History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6

by William Francis Patrick Napier

The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, who had in Gallicia openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition and excited the people to resistance, was an object of prominent interest with an active section of the liberals called the Jacobins. And this section generally ruled the Cortez, because the Americanos leaned strongly towards their doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English, or French party, was to produce dissensions which could be best effected by supporting the most violent public men. A fierce and obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to submit for the time, but not until the dispute became so serious that lord Wellington when in the Pyrenees expected a civil war on his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would take part with the French. This notion which gives his measure for the patriotism of both parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had somewhat warped his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he imagined, the clergy of Gallicia, meeting with no solid support, submitted to the Cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to Portugal.

Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring of the English tories’ policy. Napoleon was warred against, not as they pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because he was the powerful and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges. The happiness and independence of the Peninsula were words without meaning in their state-papers and speeches, and their anger and mortification were extreme when they found success against the emperor had fostered that democracy it was their object to destroy. They were indeed only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity of their general, from interfering with the internal government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture wherein the Spaniards would have had all appearance of justice, must have ensued. This folly was however stifled by Wellington, who desired to wait until the blow could be given with some effect, and he was quite willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the Cortez, and that of the executive government which acted under its controul, was so injurious to Spain and to his military operations, and so unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortez and perfectly acquainted with the subject.

Speaking of the “Afrancesados” or French party, more numerous than was supposed and active to increase their numbers, he says, “The thingOriginal Letter, MSS. which they most enforced and which made most progress was the diminution of the English influence.” Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the Spanish constitution having brought the king’s authority under that of the Cortez was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers of England, were resolved that the Spanish constitution should not stand. To the Americans they observed that lord Wellington opposed them, because he did not help them and permitted expeditions to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they did not join their forces with Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots of all parties they said, that every concession to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers turn the army against the country and thus render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations were effectual because they flattered the national pride, as proving that the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves without the aid of foreigners. Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those victories came and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but many of their arguments were too well founded to be stifled with their party.

The change of government which had place in the beginning of the year, gave hope that the democratic violence of the Cortez would decline under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had married without the consent of the king, was from age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new regency became therefore more the slaves of the Cortez than their predecessors, and the Cadiz editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in falsehood and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled European brotherhood, being the champions of the Jacobins directed the populace of that city as they pleased. And always the serviles yielded under the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the commencement of the contest that murder was patriotism, and now their spirit sunk and quailed, because at every step to use the terribly significant expression of Wellington, “The ghost of Solano was staring them in the face.”

The principal points of the Jacobins’ policy in support of their crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation from the Deity, were, 1º. The abolition of the Inquisition, the arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, and the consequent warfare with the clergy. 2º. The putting aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. 3º. The appointment of captain-generals and other officers to suit their factious purposes. 4º. The obtaining of money for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of the armies. 5º. The control of the elections for a new Cortez so as to procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or to prevent its assembling at the legal period in October.

The matter of the bishops as we have seen nearly involved them in a national war with Portugal, and a civil war with Gallicia. The affair of the princess was less serious, but she had never ceased intriguing, and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British ministers and general while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather favoured by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the spread of democracy. Lord Wellington however still held aloof, observing that if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a slave to the Cortez than her predecessors, and England would have the discredit of giving power to the “worst woman in existence.”

To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz populace was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party, and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the general Cortez in September, had apparently given the executive government some freedom of action, and seemed to furnish a favourable opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal. The regency, dreading the epidemic, suddenly resolved to proceed to Madrid, telling sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. They had secretly formed this resolution at night and proposed to commence the journey next day, but a disturbance arose in the city and the alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary Cortez; the ministers were immediately called before it and bending in fear before their masters, declared with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting the Cortez. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed[Appendix, No. 2.] to inquire if there was any fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently to shield the regents, recommended that they should remove to Port St. Mary.

This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortez should be installed, and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of the first deputation, that the speech of Arguelles on presenting it was hissed from the galleries, although he was the most popular and eloquent member of the Cortez. The more moderate liberals thus discovered that they were equally with the serviles the slaves of the newspaper writers. Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom, though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington when he declared, that wherever the Cortez and government should fix themselves the press would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or Madrid, would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.

The composition of the new Cortez was naturally an object of hope and fear to all factions, and the result being uncertain, the existing assembly took such measures to prolong its own power that it was expected two Cortez would be established, the one at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However the new body after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November, and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For the general belief being, that no person could take the sickness twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from former visitations, the merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring that[Appendix, No. 2.] there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving the port, and endeavoured by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortez in the city.