[240] Memorials of C. J. Fox, iii., 349.
CHAPTER XVII.
The nine years between Pitt's accession to office and the outbreak of the war with France were a period of advance in constitutional freedom and financial prosperity. All progress in these directions was arrested by the war. The security of England, a matter of higher importance than these, was at stake. The war demanded all the energies of the nation. Questions which would have divided the country or weakened the government were shelved, for it was not a time to debate reforms when the state itself was in peril. Pitt defeated efforts for parliamentary reform and grew cold to the cause of the abolition of the slave trade. But the war brought worse than an arrest of progress; it brought repression of freedom and a tremendous load of debt. The French propaganda roused general indignation and alarm. Towards the end of 1792 the ministers were convinced of the existence of a plot for effecting a revolution by the aid of France. There was much to justify their alarm; Ireland seemed ripe for revolt, political discontent was strong in Scotland, and evidence, gained later, confirmed them in their belief that sedition was reaching a dangerous height in England. They overrated the existing danger, though if sedition had remained unchecked it might soon have become dangerous; for France was attacking the state by secret seduction as well as by open arms. Extraordinary precautions were taken to meet a peril which was specially terrible because its extent was unknown. Measures of repression were eagerly welcomed by parliament; judges and magistrates exercised their powers with harshness, and juries were often biassed by the feeling of the bench. The nation was alarmed, and severity was popular.
PITT AS A WAR MINISTER.
Pitt, who had guided England in peace, was to remain at the helm in war. The conduct of the war is therefore closely connected with the question whether, great as he was in peace, he was a great war minister.[241] The British army, which in 1792 only numbered about 17,300 men and at the outbreak of the war was increased by 9,945, was so small that it could only either act a secondary part in a continental war, or engage in isolated expeditions to support insurrections in France. During the first part of the war our successes on land were trifling and our failures many. This was partly at least due to the custom of regarding noble birth rather than military attainments as a claim to command. Though Pitt, as we shall see, insisted on the recall of the Duke of York, he did not break through this evil custom, and our generals, though brave, were often incompetent. Pitt built great hopes on the co-operation of the French royalists and many expeditions were sent out to act with them. A belligerent power should place little dependence on insurrectionary movements in an enemy's country; for insurgents, however hostile they may be to their own government, will seldom act cordially with a foreign invader; their forces are generally unorganised, and they are apt to expect too much of their foreign ally. It is good policy to encourage them by sending them supplies, for their revolts embarrass their government and are useful as diversions in war. But a belligerent should not squander on diversions strength which might be employed in the main conflict. Pitt's expeditions of this kind were costly failures; they inflicted no deadly wound and were expensive both in men and money. On the other hand England was victorious by sea; the naval force was raised to 45,000 men in February, 1793, was constantly increased, and was commanded by admirals whose right to command was based on their skill in seamanship and maritime warfare.
For the security of England and the peace of Europe France, it was held, must be reduced to powerlessness. England's greatness at sea might enable her to destroy the enemy's commerce, conquer her colonies, and blockade her ports; the object of the war could be attained only by victories on land. Politically the continental states were rotten; their rulers were selfish despots, each bent on extending his dominions by any means, however dishonest; for international morality had broken down before the bait offered by the weakness of Poland. What barrier could they oppose to the flood of French aggression, the outcome of the enthusiasm of a great people? When France forced England into war she provoked a more dangerous enemy—the will of a nation. Supported by the national will, Pitt embarked on the task of combining the powers of Europe against France, and as some were unwilling and some unable to fight at their own expense, he paid them with English gold, and England found money for them as well as for her own naval and military operations. Pitt raised enormous loans. The funded debt, which in 1792 was, roughly, £238,000,000, rose during nine years of war to about £574,000,000. He began to borrow at once; in 1793 he raised a loan of £4,500,000, and in 1794 another of £11,000,000, besides imposing new taxes amounting to £913,000.
He has been blamed for not raising more by taxation during the early years of the war instead of burdening posterity so heavily. The financial difficulties of France led him to believe that the war would be short. "It will be a short war," he said, "and certainly ended in one or two campaigns." "No, sir," replied the more prescient Burke, "it will be a long war and a dangerous war; but it must be undertaken." In its earliest years Pitt had good reason for avoiding high taxation. It began in the midst of a financial crisis. The harvest of 1792 was seriously defective, and there was much want. The rapid advance in agriculture, commerce, and manufactures had led to the foundation of many country banks, which eagerly pushed their own notes into circulation, and credit was unduly strained. Currency became redundant, and a violent revulsion began in November, 1792, when the number of bankruptcies in the month amounted to 105, more than double the average number of the ten earlier months of the year. The crisis became more acute in the spring of 1793, and during the year there were 1,926 failures, of which twenty-six were failures of country banks. In order to relieve the distress Pitt, in April, obtained the assent of parliament for the issue of exchequer bills to the extent of £5,000,000 to be applied in advances at fair interest and on good security. Fox offered a factious opposition to this measure, alleging that it conferred a dangerous power on the executive. It was completely successful, and the panic was checked. As, then, Pitt believed that the war would be short, and as it was not a time for attempting to raise taxation to an amount sufficient to furnish the supplies within the year, he was justified in having an early recourse to loans.
In return for the £336,000,000 of debt created by Pitt in nine years, the country only received about £223,000,000 in money; and he has been accused of extravagance because he raised money mainly in 3 per cent. stock instead of at a rate more nearly corresponding to its market value. In 1793 every £100 borrowed created £138 stock, and when in 1797 the 3 per cents. fell to 47, the sacrifice was enormous. Pitt did attempt to raise a loan at a higher rate in 1793, and found it impossible; and it is at least doubtful whether he did not act more prudently in borrowing in the 3 per cents. than at a high rate.[242] In his budget speech of 1793 he announced that he would always maintain the sinking fund. He kept his promise, and this expensive economy provided a deduction of £42,500,000 from the £336,000,000 of debt. Financially, as we have seen, this was a mistake; politically it was useful in encouraging and comforting the country in a time of stress; for the opposition was as fully persuaded as the ministry of the efficacy of the fund. If, then, it be allowed that the war was just and necessary, little fault should be found with the way in which money was provided for it. That Pitt's subsidies were sometimes unwise may be conceded; that his coalitions disappointed him is certain. He had to contend with selfishness and deceit in the rulers of Europe, and laboured with ability and courage to keep them steadfast to the common cause, again and again taking up his task, undismayed by failures which are not to be laid to his charge. While mistakes in the conduct of the war forbid us to call him a great war minister in the narrow sense of the term, we should scarcely refuse that praise in a wider, truer sense to a minister so dauntless in adversity, so fertile in resource, so deservedly trusted by the nation as "the pilot that weathered the storm".