During this correspondence between the French marshals, Napoleon remained silent, yet at a later period he expressed his discontent at Suchet’s inactivity, and indirectly approved of Soult’s plans by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza which Suchet however did not execute. It would appear that the emperor having given all the reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to act as they judged fitting for his service, would not, at a distance and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution essential to success was not to be expected if either marshal acted under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet’s modification and it would have been unwise to substitute a new plan which would have probably displeased both commanders. Meanwhile Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet’s project was annulled by the approach of winter and by the further operations of the allies.
If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro or fight a great battle with an army much less strongly constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory would have profited him little, because his enemy strong in cavalry could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he received a check he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre, and Valencia. It is not probable however that such a great operation could have been conducted without being discovered in time by Wellington. It has been already indicated in this History, that besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence employed by all generals, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph’s courtiers, and even amongst French officers of rank; and it has been shown that Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him on the 31st of August when the combinations were only two days old. It is true that the retreat of Suchet from Catalonia and his junction with Soult in France at the moment when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to the belief that it was a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless the secret must have been known to more than one person about each marshal, and the English general certainly had agents who were little suspected. Soult would however still have had the power of returning to his old positions, and, with his numbers increased by Suchet’s troops, could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles. It might be that his secret design was thus to involve that marshal in his operations, and being disappointed he was not very eager to adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the approach of the bad season, and the menacing position of Wellington, rendered each day less promising. His own project was hardy, and dangerous for the allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington’s profound acquaintance with his art. For he had entered France only in compliance with the wishes of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for Suchet, averring that the true military line of operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now however actually established in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn for the allies, he resolved to continue the operations on his actual front awaiting only the
FALL OF PAMPELUNA.
This event was produced by a long blockade,September. less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian yet very honourable to the firmness of the governor general Cassan.
The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold table-land on which a number of valleys opened, and where the great roads, coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, Estella, Vittoria, and Irurzun, were concentrated. The northern and eastern fronts of the fortress were covered by the Arga, and the defences there consisted of simple walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river, but the other fronts were regularly fortified with ditches, covered way, and half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks were constructed on the south front, but the citadel which stood on the south west was a regular pentagon, with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system of mines.
Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the action, the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army increased the garrison to something more than three thousand five hundred men of all arms, who were immediately invested by the allies. Many of the inhabitants went off during the short interval between the king’s arrival and departure, and general Cassan, finding his troops too few for action and yet too many for the food, abandoned the two outworks on the south, demolished everything which could interfere with his defence outside, and commenced such works as he deemed necessary to improve it inside. Moreover foreseeing that the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns to succour the garrison, he prepared a field-train of forty pieces to meet the occasion.
It has been already shown that Wellington,July. although at first inclined to besiege Pampeluna, finally established a blockade and ordered works of contravallation to be constructed. Cassan’s chief object was then to obtain provisions, and on the 28th and 30th of June he sustained actions outside the place to cover his foragers. On the 1st of July he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders’ works were completed. Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the French always seeking to gather the grain, and vegetables which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls, and the allies endeavouring to set fire to the standing corn within range of the guns of the fortress.
On the 14th of July, O’Donnel’s Andalusians were permanently established as the blockading force, and the next day the garrison made a successful forage on the south side of the town. This operation was repeated towards the east beyond the Arga on the 19th, when a sharp engagement of cavalry took place, during which the remainder of the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.
The 26th the sound of Soult’s artillery reached the place, and Cassan, judging rightly that the marshal was in march to succour Pampeluna, made a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he was driven back, but the next morning he came out again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back with the third and fourth divisions. Then O’Donnel, as I have before related, evacuated some of the entrenchments, destroyed a great deal of ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for the timely arrival of Carlos D’España’s division, and the stand made by Picton at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.
Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, the smoke rose over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage of the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction by Berioplano along the road of Irurzun. The garrison thought deliverance sure, and having reaped a good harvest withdrew into the place. The bivouac fires of the French army cheered them during the night, and the next morning a fresh sally being made with the greatest confidence, a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of men. Several deserters from the foreign regiments in the English service also came over with intelligence exaggerated and coloured after the manner of such men, and the French re-entered the place elated with hope; but in the evening the sound of the conflict ceased and the silence of the next day shewed that the battle was not to the advantage of Soult. However the governor losing no time made another sally and again obtained provisions from the south side.