‘I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed 8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted with the exact extent of it, because, the Duque del Albuquerque, who is appointed to command it, is interested in making known the truth; but they have lied about the cavalry ordered to the Duque del Parque.’
‘It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at Seville with their own false intelligence.’
‘It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops.’
1810. ‘We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably after it is made.’
‘I have had accounts from the marquis de la Romana: he tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, which cannot be true.’
‘I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at Madrid.’
‘There is so far a foundation for the report of O’Donnel’s action, as that it appears that Suchet’s advanced guard was at Lerida on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, according to my experience of Spanish reports, whether O’Donnel was beaten or gained a victory.’
‘I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the marquis de la Romana, and all the Spanish officers. It is obvious there is nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations. This is evident both from the letters of the marquis himself, and from the false reports made to lieutenant Heathcote of the firing heard from Badajos at Albuquerque.’
Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartaxo.
‘The circumstances which I have related above will show your Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with a corps so ill-organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions no reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabal received of the assembling of the enemy’s troops at Seville was from hence.’