By the beginning of 1761 France was anxious for peace, and in concert with her allies, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Poland, invited Great Britain and Prussia to negotiate, and suggested that a congress should meet at Augsburg. England and Prussia assented, and plenipotentiaries were appointed. In England the prospect of a peace was hailed with satisfaction, and the funds rose 4 per cent. The congress never met, but the plan was not abandoned for some months; and Choiseul, the minister of Louis XV., sent a memorial to England proposing that, as difficulties would arise at the congress if the questions in dispute between England and France were debated along with the affairs of their respective allies, the two courts should enter on a separate negotiation. He offered to treat on the basis of uti possidetis, that is, that the possessions of both countries should be acknowledged as regards the conquests made by the one from the other, and that certain dates in the current year should be fixed upon as those on which the conquests should be ascertained. The offer was large; for at that time England had conquered from France Cape Breton, Canada, Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, Goree, and Senegal, and had also gained great advantages in India, though the fall of Pondicherry was not yet known; while France had only conquered Minorca from England. She had also, it will be remembered, gained insecure possession of Hesse, Hanau, and Göttingen. England agreed to a separate negotiation on the basis of uti possidetis, but Pitt would not commit himself as to the dates, for he was preparing the expedition against Belle Ile, and intended that England should not lose the advantage which would accrue from its success. He also declared that his court would not desert the King of Prussia. Choiseul replied that neither would France desert her allies, and that the negotiation only concerned the interests of the two powers. On this understanding the two courts sent representatives the one to the other; the English representative chosen by Pitt was Hans Stanley, and M. de Bussy was sent to London by Choiseul.
Soon after they arrived at their destinations Belle Ile was conquered. Pitt knew how deeply the national spirit of France would be wounded by this blow; he promised to restore the island if adequate compensation were made, and Choiseul professed himself willing to make important concessions. On July 15, however, he made proposals of a less favourable kind than might have been expected. They were, briefly, that France should cede Canada on certain conditions, one of which was that she should have liberty to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and dry cod on the Newfoundland shore, and should have Cape Breton in sovereignty for a shelter for her ships, though she should not erect fortifications. She would restore Minorca, and should receive back Guadeloupe and Mariegalante; two of the neutral islands, Dominica and St. Vincent, should be under her protection, and of the other two she should keep St. Lucia and England should have Tobago. The rival claims in India were to be settled on the basis of a treaty of 1755, before the late English victories. England should restore either Senegal or Goree, for unless France had one of them, her West India possessions would be useless, as she would have no port for the shipment of negroes. Belle Ile was to be restored, and France would evacuate Hesse and Hanau. After preliminaries were signed England was not to help Prussia, nor France Austria, but France would not surrender the territories conquered from the King of Prussia, for they were conquered and held in the name of the Empress-queen. This stipulation was made in favour of Austria which had assented to the separate negotiation on condition that her interests were guarded. The proposals were of a kind to suggest doubts as to Choiseul's sincerity. As a matter of fact he was secretly arranging a strict alliance with Spain as a means of forcing England to make favourable terms.
SPANISH AND FRENCH MEMORIALS.
Spain had three grievances against Great Britain. She complained that her ships had wrongfully been made prizes, that she was shut out from the Newfoundland fishery, and that British settlements had been made on the bay of Honduras. Charles III, of Spain had a strong leaning towards a French alliance; he was much influenced by the family tie between himself and the other Bourbon powers, and he considered that the destruction of the French navy by Great Britain deprived Spain of a guarantee for the safety of her possessions in the western hemisphere. He believed that by identifying the interests of Spain with those of France, he would gain a satisfactory settlement of his own claims and also better terms for France than she could otherwise obtain. As early as September, 1760, the Count de Fuentes, the Spanish minister in London, presented to Pitt a memorial on the Newfoundland fishery, in which it was stated that a copy had been communicated to the court of France. Indignant at the implied threat, Pitt replied that he was at a loss to understand the meaning of such a communication, and that France had nothing to do with the question.[35] A month later Dutens, secretary to the British embassy at Turin, sent him information which proved that the King of Spain would not long remain a passive spectator of the war.[36] Pitt was thus fully aware of the necessity for watchfulness as to the relations between France and Spain; the correspondence between Fuentes and the Marquis Grimaldi, the Spanish minister at Paris, was regularly intercepted and its contents communicated by Pitt to his colleagues. The two ambassadors were endeavouring to bring about an alliance between their king and Louis, and, on March 10, 1761, Fuentes wrote that "if this is done, at the end of the year we shall have a peace to our liking and France's," and that England would be compelled by "force and fear" to do justice to Spain. Pitt soon showed him and Choiseul how unsafe it was to reckon on English fear.
Along with the French proposals of July 15, Bussy presented Pitt with a memorial on the grievances of Spain, proposing that England should terminate her differences with that court, and declaring that the French king "cannot disguise the danger he apprehends, and of which he must necessarily partake if these objects which seem nearly to concern his Catholic majesty shall be the occasion of a war". Pitt was furious at this insult to his country and at once addressed Bussy in terms different from the ordinary language of diplomacy. He declared in plain words that the king would not allow the dispute with Spain to be blended in any manner whatever in the negotiation, and that any further attempt to blend them would be considered an affront. He returned the memorial as "wholly inadmissible".[37] In answer to the French articles he replied that Canada must be ceded unconditionally, and refused to surrender Cape Breton or to allow France any part in the fisheries. Both Pitt and Choiseul held the fisheries question to be of prime importance. If France were shut out from them, she would, Pitt believed, permanently be crippled as a maritime power, for apart from the value of the fish both for victualling ships and in commerce the fisheries were a nursery for a race of hardy seamen, and Pitt wished to prevent France from ever restoring either her merchant marine or her naval strength. The second crucial question in the negotiation concerned our allies. Pitt insisted that Frederick should receive back the territories conquered from him by France, and that both England and France should be free to help their allies. Determined to give France no commercial advantage, he refused to cede either Senegal or Goree. England must have Minorca, but would agree to an equal partition of the neutral islands, and would restore Belle Ile, Guadeloupe, and Mariegalante. He further rejected the date proposed as a basis for a peace in India.
PITT'S ULTIMATUM.
Pitt kept the negotiation with Bussy in his own hands, and met opposition in the cabinet with haughty determination. Newcastle and his party were eager for peace, and, equally with Bussy, complained that the tone of his despatches was too peremptory. Bute resented what he described as Pitt's insolence.[38] Nevertheless the king and he considered the French proposals unsatisfactory and were annoyed by the memorial concerning the Spanish grievances, but Bute believed that patient negotiation would induce France to yield all that was in dispute. Accordingly, to Newcastle's consternation, he supported Pitt's demands. Pitt's strongest opponent was the Duke of Bedford, who was urgently summoned to the council by Bute and Newcastle when they wanted a champion against him. Upright and fairly able, Bedford owed his political prominence mainly to his rank and vast wealth; he was much addicted to sport and other pleasures, and allowed himself to be guided by a gang of greedy adherents of whom Rigby, a coarse and shameless place-hunter, was the chief. Pitt laid his ultimatum to France before the council on August 15. He had so far yielded to pressure as to offer France a limited right of fishing, and the island of St. Pierre as a shelter and port, provided it was kept unfortified. On the other crucial question his demand was unchanged; the Westphalian lands were to be restored to Frederick, and both parties were to remain free to help their allies. His despatch was considered needlessly irritating, but he would not allow a word to be altered. Bute would give no help against him. Bedford, who had a violent temper, was so angry at being overborne, that he declared that he would attend no more councils, and Newcastle was reduced to whining despair. By the 18th, however, Bute came to an agreement with the Newcastle faction and promised to help them against Pitt.[39]
Lord Bristol, our ambassador at Madrid, was instructed to remonstrate energetically with General Wall, the Spanish minister, on the subject of Bussy's memorial. He was to say that as regards the prizes there were courts whose business it was to decide such matters, that England would not allow Spain any share in the fishery, but was willing to receive representations as to the Honduras settlements, provided they were not sent through France, and that any union of counsels with France would hinder an amicable arrangement. He was, further, to demand an explanation of the naval preparations which Spain was making. He could obtain no satisfaction, and on August 31 sent Pitt a paper in which Wall declared that his master concurred in Bussy's memorial, and, while he protested that no offence was intended, maintained that Spain and France had a right to mix in the affairs each of the other "for mutual assistance". A declaration of war from Spain was, Bristol thought, not far off.[40] On September 2 Stanley sent Pitt a copy of what he believed to be an article of a secret treaty between France and Spain, and wrote that he was assured in Paris that Spain would immediately declare war, and that a treaty between the two powers only needed signature.[41] Intercepted letters between Fuentes and Grimaldi proved that a treaty had been signed between them on August 15. This was the famous family compact, the purport of which was not yet known in England. A fresh set of proposals was made by Choiseul, and Stanley was led to believe one day that peace was unlikely, and another that France would agree to terms and that "the affair of Spain would be dropped".[42] It became evident that Choiseul was trifling with England, and on September 15 the cabinet decided to recall Stanley forthwith.
Choiseul was anxious to avoid an immediate breach between England and Spain, both because Spain was expecting the arrival of her treasure-ships from America,[43] and also because her naval preparations were incomplete. Pitt, who was convinced that Spain was intending to declare war, was anxious to strike while so grand an opportunity lasted. A cabinet council was held on the 19th. He was not present, but sent in a paper signed by himself and Temple, urging that, in view of Wall's avowal of "a total union of counsels and interests" between the two Bourbon monarchies, Bristol should be ordered to return to England without taking leave, in fact, that war with Spain should at once be declared.[44] Unfortunately we had no casus belli against Spain, and could not found one on secret information. The council made a point of this, and voted that a declaration of war would neither be just nor expedient, but that Bristol should demand further and distinct assurances of the intentions of Spain. They knew that their decision would probably lead to Pitt's resignation, and held anxious discussion, for they were in great perplexity. Bute had hoped that peace would be made, and then Pitt might be got rid of. Things were turning out awkwardly. "If," he said, "we had any view of peace, he should be less solicitous what part Mr. Pitt took, but that, as the continuance of the war seemed unavoidable, he thought that we should do what we could to hinder Mr. Pitt from going out, and thereby leaving the impracticability of his own war upon us."[45] He and the rest of the council knew that Pitt could conduct the war, and that they could not. They agreed that peace with France might still be hoped for.
PITT AND HIS COLLEAGUES.