Now ‘rideau’ can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a steppe or a ridge; but, in this case, it could not mean a steppe, since the Spanish army was hidden behind it, and on a steppe it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a high ridge, because it not only perfectly commanded the basin of the Guadiana, overlooking the steppe which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. What is my description of the ground?—‘The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge of land, mark, reader, not a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance.’ Here then we have another measure of value for the reviewer’s topographical pretensions.
The reference to French military reports and registers has not been so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register of general Heudelet, which register was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession the general report and register of Soult’s army, which enables me to show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses me of painting the wretched state of Soult’s army at St. Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult’s own account, and the account of Le Noble, historian of the campaign, and ordonnateur en chef or comptroller of the civil administration of the army.
Extract from Soult’s Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809.
‘Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted, the shattered and exhausted state (“delabrement et epuisement”) of the “corps d’armée,” and the insufficiency of the means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was necessary to obey.’... ‘The march was directed upon St. Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give them since they quitted the Carion River in Castile.’... ‘Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod; the parc which since the Carion had not been seen now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña), together with various detachments that the previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end of February because he could not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were connected with the duke of Belluno’s, &c. &c., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties.’
Extract from Le Noble’s History.
‘The army was without money, without provision, without clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country.’
Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected from a writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have celebrated marshal Soult for the reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without one word of praise towards the French marshal.
To return to general Heudelet’s register. The first notable discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action described by me as happening on the 17th of February at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spaniards’ position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he contradicts. Now this is only the old story of ‘the big book which contains all that sir George does not know.’ For, first, Heudelet’s register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th February, the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer’s other objections. And I request the reader, both now and always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.
Extract from Soult’s General Report.
‘The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach of La Romana’s corps, organized itself in the province of Orense.