Sir Arthur Wellesley also repeatedly mentions this gallant fight in his Despatches and letters. Besides the message thus conveyed by Craufurd, he tells Admiral the Honourable G. Berkeley that the French were ‘repulsed in fine style’ by the 95th; and in his Despatch reporting it to the Earl of Liverpool, he adds that ‘this affair was highly creditable to Colonel Beckwith, and displayed the gallantry and discipline of the officers and troops under his command.’
But this discipline, which thus elicited the approval of the great commander, was not enforced by Beckwith with sternness or severity. It is recorded how, during their halts at Campo Major and near the Coa, during the preceding winter, he had let his Battalion repose from the fatigues of their long marches, and their sufferings from famine and disease; not worrying the soldiers with drills or barrack-yard parades; but rather encouraging amusements and sports which refreshed and reanimated them. This it was, added to their knowledge of his valour and experience when leading them in the field, that made him loved by the Officers and Riflemen of his Battalion, made them ready to ‘follow him through fire and water when the day of trial came; for they well knew that he was the last man on earth who would give them unnecessary trouble, or, on the other hand, would spare either man or officer when the good of the service demanded their utmost exertions.’[75]
About this time the 1st and 3rd Caçadores of the Portuguese army were added to Craufurd’s Division; the latter commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Elder, one of the original officers of the Rifle Corps.[76] At the same time Ross’[77] troop of Horse Artillery and the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons were attached to the Light Division.
Soon after the attack on Barba del Puerco the troops (which had been reinforced with some of the 43rd and 52nd) were withdrawn to Villa de Ciervo.
Early in April, in compliance with orders from home, the ten companies of which the Battalion on service had hitherto consisted were reduced to eight, two captains with subalterns, non-commissioned officers, and a few men returning to England to form a Depôt. These eight companies were of about a hundred men each, as the Battalion which embarked a thousand and ten rank and file, had been reduced in about nine months, principally by disease, to about eight hundred men in all.
Craufurd now maintained a long line of posts on the right bank of the Agueda, from Fuentes Guinaldo on the right to the junction of the Agueda and the Douro, near Escalhao, on the left. In May the French began the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, distant a few miles from Gallegos, then the head-quarters of the Light Division. The 1st Battalion had picquets at Carpio, Molina das Flores, and Marialva. The Battalion itself was every evening under arms, and took up a position in a wood situated on some high ground behind Gallegos, and towards Duas Casas; here they remained during the night, returning for the day to their quarters. It seems that Massena observed this movement, and supposed that these troops were reinforcements to Craufurd’s Division. He therefore ordered Junot with a considerable force to cross the Azarva at the bridge of Marialva. This he did at daybreak on July 4, driving in the picquet at Marialva; the passage of his cavalry was gallantly disputed and checked by the German hussars; but Junot advancing in force, Craufurd resolved to fall back behind the Duas Casas. The Battalion, with some cavalry, covered this movement, and skirmishing with the French advanced troops, held them back until Craufurd had established himself behind the river. Junot, probably thinking Craufurd’s force to be much larger than it was, did not follow up this advance; and the Battalion took up a position at Val de la Mula, behind the River Turon, here the boundary between Spain and Portugal, detaching two companies to Fort Concepcion in front of the position. On July 10 Craufurd resolved by a night march to surprise the French posts at Gallegos and Barquillo. Accordingly, seven companies of the 95th with two of the 52nd got under arms late on that night, together with the 14th Light Dragoons and some German hussars. The Riflemen were ordered to load, to march in silence, and not to light their pipes. The wheels of two of Ross’ guns, which formed part of the column, were muffled. Thus they marched through a good part of the night, Craufurd himself accompanying them. On reaching some high ground, the Riflemen were ordered to lie down in some high standing corn. Here they waited for dawn; when it appeared, the orders to fall in and to advance to the edge of the height were given, and the French appeared in the plain below. They consisted of about two companies of infantry and a troop of cavalry. Craufurd ordered Colonel Talbot to charge them with the 14th; this he did gallantly, sabreing or making prisoners the cavalry; but the infantry formed square, and receiving the charge, brought down Talbot himself and several of his troopers, and then made good their retreat. Why Craufurd did not use his guns, or let loose the Riflemen at the French infantry, seems inexplicable. But so it was: and after remaining on the hill inactive spectators of the combat, they marched back to their position at Val de la Mula. But Ciudad Rodrigo having surrendered, Craufurd fell back on July 16 to Junça, about a mile and a half from Almeida, in Portugal, and on the right bank of the Coa.
At daybreak on the 21st the Battalion, with Ross’ battery, advanced towards the Turon to support the cavalry who were driven from Val de la Mula and across the Turon by an advance of the enemy in great force. On this advance the mines which our engineers had formed under Fort Concepcion were fired. The two companies of Riflemen posted there, under Captain O’Hare, proceeded to rejoin the Battalion, and had not long left their position when the work fell with a tremendous explosion. On the 22nd Craufurd fell back to near Almeida, his left protected by the guns of that place, and his right resting on the Coa.
During the night of the 23rd the Division was exposed to a violent storm of thunder, lightning and torrents of rain. Day had just begun to dawn on the morning of the 24th, and the troops, which had assembled at their alarm posts, were expecting an order to retire, as all seemed quiet, when the crack of the rifle of one of the advanced sentries announced the approach of the enemy. Marshal Ney, with an overwhelming force, was advancing by the road from Val de la Mula, and attacked and drove in the outlying picquet under Captain the Honourable Keith Stewart, which occupied that road. In resisting this attack, and falling back on the supports, Lieutenant M’Cullock, who was on this picquet, was sabred, and, with several men, taken prisoner.[78]
O’Hare’s company were at once ordered in support, and he disposed them behind some walls. Here they waited till Stewart’s picquet, slowly retreating and disputing their ground, came in upon them, followed by a swarm of French tirailleurs. A wing of the 43rd were about a hundred yards in the rear of these Riflemen; and at this moment a shell from Almeida, thrown of course at the French, burst close by, and killed and wounded several Riflemen.
O’Hare’s company was now ordered to retire. Half the company did so; the remainder, under Lieutenant Johnston, were still engaged with the French advanced troops, when a troop or squadron of the enemy’s hussars, whom our men, on account of the similarity of the uniform to that of the German hussars, had not noticed, swept round their left flank, and galloping between the Riflemen and their support the 43rd, sabred and rode down many, and caused great confusion.