If Hill had not observed the French passing their bridge on the evening of the 12th, and their bivouac fires in the night, Barnes’s brigade, with which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray, and Soult could not have been stopped. But the French general could only bring five divisions into action, and those only in succession, so that in fact three divisions or about sixteen thousand men with twenty-two guns actually fought the battle. Foy’s and Maransin’s troops did not engage until after the crisis had passed. On the other hand the proceedings of colonel Peacocke of the seventy-first, and colonel Bunbury of the third, for which they were both obliged to quit the service, forced general Hill to carry his reserve away from the decisive point at that critical period which always occurs in a well-disputed field and which every great general watches for with the utmost anxiety. This was no error, it was a necessity, and the superior military quality of the British troops rendered it successful.
The French officer who rode at the head of the second attacking column might be a brave man, doubtless he was; he might be an able man, but he had not the instinct of a general. On his right flank indeed Hill’s vigorous counter-attack was successful, but the battle was to be won in the centre; his column was heavy, undismayed, and only one weak battalion, the ninety-second, was before it; a short exhortation, a decided gesture, a daring example, and it would have overborne the small body in its front, Foy’s, Maransin’s, and the half of D’Armagnac’s divisions would then have followed in the path thus marked out. Instead of this he weighed chances and retreated. How different was the conduct of the British generals, two of whom and nearly all their staff fell at this point, resolute not to yield a step at such a critical period; how desperately did the fiftieth andPublished Memoir by Captain Pringle of the Royal Engineers. Portuguese fight to give time for the ninety-second to rally and reform behind St. Pierre; how gloriously did that regiment come forth again to charge with their colours flying and their national music playing as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man who in that moment and immediately after a repulse thought of such military pomp was by nature a soldier.
I have said that sir Rowland Hill’s employment of his reserve was no error, it was indeed worthy of all praise. From the commanding mount on which he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the two colonels would cause the loss of his position more surely than any direct attack upon it, and with a promptness and decision truly military he descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier as well as the general, rallying the seventy-first and leading the reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with a noble and well-placed confidence to the courage of the ninety-second and the fiftieth to sustain the fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth division was then close at hand and that the battle might be fought over again, but like a thorough soldier he was resolved to win his own fight with his own troops if he could. And he did so after a manner that in less eventful times would have rendered him the hero of a nation.
CHAPTER III.
To understand all the importance of the battle of1813. December. St. Pierre, the nature of the country and the relative positions of the opposing generals before and after that action must be considered. Bayonne although a mean fortress in itself was at this period truly designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France. Covered by its entrenched camp, which the inundations and the deep country rendered impregnable while there was an army to defend it, this place could not be assailed until that army was drawn away, and it was obviously impossible to pass it and leave the enemy to act upon the communications with Spain and the sea-coast. To force the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore lord Wellington’s object, and his first step was the passage of the Nive; he thus cut Soult’s direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained an intercourse with the malcontents in France, opened a large tract of fertile country for his cavalry, and menaced the navigation of the Adour so as to render it difficult for the French general to receive supplies. This was however but a first step, because the country beyond the Nive was still the same deep clayey soil with bad roads; and it was traversed by many rivers more or less considerable, which flooding with every shower in the mountains, formed in their concentric courses towards the Adour a number of successive barriers, behind which Soult could maintain himself on lord Wellington’s right and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de Port. He could thus still hem in the allies as before; upon a more extended scale however and with less effect, for he was thrown more on the defensive, his line was now the longest, and his adversary possessed the central position.
On the other hand, Wellington could not, in that deep impracticable country, carry on the wide operations necessary to pass the rivers on his right, and render the French position at Bayonne untenable, until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter of 1813 was peculiarly wet and inclement.
From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish their own armies and circumvent their adversaries in that respect were the objects of both generals, Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain, Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely, or so reduce his force in the entrenched camp that the works might be stormed. The French general’s recent losses forbad him to maintain his extended positions except during the wet season; three days’ fine weather made him tremble; and the works of his camp were still too unfinished to leave a small force there. The difficulty of the roads and want of military transport threw his army almost entirely upon water-carriage for subsistence, and his great magazines were therefore established at Dax on the Adour, and at Peyrehorade on the Gave of Pau, the latter being about twenty-four miles from Bayonne. These places he fortified to resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation of the Adour below that point, especially at Urt, the stream being confined there, could be interrupted by the allies who were now on the left bank. To remedy this Soult ordered Foy to pass the Adour at Urt and construct a bridge with a head of works, but the movement was foreseen by Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force, recrossed the river. The navigation was then carried on at night by stealth, or guarded by the French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the supply would have been quite unequal to the demand if the French coasting trade, now revived between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted by the navy, but lord Wellington’s representations on this head were still unheeded.
Soult was embarrassed by Foy’s failure at Urt. He reinforced him with Boyer’s and D’Armagnac’s divisions, which were extended to the Port de Lannes; then leaving Reille with four divisions to guard the entrenched camp and to finish the works, he completed the garrison of Bayonne and transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade. Clauzel with two divisions of infantry and the light cavalry now took post on the Bidouze, being supported with Trielhard’s heavy dragoons, and having his left in communication with Paris and with St. Jean Pied de Port where there was a garrison of eighteen hundred men besides national guards. He soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse or Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to fall into the Adour near Urt, and he also occupied Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the Bastide de Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at Peyrehorade, Hastingues was fortified on the Gave de Pau, Guiche, Bidache and Came, on the Bidouze, and the works of Navarens were augmented. In fine Soult with equal activity and intelligence profited from the rain which stopped the allies’ operations in that deep country.
Lord Wellington also made some changes of position. Having increased his works at Barrouilhet he was enabled to shift some of Hope’s troops towards Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the heights of Villefranque, which permitted general Hill to extend his right up the Adour to Urt. The third division was posted near Urcuray, the light cavalry on the Joyeuse facing Clauzel’s outposts, and a chain of telegraphs was established from the right of the Nive by the hill of San Barbe to St. Jean de Luz. Freyre’s Gallicians were placed in reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to Itzassu where supported by the Andalusian division and by Freyre, he guarded the valley of the Upper Nive and watched general Paris beyond the Ursouia mountain. Such was the state of affairs in1814. January. the beginning of January, but some minor actions happened before these arrangements were completed.