Second Shetland Truck System Report

by William Guthrie

The probabilities are that the fisherman will increase the debt year after year, for some years. Then the curer takes from him a sale-note of the boat and of his drift. The boat is beached, so as to preserve the curer's right to it. The nets are sent to his store. The generosity of the original transaction disappears. It is, of course, understood that the boat and nets may be redeemed; but in many cases interest is added to the debt year after year, the deal is always charged for the boat, and the fisherman loses about 20 per cent. of his earnings by the 'general terms.' The sense of failure operates injuriously on the man, perhaps makes him negligent. He finds the curer disinclined to increase the debt by an additional advance of money just when money is most necessary to him for subsistence, and things go on from bad to worse. At last his year of luck comes round. He fishes 100 or 120 crans, perhaps 200 crans. His debt is reduced so as to be fairly less than the value of the boat and drift. Then he may go on for another course of the same risk and indebtedness. But not unfrequently the curer at this juncture closes the transaction by retaining and appropriating the boat and drift, and dismissing the man. The appropriation is made not seldom without any valuation of the property, and the man is dismissed without discharge or balancing of the debt.

The disadvantages of this system to the fishermen are apparent, and are really very great. <First>, Responsibility for the whole expenses of the fishing is cast upon them, while really the boats and nets are the fishcurer's. <Second>, They are charged with the maintenance of these boats and nets, in effect to keep the curer's capital put into their hands as near to its original value as possible. <Third>, They pay interest in some cases, and not seldom an arbitrary profit on part of the capital in form of boat's deal. <Fourth>, They receive 20 per cent. less for their fish than free fishermen do.

The disadvantages of the fishermen are the advantages of the fish-curers. But these advantages are not wholly unmixed. The fish-curer has not only in the majority of cases to find the boats and nets, but to disburse all the charges of the fishing where the proceeds of the catch are insufficient to do it, and 'to keep on' the fishermen by advances for their food and rents. Thus the aggregate of the debts is a continual strain on the curer's capital, and payment is as uncertain as the chances of fishermen individually getting extraordinary hauls of fish. There is still further the risk of the debtor dying, in which event the debt is wholly lost beyond the value of the boat and nets. On the death of a fish-curer recently, his books were found to contain about £16,000 of debts due to him by fishermen, and these for the most part valueless. Still, if the system were not advantageous to the curers, it is plain that they would not conduct their trade in so questionable a method.

The fisherman's profits in good years are swallowed up by the charges and drawbacks of bad and indifferent years, unless happily there be for him a succession of good years. But, considering how little the average value of the fishing exceeds the actual outlays of the year, it is not surprising that this great fishing should be carried on under a mass of debt, spread over fully two-thirds of the fleet. It is unquestionably a national misfortune that any great enterprise like the Caithness herring-fishing should be conducted under such serious disadvantages, and with such unfortunate results to the large and adventurous class of men who labour in it.

These results are mainly owing to the great error of the fishermen in accepting the use of capital on terms unreasonably to their own disadvantage, standing debtor for the whole charges of the fishing, and submitting to the large deduction of 20 per cent. on the value of their fish. But they do it with their eyes open; and it is of contract, partly expressed and partly understood, and regulated by local custom. If it were desirable to regulate the arrangements of the trade by Act of Parliament, and if it were provided (1) that no person could advance money or money's worth to a fisherman, with the view of engaging in or equipping him for the fishing, without thereby constituting himself a partner of the fisherman, to the extent of such advance, proportionately to the value of the boat, drift of nets, etc. possessed by the fisherman and used in the fishing, and becoming liable as such partner for a proportional share of the charges of the fisherman's adventure, and (2) that the custom of fixing the price 'by general terms' be abolished; the trade would, it is thought, soon revert to legitimate methods of dealing. The real capitalist would share the risks and generally engross them; while the labour and zeal of the individual fisherman, who may have only his labour and zeal to give, would find their value in wages or other remuneration. But it is not to be denied that any such legislation would be extremely arbitrary and indefensible in principle.

It should here be stated that what the fishermen earn in white-fishing, and in the winter and Lewis herring-fishing, is always paid in cash, irrespective of the debt resting owing in respect of the Caithness herring-fishing. The individual debtor of the herring-fishing is lost in the five, six, or eight joint-adventurers who man the boats in the fishings first mentioned.

The men who hire themselves as boatmen for the herring-fishing season bargain for wages to be paid in cash at the end of the season. These wages vary from £4 to £8, according to the skill or strength of the boatman. Besides the money wages, these men have lodgings and cooking of their food supplied to them, and each receives a stone of meal weekly. The money wage is payable at the close of the fishing, and is always paid in cash. The number of men so employed is about 4000 at Wick alone.

These men make their engagements with the boatmasters, who, as already stated, are ostensibly owners of the boats. They used to experience much hardship by the failure of the boatmasters to pay them in bad years. To enforce payment was difficult, for the fish-curers were invariably found to be the owners of the boats and nets, the sole possessions of the boatmasters. This has come to be remedied to a great extent by the men refusing to engage without receiving a guarantee for payment by the curer.

With regard to coopers, they are engaged for terms longer or shorter, to make barrels at current wages or rates, and payments are fortnightly and always in cash.

The women employed in gutting and curing the herring are engaged for the season. They are paid 6d. per barrel, and 1s. 3d. a day for repacking and filling up the barrels. 1500 of them may be employed. The payments are made in cash at the end of the season.