Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet’s signature, and the former addressed letters in cypher to the governors of Tortoza, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, telling them that the emperor in consequence of his reverses required large drafts of men from Catalonia, and had given Suchet orders to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons south of the Llobregat were to join the army with arms and baggage and followers. The result was uncertain, but if the treaty could not be effected the governors were to join the army by force, and they were therefore immediately to mine their principal bastions and be prepared to sally forth at an appointed time. The marches and points of junction were all given in detail, yet they were told that if the convention took place the marshal would immediately send an officer of his staff to them, with such verbal instructions as might be necessary. The document finished with deploring the necessity which called for the sacrifice of conquests achieved by the valour of the troops.
Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are common in all wars, but in the Peninsula so many pretended to serve the French and were yet true to the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of placing a very small piece of light-coloured hair in the cyphered paper, the latter was then enclosed in a quill sealed and wrapped in lead. When received, the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper and if the hair was discovered the communication was good, if not, the treachery was apparent because the hair would escape the vigilance of uninitiated persons and be lost by any intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned after delivering the preparatory communication, he proceeded in person with a forged convention, first to Tortoza, for Suchet has erroneously stated in his Memoirs that the primary attempts were made at Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by several Spanish officers and by some French deserters dressed in the uniforms of the hussars he had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The governor Robert though a vigilant officer was deceived and prepared to evacuate the place. During the night however a true emissary arrived with a letter from Suchet of later date than the forged convention. Robert then endeavoured to entice Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was too wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and Lerida where he completely overreached the governors and then went to Monzon.
This small fortress had now been besieged since the 28th of September 1813, by detachments from the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. Its means of defence were slight, but there was within a man of resolution and genius called St. Jacques. He was a Piedmontese by birth and only a private soldier of engineers, but the commandant appreciating his worth was so modest and prudent as to yield the direction of the defence entirely to him. Abounding in resources, he met, and at every point baffled the besiegers who worked principally by mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious always led the numerous counter-attacks which he contrived to check the approaches above and below ground. The siege continued until the 18th of February when the subtle Van Halen arrived, and by his Spanish wiles obtained in a few hours what Spanish courage and perseverance had vainly strived to gain for one hundred and forty days. The commandant was suspicious at first, but when Van Halen suffered him to send an officer to ascertain that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, he was beguiled like the others and marched to join the garrisons of those places.
Sir William Clinton had been informed of this project by Eroles as early as the 22d of January and though he did not expect any French general would be so egregiously misled, readily promised the assistance of his army to capture the garrisons on their march. But Suchet was now falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing the fortified line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain of Suchet’s real strength and designs, renewed his former proposal to Copons for a combined attack which should force the French general to discover his real situation and projects. Ere he could obtain an answer, the want of forage obliged him to refuse the assistance of the Spanish cavalry lent to him by Elio, and Sarzfield’s division was reduced to its last ration. The French thus made their retreat unmolested, for Clinton’s project necessarily involved the investment of Barcelona after passing the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry, being mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest part of which were foundered or unserviceable from sand-cracks, a disease very common amongst the horses of that country, were too weak to act without the aid of Elio’s horsemen. Moreover as a division of infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the effect of Van Halen’s wiles against Tortoza the aid of Sarzfield’s troops was indispensable.
Copons accepted the proposition towards the end of the month, the Spanish cavalry was then gone to the rear, but Sarzfield having with great difficulty obtained some provisions the army wasFebruary. put in movement on the 3d of February, and as Suchet was now near Gerona, it passed the Llobregat at the bridge of Molino del Rey without resistance. On the 5th Sarzfield’s picquets were vigorously attacked at San Filieu by the garrison of Barcelona, he however supported them with his whole division and being reinforced with some cavalry repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. On the 7th the city was invested on the land side by Copons who was soon aided by Manso; on the sea-board by admiral Hallowell, who following the movements of the army with the fleet blockaded the harbour with the Castor frigate, and anchored the Fame a seventy-four off Mataro. On the 8th intelligence arrived of Van Halen’s failure at Tortoza, but the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted until the 16th when Clinton was informed by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march upon Igualada, and Eroles who, under pretence of causing the convention to be observed by the Somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to undeceive and disarm them at that place. On the 17th however he sent notice that Martorel had been fixed upon in preference to Igualada for undeceiving and disarming the French, and as they would be at the former place that evening general Clinton was desired to send some of his troops there to ensure the success of the project.
This change of plan and the short warning, for Martorel was a long march from Barcelona, together with the doubts and embarrassments which Copons’ conduct always caused, inclined the English general to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet fearing that it would fail in the Spaniard’s hands he finally drafted a strong division of troops and marched in person to Martorel. There he met Copons who now told him that the French would not pass Esparaguera that night, that Eroles was close in their rear, and another division of the Catalan army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel. Clinton immediately undertook to pass the Llobregat, meet the French column, and block the road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons the necessary precautions and signals.
About nine o’clock general Isidore La Marque arrived with the garrisons at Martorel, followed at a short distance by Eroles. No other troops were to be seen and after a short halt the French continued their march on the right bank of the Llobregat, where the Barcelona road enters a narrow pass between the river and a precipitous hill. When they were completely entangled Clinton sent an officer to forbid their further progress and referred them to Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation, then giving the signal all the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. It was in vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having two thousand six hundred men, four guns, and a rich military chest, capitulated, but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The odium of this baseness which was quite gratuitous, since the French helpless in the defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle in any manner with the convention, he had not been a party to Van Halen’s deceit, he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the field which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid, he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the capitulation, and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in Suchet’s Memoirs no appeal on the subject from that marshal ever reached him.
During the whole of these transactions the infatuation of the French leaders was extreme. The chief of one of the battalions more sagacious than his general told Lamarque in the night of the 16th at Igualada that he was betrayed, at the same time urging him vainly to abandon his artillery and baggage and march in the direction of Vich, to which place they could force their way in despite of the Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert when he had detected the imposture and failed to entice Van Halen into Tortoza did not make a sudden sally upon him and the Spanish officers who were with him, all close to the works. And still more notable is it that the other governors, the more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, did not insist upon the bearer of such a convention remaining to accompany their march. It has been well observed by Suchet that Van Halen’s refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to prove his treachery.
The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved into France, and in March was followed by a second column of equal force which was at first directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of lord Wellington’s troops on the Garonne caused, as we shall hereafter find, a change in its destination. Meanwhile by order of the minister at war Suchet entered into a fresh negociation with Copons, to deliver up all the fortresses held by his troops except Figueras and Rosas, provided the garrisons were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish commander assented and the authorities generally were anxious to adopt the proposal, but the regency referred the matter to lord Wellington who rejected it without hesitation, as tending to increase the force immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached at all points, Suchet destroyed the works of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and Palamos, dismantled Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces at Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though he still had twelve thousand veterans besides the national guards and depôts of the French departments, he continued most obstinately to refuse any aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The blockade of Barcelona was therefore maintained by the allies without difficulty or danger save what arose from their commissariat embarrassments and the efforts of the garrison.
On the 23d of February Habert made a sally with six battalions, thinking to surprize Sarzfield, he was however beaten, and colonel Meder the Nassau officer who had before shewn his attachment to the French cause was killed. The blockadeMarch. was thus continued until the 12th of March when Clinton received orders from lord Wellington to break up his army, send the foreign troops to lord William Bentinck in Sicily, and march with the British battalions by Tudela to join the great army in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey but Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared to be provoking a collision though he was quite unable to oppose the French in the field; and to maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition, after the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite impossible. The latter therefore remained and on the 19th of March king Ferdinand reached the French frontier.