"Sir, this bill applies to white men as well as black men. It declares that all men in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil rights, the right to the fruit of their own labor, the right to make contracts, the right to buy and sell, and enjoy liberty and happiness; and that is abominable and iniquitous and unconstitutional! Could any thing be more monstrous or more abominable than for a member of the Senate to rise in his place and denounce with such epithets as these a bill, the only object of which is to secure equal rights to all the citizens of the country—a bill that protects a white man just as much as a black man? With what consistency and with what face can a Senator in his place here say to the Senate and the country, that this is a bill for the benefit of the black men exclusively, when there is no such distinction in it, and when the very object of the bill is to break down all discrimination between black men and white men?"
Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, said: "My doctrine is that slavery exists no longer in this country; that it is impossible to exist in the face of that provision; and with slavery fell the laws of all the States providing for slavery, every one of them. I do not see what benefit can arise from repealing them by this bill, because, if they are not repealed by the Constitution as amended, this bill could not repeal them. I hope that all the States in which slavery formerly existed will accept that constitutional provision in good faith. I myself accept it in good faith. Believing that all the laws authorizing slavery have fallen, I have advised the people of Kentucky, and I would advise all the States, to put these Africans upon the same footing that the whites are in relation to civil rights. They have all the rights that were formerly accorded to the free colored population in all the States just as fully this day as they will have after this bill has passed, and they will continue to have them.
"Now, to the States belong the government of their own population, and those within their borders, upon all subjects. We, in Kentucky, prescribe punishment for those who violate the laws; we prescribe it for the white population; we prescribe it for the free African population, and we prescribe it for the slave population. All the laws prescribing punishment for slaves fell with slavery, and they were subject afterward only to the penalties which were inflicted upon the free colored population, they then being free. Slaves, for many offenses, were punished far less than the free colored people. No slave was sent to the penitentiary and punished for stealing, or any thing of that kind, whereas a free person was. But all these States will now, of course, remodel their laws upon the subject of offenses. I would advise that there should be but one code for all persons, black as well as white; that there shall be one general rule for the punishment of crime in the different States. But, sir, the States must have time to act on the subject; and yet we are here preparing laws and penalties, and proposing to carry them into execution by military authority, before the States have had time to legislate, and even before some of their Legislatures have had time to convene.
"Kentucky has had her share of talking here, and, sir, she has had her share of suffering during the war. At one time she was invaded by three armies of the rebellion; all but seven or eight counties of the State, at one time, were occupied by its armies, and her whole territory devastated by guerrillas. We have suffered in this war. We have borne it as best we could. We feel it intensely that now, at the end of the war, we should be subjected to a military despotism, our houses liable to be entered at any time when our families are at rest, by military men who can arrest and send to prison without warrant, and we are obliged to go, and we are obliged to pay any fines they may impose. I do not believe that you will lose any thing if you pause before passing such legislation as this, and establishing these military despotisms, for we do not know where they are to end."
Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, had proposed to strike out the last clause of the bill, which provided that "such part of the land and naval forces of the United States, or of the militia," as should be necessary, might be employed to prevent the violation, and enforce the due execution of this act. The Senator from Indiana opposed the bill on the ground that it employed the machinery of the Fugitive Slave Law, and that it was to be enforced by the military authority of the United States. He said:
"This bill is a wasp; its sting is in its tail. Sir, what is this bill? It provides, in the first place, that the civil rights of all men, without regard to color, shall be equal; and, in the second place, that if any man shall violate that principle by his conduct, he shall be responsible to the court; that he may be prosecuted criminally and punished for the crime, or he may be sued in a civil action and damages recovered by the party wronged. Is not that broad enough? Do Senators want to go further than this? To recognize the civil rights of the colored people as equal to the civil rights of the white people, I understand to be as far as Senators desire to go; in the language of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner], to place all men upon an equality before the law; and that is proposed in regard to their civil rights."
In reference to the reënactment of the odious features of the Fugitive Slave Law in this bill, Mr. Hendricks said: "I recollect how the blood of the people was made to run cold within them when it was said that the white man was required to run after the fugitive slave; that the law of 1850 made you and me, my brother Senators, slave-catchers; that the posse comitatus could be called to execute a writ of the law, for the recovery of a runaway slave, under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States; and the whole country was agitated because of it. Now slavery is gone; the negro is to be established upon a platform of civil equality with the white man. That is the proposition. But we do not stop there; we are to reënact a law that nearly all of you said was wicked and wrong; and for what purpose? Not to pursue the negro any longer; not for the purpose of catching him; not for the purpose of catching the great criminals of the land; but for the purpose of placing it in the power of any deputy marshal in any county of the country to call upon you and me, and all the body of the people, to pursue some white man who is running for his liberty, because some negro has charged him with denying to him equal civil rights with the white man. I thought, sir, that that frame-work was enough; I thought, when you placed under the command of the marshal, in every county of the land, all the body of the people, and put every one upon the track of the fleeing white man, that that was enough; but it is not. For the purpose of the enforcement of this law, the President is authorized to appoint somebody who is to have the command of the military and naval forces of the United States—for what purpose? To prevent a violation of this law, and to execute it.
"You clothe the marshals under this bill with all the powers that were given to the marshals under the Fugitive Slave Law. That was regarded as too arbitrary in its provisions, and you repealed it. You said it should not stand upon the statute-book any longer; that no man, white or black, should be pursued under the provisions of that law. Now, you reënact it, and you claim it as a merit and an ornament to the legislation of the country; and you add an army of officers and clothe them with the power to call upon any body and every body to pursue the running white man. That is not enough, but you must have the military to be called in, at the pleasure of whom? Such a person as the President may authorize to call out the military forces. Where it shall be, and to whom this power shall be given, we do not know."
Mr. Lane, of Indiana, replied to the argument of his colleague. He said: "It is true that many of the provisions of this bill, changed in their purpose and object, are almost identical with the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, and they are denounced by my colleague in their present application; but I have not heard any denunciation from my colleague, or from any of those associated with him, of the provisions of that Fugitive Slave Law which was enacted in the interest of slavery, and for purposes of oppression, and which was an unworthy, cowardly, disgraceful concession to Southern opinion by Northern politicians. I have suffered no suitable opportunity to escape me to denounce the monstrous character of that Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. All these provisions were odious and disgraceful in my opinion, when applied in the interest of slavery, when the object was to strike down the rights of man. But here the purpose is changed. These provisions are in the interest of freemen and of freedom, and what was odious in the one case becomes highly meritorious in the other. It is an instance of poetic justice and of apt retribution that God has caused the wrath of man to praise Him. I stand by every provision of this bill, drawn as it is from that most iniquitous fountain, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.
"Then my colleague asks, Why do you invoke the power of the military to enforce these laws? And he says that constables, and sheriffs, and marshals, when they have process to serve, have a right to call upon the posse comitatus, the body of the whole people, to enforce their writs. Here is a justice of the peace in South Carolina or Georgia, or a county court, or a circuit court, that is called upon to execute this law. They appoint their own marshal, their deputy marshal, or their constable, and he calls upon the posse comitatus. Neither the judge, nor the jury, nor the officer, as we believe, is willing to execute the law. He may call upon the people, the body of the whole people, a body of rebels steeped in treason and rebellion to their lips, and they are to execute it; and the gentleman seems wonderfully astonished that we should call upon the military power. We should not legislate at all if we believed the State courts could or would honestly carry out the provisions of the constitutional amendment; but because we believe they will not do that, we give the Federal officers jurisdiction.