Soult however overrated the force opposed to him, supposing it to consist of two British divisions,Official Despatch to the Minister of war, MSS. besides Byng’s brigade and Morillo’s Spaniards. He was probably deceived by the wounded men, who hastily questioned on the field would declare they belonged to the second and fourth divisions, because Byng’s brigade was part of the former; but that general and the Spaniards had without aid sustained Soult’s first efforts, and even when the fourth division came up, less than eleven thousand men, exclusive of sergeants and officers, were present in the fight. Campbell’s Portuguese never entered the line at all, the remainder of the second division was in the Bastan, and the third division was at Olague in the valley of Lanz.
On the 26th the French general put Clauzel’s wing on the track of Cole, and ordered Reille to follow the crest of the mountains and seize the passes leading from the Bastan in Hill’s rear while D’Erlon pressed him in front. That general would thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown on the side of San Estevan; D’Erlon could then reach his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the right descended the valley of Lanz and prevented Picton quitting it to aid Cole. A retreat by those generals and on separate lines would thus be inevitable, and the French army could issue forth in a compact order of battle from the mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna.
COMBAT OF LINZOAIN.
All the columns were in movement at day-break, but every hour brought its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille’s guides, bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests, and at ten o’clock having no other resource he marched down the pass of Mendichuri upon Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and artillery following Clauzel’s divisions. Meanwhile Soult, although retarded also by the fog and the difficulties of the ground, overtook Cole’s rear-guard in front of Viscayret. The leading troops struck hotly upon some British light companies incorporated under the command of colonel Wilson of the forty-eighth, and a French squadron passing round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson facing about, drove off these horsemen and thus fighting, Cole, about two o’clock, reached the heights of Linzoain a mile beyond Viscayret, where general Picton met him with intelligence that Campbell had reached Eugui from the Alduides, and that the third division having crossed the hills from Olague was at Zubiri. The junction of all these troops was thus secured, the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and neither wounded men nor baggage had been left behind. However the French gathered in front and at four o’clock seized some heights on the allies’ left which endangered their position, wherefore again falling back a mile, Cole offered battle on the ridge separating the valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri. During this skirmish Campbell coming from Eugui shewed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton’s troops were still at Zubiri, and there was light for an action. Soult however disturbed with intelligence received from D’Erlon, and perhaps doubtful what Campbell’s troops might be, put off the attack until next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was effected.
This delay on the part of the French general seems injudicious. Cole was alone for five hours. Every action, by increasing the number of wounded men and creating confusion in the rear, would have augmented the difficulties of the retreat; and the troops were fatigued with incessant fighting and marching for two days and one night. Moreover the alteration of Reille’s march, occasioned by the fog, had reduced the chances dependant on the primary combinations to the operations of D’Erlon’s corps, but the evening reports brought the mortifying conviction that he also had gone wrong, and by rough fighting only could Soult now attain his object. It is said that his expressions discoveredEdouard de LaPene Campagne 1813, 1814. a secret anticipation of failure, if so, his temper was too stedfast to yield for he gave the signal to march the next day, and more strongly renewed his orders to D’Erlon whose operations must now be noticed.
That general had three divisions of infantry, furnishing twenty-one thousand men of which about eighteen thousand were combatants. Early on the morning of the 25th he assembled two of them behind some heights near the passes of Maya, having caused the national guards of Baygorry to make previous demonstrations towards the passes of Arriette, Yspeguy, and Lorietta. No change had been made in the disposition of general Hill’s force, but general Stewart, deceived by the movements of the national guards, looked towards Sylveira’s posts on the right rather than to his own front; his division, consisting of two British brigades, was consequently neither posted as it should be nor otherwise prepared for an attack. The ground to be defended was indeed very strong, but however rugged a mountain position may be, if it is too extensive for the troops or those troops are not disposed with judgment, the very inequalities constituting its defensive strength become advantageous to an assailant.
There were three passes to defend. Aretesque on the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the left, and from these entrances two ways led to Elisondo in parallel directions; one down the valley through the town of Maya, receiving in its course the Erazu road; the other along the Atchiola mountain. General Pringle’s brigade was charged to defend the Aretesque, and colonel Cameron’s brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was broad on the summit, about three miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another; those on the right blending with the Goramendi mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola, near the summit of which the eighty-second regiment belonging to the seventh division was posted.
Cameron’s brigade, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops coming from Urdax; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one mile in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette. This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the daytime save by some Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the next guard was an infantry piquet posted on that slope of the Col which fronted the great hill. Behind this piquet of eighty men there was no immediate support, but four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope which was more rugged and difficult of access than that towards the enemy. The rest of general Pringle’s brigade was disposed at various distances from two to three miles in the rear, and the signal for assembling on the position was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments furnishing more than three thousand fighting men, half only were in line of battle, and those chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide open and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and their general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the real state of affairs, was at Elisondo when about mid-day D’Erlon commenced the battle.
COMBAT OF MAYA.
Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding the picquet at the Aretesque pass, was told by hisPlan 3. predecessor, that at dawn a glimpse had been obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills in front, some peasants also announced the approach of the French, and at nine o’clock major Thorne, a staff-officer, having patroled round the great hill in front of the pass discovered sufficient to make him order up the light companies to support the picquet. These companies had just formed on the ridge with their left at the rock of Aretesque, when D’Armagnac’s division coming from Espelette mounted the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and general Maransin with a third division advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass, meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the Atchiola mountain.