“We do not,” said that officer, “exceed nine or ten thousand men, extended on different points of a line running from the neighbourhood of Reus along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without subordination, without clothing, without artillery, without ammunition, without magazines, without money, and without means of transport!”
Copons himself, when he came down to the Campo, very frankly told Murray, that as his troops could only fight in position, he would not join in any operation which endangered his retreat into the high mountains. However, with the exception of twelve hundred men left at Vich under Eroles, all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain, were now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept the communications of the different French corps, and to harass their marches if they should descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid him in pushing on the works of the siege, or in a battle near the shore; and he expected three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, had promised to divert the attention of the French troops by a descent eastward of Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and Elio were to make a like diversion westward of Tortoza. Finally, a general rising of the Somatenes might have been effected, and those mountaineers were all at Murray’s disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the enemy’s approach, or to impede his march by breaking up the roads.
On the French side there was greater but more scattered power. Suchet had marched with nine thousand men from Valencia, and what with Pannetier’s brigade and some spare troops from Tortoza, eleven or twelve thousand men with artillery, might have come to the succour of Taragona from that side, if the sudden fall of San Felippe de Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on the westward. A movement by Mora, Falcet, and Momblanch, remained open, yet it would have been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida were few. To the eastward therefore the garrison looked for the first succour. Maurice Mathieu, reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia, could bring seven thousand men with artillery from Barcelona, and Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, hence twenty-five thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army.
But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had more than one hundred and sixty miles to march; Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places and march seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all, until Taragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should reimbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdam, and he was one hundred and thirty miles distant. Wherefore, however active the French generals might be, the English general could calculate upon ten days’ clear operations, after investment, before even the heads of the enemy’s columns, coming from different quarters, could issue from the hills bordering the Campo.
Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet would endeavour to cripple Del Parque, before he marched to the succour of Taragona; and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward, the royal causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron. The experience of captain Codrington during the first siege of Taragona, had proved indeed, that an army could not be stopped by this fire, yet it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus, the advantage of a central position, the possession of the enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement, the good will of the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions, belonged to Murray; superior numbers and a better army to the French, since the allies, brave, and formidable to fight in a position, were not well constituted for general operations.
Taragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, without ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed, nor even repaired until after the investment, and the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary rules should have been set aside and daring operations adopted. Lord Wellington[Appendix, No. 6.] had judged ten thousand men sufficient to take Taragona. Murray brought seventeen thousand, of which fourteen thousand were effective. To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments, stores, and means of land transport, that his army could not move from the shipping; he was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort Royal was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer was unprepared to profit from a successful assault.
This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was not however borne out by facts. The equipments left behind, were only draft animals and commissariat field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the general, and this was made manifest in various ways. Copons, like all regular Spanish officers, was averse to calling out the Somatenes, and Murray did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felippe de Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form, and without sufficient means; for if captain Peyton had not brought up the mortars, which was an afterthought, extraneous to the general’s arrangements, the fort could not have been reduced before succour arrived from Tortoza. Indeed the surrender was scarcely creditable to the French commandant, for his works were uninjured, and only a small part of his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe truly, that one of the officers employed to regulate the capitulation had in his pocket, an order from Murray to raise the siege and embark, spiking the guns! At Taragona, the troops on the low ground, did not approach so near, by three hundred yards, as they might have done; and the outworks should have been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed Fort Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco was a good outwork and complete. The outworks of Taragona were incomplete, ill-flanked, without palisades or casements, and their fall would have enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the body of the place as Suchet had done in the former siege; a few hours’ firing would then have brought down the wall and a general assault might have been delivered. The French had stormed a similar breach in that front, although defended by eight thousand Spanish troops, and the allies opposed by only sixteen hundred French and Italians, soldiers and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour to follow that example, since colonel Skerrett, at the former siege, refused to commit twelve hundred British troops in the place, on the special ground that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned. Murray’s troops were brave, they had been acting together for nearly a year; and after the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicant, was ready to go over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was not shared by their general. Even at the moment of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a second time, to relinquish the position of Castalla and retire to Alicant!
It is clear, that, up to the 8th, sir John Murray’s proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations, were more injudicious.
As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet reach Tortoza, and had put two thousand French in movement from Lerida. Murray then openly avowed his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet he proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls in observation of the Lerida road, and desired Manso to watch that of Barcelona.
On the 9th his emissaries said the French were coming from the east, and from the west; and would, when united, exceed twenty thousand. Murray immediately sought an interview with the admiral, declaring his intention to raise the siege; his views were changed during the conference but he was discontented; and the two commanders were now evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused to join in a summons to the governor, and his flotilla again bombarded the place.