In the night an officer came with intelligence, that Decaen’s attack had been relinquished in consequence of Suchet’s orders to move to the Llobregat, and it then appeared that a previous despatch had been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force to the amount of six or seven thousand combatants was upon Lamarque’s hands, and the firing heard at Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington’s victories in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The Spaniards followed at daylight, and Lamarque getting entangled in difficult ground near Salud was forced to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, all his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred men and was upon the point of destruction, when general Beurmann came to his succour with four fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally defeated with great loss. After this vigorous action Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate divisions, approached lord William Bentinck.
The allies having thus passed the Ebro several officers of both nations conceived the siege of Tortoza would be the best operation. Nearly forty thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa’s, Copons’, Del Parque’s, Whittingham’s, some of Elio’s forces and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for the siege, and the defiles of the mountains on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to resist Suchet’s attempts to succour the place on that side, and force him to move by the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington also leaned towards this operation, but lord William Bentinck resolved to push at once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack upon Barcelona; certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch as Suchet awaited his approach with an army every way superior. It does not however follow that to besiege Tortoza would have been advisable, for though the battering train, much larger than Murray’s losses gave reason at first to expect, was equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege of such a fortress was a great undertaking. The vicinity was unhealthy and it would have been difficult to feed the Spanish troops. They were quite inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, not sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the allies engaged in such a difficult operation might have marched at once to Aragon.
It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this time misled, partly by the reports of the Catalans, partly by lord Wellington’s great successes, into a belief that the French were going to abandon Catalonia. His mind also ran upon Italian affairs, and he did not perceive that Suchet judiciously posted and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen was in fact much stronger than all the allies united. The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numberedImperial Muster-rolls. sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven thousand, including Paris’ division then at Jaca, were in garrison, five thousand were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were not principals, they were accessories. They were to keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the allies in Navarre and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was this lord Wellington’s view, that the duke Del Parque’s army was to make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should either move himself or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William after passing the Ebro could have secured the defiles of the mountains with his own and Villa Campa’s troops, that is to say, with twenty thousand men including Whittingham’s division. He could have insulted the garrison of Tortoza, and commenced the making of gabions and fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects while he awaited the junction of del Parque’s, Copons’, and the rest of Elio’s troops. Thus forty thousand men, three thousand being cavalry and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still leaving a detachment to watch Tortoza. If Suchet then came to the succour of Taragona the allies superior in numbers could have fought in a position chosen beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all these corps would, or could have kept together.
Lord William Bentinck’s operations were headlong. He had prepared platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th quitting the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with less than six thousand men, occupying ground three hundred yards nearer to the walls the first day than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because of Suchet’s vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque’s army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day’s march. However Whittingham’s division and the cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army. Copons then promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield’s division now belonging to the second army arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it with three additional battalions while Villa Campa observed Tortoza. Meanwhile lord William seeing that Suchet’s troops were scattered and the marshal himself at Barcelona, thought of surprizing his posts and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but Elio sent no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the English general and Eroles, was slow, the garrison of Tortoza burned the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly returned from Barcelona and concentrated his army.
Up to this time the Spaniards giving copious but false information to lord William, and no information at all to Suchet, had induced a series of faults on both sides balancing each other, a circumstance not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman thinking his enemy retreating had pressed rashly forward. The Frenchman deeming from the other’s boldness the whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself too weak, and awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have seen by the combined operations of the Catalan army and the English fleet.
In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new andAugust. important successes gained in Navarre by lord Wellington, one of his Italian battalions was at the same time cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and lord William Bentinck took a position of battle beyond the Gaya. His left, composed of Whittingham’s division, occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra, and Col de Christina, his right covered the great coast-road. These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach, but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham thought himself too weak to defend the passes alone; hence, when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, finally advanced, lord William who had landed neither guns nor stores decided to refuse battle. For such a resolute officer, this must have been a painful decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting men, including a thousand marines which had been landed to join the advanced guard at Altafalla; he had assumed the offensive, invested Taragona where the military honour of England had suffered twice before, in fine provoked the action which he now declined. But Suchet had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much must have been left to the general officers at different points; Del Parque’s was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however manifest, for though he expected the enemy on the 9th he did not send his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which Decaen reached Villa Franca.
The French general dreading the fire of the fleet endeavoured by false attacks on the coast road to draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army, and those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his Memoirs state because of these demonstrations, but because lord William had previously determined to retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded, he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus turning the allies, but he had lost time and the latter were in full retreat towards the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills. The march of the former was covered by lord Frederick Bentinck who leading the British and German cavalry defeated the fourth French hussars with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that either general Habert or Harispe was taken but escaped in the confusion.
The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham’s division now entrenched themselves near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his own and Sarzfield’s troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison fell upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some loss was sustained. Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed by the remembrance of Castalla than by his recent success, would not again prove the courage of the British troops on a mountain position. Contrary to the wishes of his army he returned to Taragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the extreme hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and difficult matter: then resuming his old positions about Villa Franca and on the Llobregat he sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated lord William Bentinck’s first effort and the general result was favourable. He had risked much on insufficient grounds, yet his enemy made no profit and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.
It is strange that this renowned French general suffered his large force to be thus paralyzed at such a crisis. Above twenty-seven thousand of his soldiers if we include the isolated division of ParisImperial Muster-rolls, MSS. were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand remained with which he marched to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided in Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon before the end of July lord Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be feared? That lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one of his fortresses? If the French were successful in Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, it was not certain that any would have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia; but to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage roads was chimerical. Success in Navarre would have made an invasion by sea pass as a partizan descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet’s troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall however be treated more largely in another place, it is sufficient to observe here, that Clarke the minister of war, a man without genius or attachment to the emperor’s cause, discouraged any great combined plan of action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense operations did not interpose.
Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortoza wished lord Wellington to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army; but this the situation of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortoza was an undertaking beyond his own means. Elio when desired to gather provisions and assist in the operations demanded three weeks for preparation; all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche’s division, blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia was on half rations; and the siege of Tortoza was necessarily relinquished, because no great or sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals and such armies. Suchet’s fear of them was an illustration of Napoleon’s maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies.