[58] Ibid., pp. 343, 346, 347.—Idem, Coronaciones, pp. 200, 202.—Antonio Perez, Relaciones, fol. 92.
Sempere cites the opinion of an ancient canonist, Canellas, bishop of Huesca, as conclusive against the existence of the vast powers imputed by later commentators to the Justicia. (Histoire des Cortès, chap. 19.) The vague, rhapsodical tone of the extract shows it to be altogether undeserving of the emphasis laid on it; not to add, that it was written more than a century before the period, when the Justicia possessed the influence or the legal authority claimed for him by Aragonese writers,—by Blancas, in particular, from whom Sempere borrowed the passage at second hand.
[59] The law alluded to runs thus: "Ne quid autem damni detrimentive leges aut libertates nostrae patiantur, judex quidam medius adesto, ad quem a Rege provocare, si aliquem laeserit, injuriasque arcere si quas forsan Reipub. intulerit, jus fasque esto." Blancas, Commentarii, p. 26.
[60] Such instances may he found in Zurita, Anales, tom. ii. fol. 385, 414.—Blancas, Commentarii, pp. 199, 202-206, 214, 225.—When Ximenes Cerdan, the independent Justice of John I., removed certain citizens from the prison, in which they had been unlawfully confined by the king, in defiance equally of that officer's importunities and menaces, the inhabitants of Saragossa, says Abarca, came out in a body to receive him on his return to the city, and greeted him as the defender of their ancient and natural liberties. (Reyes de Aragon, tom. i. fol. 155.) So openly did the Aragonese support their magistrate in the boldest exercise of his authority.
[61] This occurred once under Peter III., and twice under Alfonso V. (Zurita, Anales, tom. iii. fol. 255.—Blancas, Commentarii, pp. 174, 489, 499.) The Justice was appointed by the king.
[62] Fueros y Observancias, tom. i. fol. 22.
[63] Ibid., tom. i. fol. 25.
[64] Ibid., tom. i. lib. 3, tit. Forum Inquisitionis Officii Just. Arag., and tom. ii. fol. 37-41.—Blancas, Commentarii, pp. 391-399.
The examination was conducted in the first instance before a court of four inquisitors, as they were termed; who, after a patient hearing of both sides, reported the result of their examination to a council of seventeen, chosen like them from the cortes, from whose decision there was no appeal. No lawyer was admitted into this council, lest the law might be distorted by verbal quibbles, says Blancas. The council, however, was allowed the advice of two of the profession. They voted by ballot, and the majority decided. Such, after various modifications, were the regulations ultimately adopted in 1461, or rather 1467. Robertson appears to have confounded the council of seventeen with the court of inquisition. See his History of Charles V., vol. i. note 31.
[65] Probably no nation of the period would have displayed a temperance similar to that exhibited by the Aragonese at the beginning of the fifteenth century, in 1412; when the people, having been split into factions by a contested succession, agreed to refer the dispute to a committee of judges, elected equally from the three great provinces of the kingdom; who, after an examination conducted with all the forms of law, and on the same equitable principles as would have guided the determination of a private suit, delivered an opinion, which was received as obligatory on the whole nation.