and on the 26th reached Merida unmolested. Drouet then withdrew his advanced guards, and Graham returned to Castelo de Vide. Notwithstanding this error Wellington’s precautions succeeded, for if Drouet had been aware of Hill’s real object, instead of making demonstrations with a part of his force, he would with the whole of his troops, more than ten thousand, have marched rapidly from Medellin to fall on the allies as they issued out of the passes of Truxillo, and before Erskine or Graham could come to their aid; whereas acting on the supposition that the intention was to cross the Tagus, his demonstrations merely hastened the retreat, and saved Mirabete. To meet Hill in the right place, would, however, have required very nice arrangements and great activity, as he could have made his retreat by the road of Caceres as well as by that of Merida.
Lord Wellington was greatly displeased that this false alarm, given by Erskine, should have rendered the success incomplete; yet he avoided any public expression of discontent, lest the enemy, who had no apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete, should be led to keep it, and so embarrass the allies when their operations required a restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the ministers however he complained, that his generals, stout in action, personally, as the poorest soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed with the fear of responsibility when left to themselves, that the slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide. But instead of expressing his surprise, he should rather have reflected on the cause of this weakness. Every British officer of rank knew, that without powerful interest, his future prospects, and his reputation for past services, would have withered together under the first blight of misfortune; that a selfish government would instantly offer him up, a victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press with whom success is the only criterion of merit. English generals are and must be prodigal of their blood to gain a reputation, but they are necessarily timid in command, when a single failure, even without a fault, consigns them to an old age of shame and misery. It is however undeniable that sir William Erskine was not an able officer.
On the other side the king was equally discontented with Soult, whose refusal to reinforce Drouet, he thought had caused the loss of Almaraz, and he affirmed that if Hill had been more enterprising, the arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as the dépôt of Almaraz, for he thought that general had brought up his whole corps instead of a division only six thousand strong.
CHAPTER II.
1812. April. While the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing and strengthening its position on the frontier of Portugal, the progress of the war in other parts had not been so favourable to the common cause. It has already been shewn that Gallicia, in the latter part of 1811, suffered from discord, poverty, and ill success in the field; that an extraordinary contribution imposed upon the province, had been resisted by all classes, and especially at Coruña the seat of Government; finally that the army torn by faction was become hateful to the people. In this state of affairs Castaños having, at the desire of lord Wellington, assumed the command, removed the seat of Government to St. Jago, leaving the troops in the Bierzo under the marquis of Portazgo.
Prudent conduct and the personal influence of the new captain-general soothed the bitterness of faction, and stopped, or at least checked for the moment, many of the growing evils in Gallicia, and the regency at Cadiz assigned an army of sixty thousand men for that province. But the revenues were insufficient even to put the few troops already under arms in motion, and Castaños, although desirous to menace Astorga while Marmont was on the Agueda, could not, out of twenty-two thousand men, bring even one division into the field. Nevertheless, so strange a people are the Spaniards, that a second expedition against the colonies, having with it all the field-artillery just supplied by England, would have sailed from Vigo but for the prompt interference of sir Howard Douglas.