Captain Hall: “In that case, why not place the support right up on the line of resistance in the first place?”
The Director: “Lieutenant Baker, can you answer Captain Hall’s question?”
Lieutenant Baker: “I believe I can give a reason for it. If we should place the support right up on the line of outguards we would commit it to one position, and in case of attack it would be difficult to move it to meet the enemy’s main effort. If we keep it at a central point to the rear of the line, we can readily move it to any point where it may be most needed.”
The Director: “You are right. We do not want to commit our support to action until we find out the direction of the enemy’s attack. The shifting of troops along a front line is a most difficult and hazardous operation. I hope you see the point, Captain Hall.”
Captain Hall: “Yes, sir. I do.”[[12]]
The Director: “How many outguards do you think are required on the front assigned to the support, Captain Jones?”
Captain Jones: “I should have one on the main road leading toward the enemy; another on the right of the road in the vicinity of —— (indicating); and another to the left of the road in the vicinity of —— (indicating). I think this would be sufficient for observation purposes.”
The Director: “Upon what main elements do you base the strength of these outguards?”
Captain Jones: “On the number of sentinel posts they must maintain. If a double sentinel post is required, a sentry squad should be allotted to the outguard. If only a single sentinel is required, the outguard should be a cossack post.”
The Director: “That is exactly the point I wanted to bring out. We will take it up in detail later on in the problem. Let us assume that three outguards will be required to cover the front. No. 1, on the right of the road, is to be a sentry squad; No. 2, posted on the road, is also to be a sentry squad; and No. 3, posted on the left of the road, is to be a cossack post. How many men in a cossack post, Captain Hodges?”