Compiled & Drawn by Captn H. M. Moorsom, Rifle Brigade. E. Weller, Litho.
London, Chatto & Windus.
Operations near
NEW ORLEANS
in 1814–15.
Early on the 28th the army advanced towards New Orleans, the Riflemen leading, by the high road along the river’s bank. They drove in the enemy’s picquets, and proceeded along the road here called ‘Le détour des Anglais,’ till, on turning round some houses on the left, they suddenly found themselves in front of a strong work the enemy had thrown up, and from which they opened a cannonade from four guns; while their old enemy the ship, now moored a little in advance of the work, brought a flank fire to bear on them. The Riflemen, leading and extended, did not suffer so much;[149] but the 85th which followed in close formation were mown down by this fire. Some houses were on the right, which might have afforded some temporary cover; but the enemy, by their shells, set them on fire, and the flames added to the confusion. To escape in some measure from the effects of the fire the regiments were deployed to the right, while the Riflemen advancing about a hundred yards got into a ditch, which in a great degree sheltered them. In the afternoon the regiments moved off by wings, so as to present as small a body as possible to the enemy’s fire. The Riflemen, however, did not move off till after dark, nor till some of the Yankees had ventured out of their works ‘in a very triumphant manner.’ But a few shots from the Riflemen immediately produced the conviction among them that it was more advisable to return to the protection of their rampart. This work was a stout parapet, in front of which was a wet ditch or canal. Its extent was about 1,000 yards, and its left touched the river, while its right was defended by the wood.
The army now took up a position about a mile and a half or two miles from this work. The Battalion was placed in a house rather in advance, and on the left of the line. This was exposed, not only to the fire from the work, but also, as it was near the bank, from a redoubt which the enemy had constructed on the opposite side of the river. The men were placed in a sugar-house belonging to this farm, the floor of which being sunk below the level of the natural ground afforded some protection. Yet on one occasion at least their cooking utensils were knocked off the fire by shot passing through this house.
So matters continued until the 31st. It was resolved to bring up some of the ships’ guns and to place them in battery against the enemy’s work. Accordingly on the night of the 31st strong working parties were employed in constructing two batteries near it; one with the object of keeping down the flank fire from the ship; the other with the view of breaching the centre of the rampart. The night was dark; the men worked in silence; and before daylight the batteries were completed, and the guns in position.
Early in the morning of January 1, 1815, the troops were moved up, with the object of attacking the enemy’s work. A thick fog favoured their advance, and concealed their movements from the Americans. About nine o’clock the fog rose, and our batteries at once began their fire. This threw the Yankees, who were seen on parade, into utter confusion; and had a charge on the works been made at that moment, no doubt it would have been successful. But unhappily the orders were that the attack was not to be made till the enemy’s fire had been silenced, and his works breached. When, therefore, the Americans saw that nothing took place but a cannonade, their courage returned, and after about twenty minutes they began to return our fire; and gradually increased to a vigorous cannonade, which effectually overpowered our guns, and dismounted some of them. The flank fire too from the battery on the opposite bank of the river, in which they had placed their ship’s guns, was very galling.
After being kept under this fire inactive till between two and three o’clock in the afternoon, the troops were withdrawn and bivouacked on the ground, and some occupied the houses they had held during the last few days. At night the troops were turned out and employed in withdrawing the guns from the batteries in which they had been placed. This was hard work; and some of the guns had to be buried, it being found impossible to remove them before daylight. Thus the men had been up, and at hard work, two nights; and in the intervening day had been for many hours under the enemy’s fire, without the chance of fighting them. The loss of the Battalion was, 1 Rifleman killed, and 2 missing.
Things continued in this state till the 7th, the picquets being as before constantly harassed by the enemy.
No other course remained but to carry the enemy’s work by an attack de vive force, and it was decided that this should take place on the 8th. Three companies of the Battalion were to precede the advance of the right column under General Gibbs, consisting of the 4th, 21st and 44th regiments; while the other two companies were in like manner to act with the left column. The Riflemen were to extend along the edge of the canal or ditch in front of the enemy’s rampart, and both parties so extended were to occupy the whole of the bank, or as it might be called, the crest of the glacis. At four o’clock in the morning the troops paraded; and by daylight the Riflemen were in their place. But the 44th Regiment, which had been appointed to carry ladders and fascines to enable the attacking force to cross the ditch, had come without them. Their commanding officer, the Hon. Colonel Mullens, had said loudly the night before when the regiment was detailed for this duty in orders, that ‘his regiment was sent on a forlorn hope’ and ‘was doomed.’ And on the regiment returning to fetch the ladders and fascines, he prudently did not come back to the front with them. The enemy meanwhile opened a furious fire on the troops, specially destructive to the Riflemen who were extended within 100 or 150 yards of the work. One regiment of the right attack, finding itself exposed to this fire, and without the fascines and ladders they had been led to expect, wavered, broke up, and fled to the rear, throwing the regiment which was following in support into confusion. Sir Edward Pakenham, who commanded, in trying to rally this column was killed; General Gibbs, who commanded it, was mortally wounded; and General Keane, who commanded the left attack, was wounded. This attack succeeded better; and for a time the troops composing it held a redoubt which the enemy had constructed in front of the ditch, and which they had stormed. But in the end they were obliged also to give way. Thus the Riflemen, extended in skirmishing order along the edge of the ditch, were left unsupported, and were obliged to retire as best they could. As their files were extended they presented a less prominent object for the enemy’s guns, and they eventually got away with comparatively small loss. Some of them had got quite to the edge of the ditch, and reported that they could have passed it, but the attacking columns which they expected never came up; and to have entered the enemy’s work without them would, of course, have been certain destruction.