CHAPTER II.
Soult having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to1813. November. leave part of his forces in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and with the remainder take a flanking position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the entrenched mountain of Ursouia, and his right on the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head of which would give him the power of making offensive movements. He could thus keep his troops together and restore their confidence, while he confined the allies to a small sterile district of France between the river and the sea, and rendered their situation very uneasy during the winter if they did not retire. However he soon modified this plan. The works of the Bayonne camp were not complete and his presence was necessary to urge their progress. The camp on the Ursouia mountain had been neglected contrary to his orders, and the bridge-head at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank. On the left it was indeed complete but constructed on a bad trace. Moreover he found that the Nive in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz below Cambo, and at many places above that point. Remaining therefore at Bayonne himself with six divisions and Villatte’s reserve, he sent D’Erlon with three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet neither D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army could have stopped lord Wellington at this time if other circumstances had permitted the latter to follow up his victory as he designed.
The hardships and privations endured on the mountains by the Anglo-Portuguese troops had been beneficial to them as an army. The fine air and the impossibility of the soldiers committing their usual excesses in drink had rendered them unusually healthy, while the facility of enforcing a strict discipline, and their natural impatience to win the fair plains spread out before them, had raised their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful degree. Danger was their sport, and their experienced general in the prime and vigour of life was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier of the Nive, suddenly manned by a beaten and dispirited army, could have long withstood the progress of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could have let their strength and fury loose in the first days succeeding the battle of the Nivelle France would have felt his conquering footsteps to her centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees is a deep clay, quite impassable after rain except by the royal road near the coast and that of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in the power of the French. On the bye-roads the infantry sunk to the mid leg, the cavalry above the horses’ knees, and even to the saddle-girths in some places. The artillery could not move at all. The rain had commenced on the 11th, the mist in the early part of the 12th had given Soult time to regain his camp and secure the high road to St. Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily gained their proper posts on the Nive, while his adversary fixed in the swamps could only make the ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo already noticed.
Wellington uneasy for his right flank while the French commanded the Cambo passage across the Nive directed general Hill to menace it again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to preserve the bridge-head on the right bank in any circumstances, but he was permitted to abandon the work on the left bank in the event of a general attack; however at Hill’s approach the officer placed there in command destroyed all the works and the bridge itself. This was a great cross to Soult, and the allies’ flank being thus secured they were put into cantonments to avoid the rain, which fell heavily. The bad weather was however not the only obstacle to the English general’s operations. On the very day of the battle Freyre’s and Longa’s soldiers entering Ascain pillaged it and murdered several persons; the next day the whole of the Spanish troops continued these excesses in various places, and on the right Mina’s battalions, some of whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a plundering and murdering incursion from the mountains towards Hellette. The Portuguese and British soldiers of the left wing had commenced the like outrages and two French persons were killed in one town, however the adjutant-general Pakenham arriving at the moment saw and instantly put the perpetrators to death thus nipping this wickedness in the bud, but at his own risk for legally he had not that power. This general whose generosity humanity and chivalric spirit excited the admiration of every honourable person who approached him, is the man who afterwards fell at New Orleans and who has been so foully traduced by American writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage has been with astounding falsehood represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous excesses. But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery while they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn with loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected?
Terrified by these excesses the French people fled even from the larger towns, but Wellington quickly relieved their terror. On the 12th, although expecting a battle, he put to death all the Spanish marauders he could take in the act, and then with many reproaches and despite of the discontent of their generals, forced the whole to withdraw into their own country. He disarmed the insubordinate battalions under Mina, quartered Giron’s Andalusians in the Bastan where O’Donnel resumed the command; sent Freyre’s Gallicians to the district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa over the Ebro. Morillo’s division alone remained with the army. These decisive proceedings marking the lofty character of the man proved not less politic than resolute. The French people immediately returned, and finding the strictest discipline preserved and all things paid for adopted an amicable intercourse with the invaders. However the loss of such a mass of troops and the effects of weather on the roads reduced the army for the moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters were suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the troops were established in permanent cantonments with the following line of battle.
The left wing occupied a broad ridge on bothPlan 7. sides of the great road beyond Bidart, the principal post being at a mansion belonging to the mayor of Biaritz. The front was covered by a small stream spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks between which the road was conducted. The centre posted partly on the continuation of this ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of San Barbe, extended by Arrauntz to Ustaritz, the right being thrown back to face count D’Erlon’s position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From this position which might stretch about six miles on the front and eight miles on the flank, strong picquets were pushed forwards to several points, and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns behind as far back as Espelette, Suraide, Ainhoa, San Pé, Sarre, and Ascain. One regiment of Vandeleur’s cavalry was with the advanced post on the left, the remainder were sent to Andaya and Urogne, Victor Alten’s horsemen were about San Pé, and the heavy cavalry remained in Spain.
In this state of affairs the establishment of the different posts in front led to several skirmishes. In one on the 18th, general John Wilson and general Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains, near the junction of the Ustaritz and San Pé roads, and though attacked in force the next day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious action occurred on the 23d in front of Arcangues. This village held by the picquets of the light division was two or three miles in front of Arbonne where the nearest support was cantoned. It is built on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge, and the sentries of both armies were so close that the reliefs and patroles actually passed each other in their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it suited either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington visited this post and the field-officer on duty made known to him its disadvantages, and the means of remedying them by taking entire possession of the village, pushing picquets along the horns of the crescent, and establishing a chain of posts across the valley between them. He appeared satisfied with this project, and two days afterwards the forty-third and some of the riflemen were employed to effect it, the greatest part of the division being brought up in support. The French after a few shots abandoned Arcangues, Bussussary, and both horns of the crescent, retiring before the picquets to a large fortified house situated at the mouth of the valley. The project suggested by the field-officer was thus executed with the loss of only five men wounded and the action should have ceased, but the picquets of the forty-third suddenly received orders to attack the fortified house, and the columns of support were shewn at several points of the semicircle; the French then conceiving they were going to be seriously assailed reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish ensued and the picquets were finally withdrawn to the ground they had originally gained and beyond which they should never have been pushed. This ill-managed affair cost eighty-eight men and officers of which eighty were of the forty-third.
Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and cavalry, the former consisting of nearly one hundred field-pieces and the latter furnishing more than eight thousand six hundred sabres, were paralysedOriginal Morning States, MSS. in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious to pass the Nive, but the rain which continued to fall baffled him, and meanwhile Mina’s Spaniards descending once more from the Alduides to plunder Baigorry were beaten by the national guards of that valley. However early in December the weatherDecember. amended, forty or fifty pieces of artillery were brought up, and other preparations made to surprize or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo and Ustaritz. And as this operation led to sanguinary battles it is fitting first to describe the exact position of the French.
Bayonne situated at the confluence of the NivePlans 7 and 8. and the Adour commands the passage of both. A weak fortress of the third order its importance was in its position, and its entrenched camp, exceedingly strong and commanded by the fortress could not be safely attacked in front, wherefore Soult kept only six divisions there. His right composed of Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve touched on the Lower Adour where there was a flotilla of gun-boats. It was covered by a swamp and artificial inundation, through which the royal road led to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well entrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on this causeway. His left under Clauzel, composed of three divisions, extended from Anglet to the Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly by the large fortified house which the light division assailed on the 23d, partly by an inundation spreading below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus entrenched the fortified outposts may be called the front of battle, the entrenched camp the second line, and the fortress the citadel. The country in front a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with small wood and farm-houses, was very difficult to move in.
Beyond the Nive the entrenched camp stretching from that river to the Adour was called the front of Mousseroles. It was in the keeping of D’Erlon’s four divisions, which were also extended up the right bank of the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac’s troops was in front of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged the line to Cambo. The remainder of D’Erlon’s corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights about two miles in front of Mousseroles, the right at Villefranque on the Nive, the left at Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D’Erlon’s communications with the rest of the army were double, one circuitous through Bayonne, the other direct by a bridge of boats thrown above that place.