Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the 1st of August; Decaen and Maurice Mathieu with some eight thousand disposable men were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is to say, only two marches from Taragona; Lamarque with from four to five thousand, was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Taragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Cerdaña, being about seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the garrisons, and minor posts, smaller succours might have been drawn; Tortoza alone could have furnished two thousand. But Lacy’s division was at Vich, Sarzfield’s at Villa Franca, Eroles’ divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan’s in the Grao D’Olot, and they required five days even to assemble; when united, they would not have exceeded seven thousand men, and with their disputing, captious generals, would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without fighting a battle in which their defeat would have been certain.
Sarzfield judged that ten days at least were necessary to reduce Taragona, and positively affirmed that the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian troops alone. Thus Maitland would have had to land his men, his battering train and stores, and to form his investment, in the face of Decaen’s power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated that general first. But Decaen’s troops numerically equal, without reckoning the garrison of Taragona two thousand strong, were in composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only three thousand British and German troops in Maitland’s army, were to be at all depended upon in battle; neither does it appear that the platforms, sand-bags, fascines and other materials, necessary for a siege, were at this period prepared and on board the vessels.
It is true Maitland would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at first, which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion, and Wellington’s object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature of the coast, declared that a safe re-embarkation could not be depended upon. The soundness of this opinion has indeed been disputed by many seamen, well acquainted with the coast, who maintain, that even in winter the Catalonian shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for a camp, affords a certain retreat, and facility of re-embarking on one or other of its sides in all weather. However, to Maitland the coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the question is also supported by very able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.
OPERATIONS IN MURCIA.
July. The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicant at a critical moment; the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O’Donel, brother to the regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian army after Blake’s surrender at Valencia, and this army, based upon Alicant and Carthagena, was independent of a division under general Frere, which always hung about Baza, and Lorca, on the frontier of Grenada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Both Suchet and Soult were paralyzed in some degree by the neighbourhood of these armies, which holding a central position were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed by Wellington’s march into Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. For the two French commanders were forced to watch his movements, and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the Isla de Leon, the other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, which were moreover supported by the arrival of general Ross with British troops at Carthagena.
O’Donel had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching Maupoint’s brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with two thousand men for Catalonia, leaving general Harispe with not more than four thousand men beyond the Xucar. General Ross immediately advised O’Donel to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet, with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act in consequence of Palombini’s and Maupoint’s departure for Madrid, came down from their haunts in the mountains of Albaracyn upon the right flankSee [Plan 6.] and rear of the French positions. Villa Campa penetrated to Liria, and Bassecour to Cofrentes on the Xucar; but ere this attack could take place, Suchet, with his usual celerity, returned from Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament, he recalled them again, and sent for Paris’ brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast, and meanwhile O’Donel’s operations brought on the
FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.
Harispe’s posts were established at Biar, Castalla, and Onil on the right; at Ibi and Alcoy on the left. This line was not more than one march from Alicant. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassiers held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort, with another regiment of infantry, was at Castalla, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his left, and a regiment of dragoons with three companies of foot at Biar on his right. In this exposed situation the French awaited O’Donel, who directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and eight guns, against Delort; meanwhile Roche with threeSee [Plan 7.] thousand men was to move through the mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at Castalla. O’Donel hoped thus to cut the French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, with two thousand men, was to come down from Cofrentes to Villena, on the right flank of Delort.
Suchet’s official correspondence, MSS. Roche, who marched in the night of the 19th, remained during the 20th in the mountains, but the next night he threaded a difficult pass, eight miles long, reached Ibi at day-break on the 21st, and sentSuchet’s Memoirs. notice of his arrival to O’Donel; and when that general appeared in front of Delort, the latter abandonedRoche’s correspondence, MSS. Castalla, which was situated in the same valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it. But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge General Delort’s official report behind that town, which also extended behind Ibi; this secured his communication with Mesclop, of whom he demanded succour, and at the same time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry, two guns, and his cuirassiers, to defend Ibi and a small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and thus Roche, finding only a few men before him, got possession of the town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.