Not till midday did a detachment of British troops, grenadiers and light infantry, begin to land on the peninsula under the command of Howe and Pigot. They waited for reinforcements, which brought their number up to over 2,000 men, with artillery. Hot as the weather was, the men were burdened with knapsacks containing provisions for three days. At 3 p.m. they advanced in two divisions, the light infantry under Howe against the line of defence, the grenadiers under Pigot against the redoubt. At first their advance was covered by their artillery, but the guns stuck in the mire, and it is said that a fresh supply of ball sent from Boston was too large for the cannon. Even if this was the case, it could have made no difference, for the supply taken with the guns was not exhausted.[102] Up the steep hill, through long tangled grass, the red-coats toiled on towards the redoubt, each burdened with a weight of some 125 pounds. With admirable coolness the Americans held their fire until the enemy was about fifty yards from them, and then poured a volley into their ranks. For a few minutes the men stood steady and returned the fire, then they turned and retreated in disorder. The attack on the fence was equally unsuccessful. While the officers were rallying their men, the battery on Cops hill burnt the wooden houses of the almost deserted village of Charlestown, from which the troops had been fired upon as they advanced. Then a second attack was made, and again the British were sent staggering back by the enemy's fire. At this crisis Clinton came over from Boston, took command of two battalions, a body of marines, and the 47th, and did good service in helping to rally the troops. With fine persistency they made ready for a third attack. More rational orders were given; the force was not divided, and only a feint was made against the line of defence, the men laid aside their knapsacks, advanced in column against the redoubt, and attacked with the bayonet. The Americans, who had received little support of any kind from headquarters, were weary, and their ammunition was almost exhausted; they were driven from their works and retreated across the neck. Their retreat was covered with bravery and military skill[103] by the body stationed along the line of defence on their left, but as they passed over the neck they suffered severely from the guns of the Glasgow sloop of war. Howe would not pursue them, and at once began to fortify the peninsula.
The victory was decisive, for it gave the English the ground for which they fought, and enabled them to hold Boston for nine months longer. It was dearly purchased by the loss of 19 officers and 207 men killed, and 70 officers and 758 men wounded, making a total of 1,054 casualties, an extraordinarily large proportion of the number engaged, apparently about 2,500. This was the natural result of sending troops up a hill to deliver a frontal attack on an earthwork held by a body of men well used to shoot. It will be observed that the loss of officers was extremely heavy; they fearlessly exposed themselves, as the British officer always does, in order to encourage their men. The Americans, who for the most part fought behind cover, stated their loss at 449. After Bunker hill, no one whose judgment was not warped by prejudice could believe that the Americans were cowards. They were not, so Gage wrote, the disorderly rabble too many have supposed; he had seen enough to convince him that the conquest of the country could only be effected by perseverance and strong armies.[104] The behaviour of the insurgent troops greatly encouraged their party. When Washington heard how they had fought he declared that the liberties of the country were safe.
THE INVASION OF CANADA.
Already some colonies were making temporary arrangements for popular government and issuing bills for the expenses of defence, and in July Georgia expressed its adherence to the general policy of armed resistance. For a while, however, royal governors still remained, and government was everywhere in a chaotic state. In New York the mob committed many outrages on the persons and property of loyalists, and hostilities took place with crews of the king's ships in the bay. Yet the town was not prepared to take a decided part; and it received Tryon, the royal governor, and Washington with the same tokens of respect. A like incongruity marked the proceedings of congress. Besides adopting addresses to the people of Great Britain and Ireland, it sent a petition to the king on whom it was levying war from his "faithful subjects," expressing attachment to his "person, family, and government" and beseeching him to "settle peace". At the same time, in spite of its declaration to the contrary, it ordered an invasion of Canada. The Americans flattered themselves that the Canadians would rise against the British, and Allen, puffed up by his recent success, made a dash at Montreal with only 150 men. He was defeated and taken prisoner. Meanwhile Montgomery started from Ticonderoga in August with over 2,000 men, captured Chamblée, where he found a good supply of military stores, and laid siege to St. John's. Canada was practically defenceless, for Carleton had only 900 regular troops; the English-speaking Canadians were disaffected, the French for the most part either apathetic or hostile. He sent to Gage for reinforcements, but the admiral, Samuel Graves, declined to transport troops to Quebec, for as it was then late in October the voyage from Boston would have been dangerous. Carleton's efforts to relieve St. John's were unsuccessful, and after a stout resistance the garrison surrendered on November 13. The fall of St. John's involved the surrender of Montreal, which was defenceless, and Carleton hastened to the defence of Quebec.
His presence was needed there, for on September 13 a detachment of about 1,500 men under the command of Arnold was sent from the army at Cambridge to surprise and capture the city. It was to proceed by land and water up the Kennebec, and down the Chaudière to the St. Lawrence. The route, though used by trappers and Indians, was dimly traced, and the equipment of the expedition was too cumbersome for the rough work which lay before it.[105] Soon after leaving their transports at Fort Western, where, fifty-eight miles from its mouth, the Kennebec ceased to be navigable except by bateaux, the troops began to suffer great hardships. Their stores were conveyed in bateaux, which they were constantly forced to haul against currents and carry over land. Many of them leaked, some were abandoned, and provisions ran short. The weather became cold and rainy. The whole rear division, with its officers, lost heart and turned back, taking with them a large share of food and ammunition. The rest toiled on through swamps and mire, half-starved and benumbed with cold. Many perished, some lost their way, and the men of one company were reduced to eating their dogs and gnawing the leather of their shoes. It was not until November 9 that Arnold's troops, a ragged and shivering crowd of about 600 men, with some Indians who had joined them, reached Point Levi. Montgomery, who was to have met them, was not there; they crossed the St. Lawrence, and Arnold sent an absurd summons to the garrison of Quebec. He then retreated to Pointe-aux-Trembles to wait for Montgomery.
The defences of Quebec were in bad condition, the garrison was small, and there was much disaffection among the inhabitants. The whole country was in the power of the invaders, the people were on their side, and it seemed as though the hopes of the Americans would be fulfilled. But while Quebec remained untaken, Canada would still be unconquered, and the defence was in good hands. The garrison was commanded by Colonel Maclean of the 84th, or Royal Highland Emigrants, a regiment largely raised by him from Frazer's Highlanders who had done good service under Wolfe. Carleton soon entered the place, and while Arnold was waiting for Montgomery, took vigorous measures for securing its safety. Montgomery arrived at Pointe-aux-Trembles on December 1, and on the night of the 31st the rebels attempted to carry Quebec by storm. They were repulsed with heavy loss, Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. They continued the siege, but were too weak either to invest the city completely or make any offensive movement. Carleton waited quietly until the breaking up of the ice should allow reinforcements to come up the river. Before long the French Canadians began to transfer their sympathies to the British. Their priests were too well satisfied with the Quebec act to desire change. Bishop Briand published a mandement, reminding his people of the benefits they received from English rule and calling upon them to defend their province. His exhortation had a powerful effect, for priests refused to confess men who joined the rebels.
PAUCITY OF THE BRITISH ARMY.
The victory of Bunker hill made no change in the position of Gage's army, which suffered from the want of wholesome food and from other privations. As England had command of the sea the troops could have been removed, and the generals wrote to the government suggesting that Boston should be evacuated and the royal forces concentrated at New York, which was more open to communication by sea, and in every respect a better base for future operations. The government, however, was unwilling to give up the town, and things remained as they were, for the generals considered that nothing was to be gained by an attack on the enemy's lines, because their army was not supplied with the materials necessary to move at a distance. Plans were indeed proposed for embarrassing the enemy by sending out a detachment to make a descent on Rhode Island;[106] but Gage did nothing, and the government, convinced of his incapacity, recalled him to England. He sailed from Boston in October, and Howe was appointed to the chief command. By sea there was as little done as by land, for the naval force under Graves was so inefficient that he was unable even to prevent the whale-boats of the rebels from intercepting supplies and destroying lighthouses. He was unjustly blamed for inaction, both by the army in Boston and the government. His removal was, the king thought, "as necessary as the mild general's".[107] This and every other matter connected with the war was directed by the king. His industry and his knowledge of details, military and naval, were extraordinary, and North, Dartmouth, and Barrington, whatever their own opinions were, had no choice but to carry out his orders.
On the outbreak of the war the army of Great Britain was on its normal peace establishment of about 17,000 men, besides the Irish army of 15,235, the garrison of Gibraltar 3,500, and of Minorca 2,500. It was an amazingly small number, considering the accessions made to the empire by the late war. George always wished for a larger permanent force; but his ministers shrank from raising a storm by increasing the estimates or provoking the popular jealousy of a standing army. Men were wanted at once. The first reinforcements were obtained from Ireland, and the Irish parliament agreed that 4,000 men should be drafted out of the country beyond the number allowed by statute. It soon became evident that the war required the immediate supply of a far greater number of men than could be spared from the present establishment or could be raised quickly. Parliament was not in session, and the king determined to obtain the services of foreign troops. As Elector of Hanover he lent 2,355 Hanoverians to garrison Gibraltar and Minorca, and so set a corresponding number of the British garrisons free to be employed in the war. He sought to hire men from other sovereigns. A proposal made to Catherine of Russia for the hire of 20,000 men was scornfully declined, and the States-General refused to sell him their Scots brigade. With the petty princes of Germany he was more lucky; the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave and the hereditary Prince of Hesse Cassel, and the Prince of Waldeck were happy to sell their subjects, and agreed to supply 17,742 in return for a liberal payment. These arrangements enraged the Americans, who spoke of them as though the king was delivering a loyal people to be massacred by foreign mercenaries. As a matter of fact they were making war on the king, and he had as good a right to buy troops to fight in his quarrel as he had to buy cannon. It is on the princes who sold the blood of their subjects that the disgrace of these transactions must rest. Frederick of Prussia expressed his disgust at their greediness in bitter terms, and is said to have jeeringly declared that when any of the unfortunate men whose lives they were selling passed through his dominions he would levy toll on them at so much a head as though they were cattle.
EVACUATION OF BOSTON.