When the battle died out in the darkness, Thielemann held the line Sombreffe-Point du Jour. He remained in position until 3 A.M. on the 17th, when the whole field had been evacuated by the First and Second Corps; and then he commenced, in perfect order, his retreat to Gembloux, where he was to join the Fourth Corps, under Bulow, who had arrived there during the night.

Thielemann’s men were not discouraged by the loss of the battle of Ligny; on the contrary, they were full of spirit and determination; their behaviour under fire had been excellent, and they eagerly waited for a further opportunity of trying their strength with their formidable enemies.

The losses in the corps at Ligny amounted to about 1,000 men killed and wounded, and 7 guns lost.

The force detached by Napoleon for the pursuit of the Prussians, and given over to Marshal Grouchy, numbered 33,611 men and 96 guns. It was composed as follows:—

THIRD CORPS—Vandamme.Battns.}Men.
Eighth Division—(Lefol) 15th Light Infantry, 23rd, 37th, and 64th Regiments of the Line11 }14,508
Tenth Division—(Habert) 22nd, 34th, 70th and 88th Regiments of the Line12 }
Eleventh Division—(Berthézène) 12th, 33rd, 56th, and 86th Regiments of the Line8 }
Battalions Infantry31
ArtilleryMen.Guns.
4 batteries Foot[4] Artillery (8 guns each)78232
Engineers146
TOTALS, THIRD CORPS
Infantry14,508
Artillery782,32
Engineers146
———
15,536
======
FOURTH CORPS—Gérard.Battns.Men.
Twelfth Division—(Pecheux) 30th, 63rd, and 96th Regiments of the Line10}12,589
Thirteenth Division—(Vichery) 48th, 59th, 69th, and 76th Regiments of the Line8}
Fourteenth Division—(Hulot) 9th Light Infantry, 44th, 50th, and 111th Regiments of the Line8}
Battalions Infantry26
===
Seventh Cavalry Division—(Maurin)Squadrons.Men.
6th Hussars3}758
8th Chasseurs3}
Reserve Cavalry Division—(Jacquinot)
6th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Dragoons161,608
ArtilleryGuns.
4 Batteries Foot Artillery32}1,538
1 Battery Horse Artillery6}
Engineers201
TOTALS, FOURTH CORPSMen.Guns.
Infantry12,589
Cavalry2,366
Artillery1,538
Engineers201
———
Total16,69438
======
TWENTY-FIRST DIVISION—Teste. Detached from Lobau’s Corps.Battns.Men.
8th Light Infantry, 40th, 65th, and 75th Regiments of the Line52,316
Artillery attached to the Division—Guns.Men.
1 Battery Foot Artillery8161
Men.Guns.
Total, Teste’s Division2,4778
CavalrySquadrons.Men.
FOURTH CAVALRY DIVISION (belonging to 1st Cavalry Corps) under Pajol (commanding First Cavalry Corps)—
1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars121,234
Artillery attached to this Cavalry Division—Guns.Men.
1 Battery Horse Artillery6154
SECOND CAVALRY CORPS (Excelmans’)—Squadrons.Men.
Ninth Cavalry Division—(Strolz) 5th, 13th, 15th, and 20th Dragoons16}2,817
Tenth Cavalry Division (Chastel) 4th, 12th, 14th, and 17th Dragoons15}
Artillery attached to the Second Cavalry Corps—Guns.Men.
2 Batteries Horse Artillery12246

SUMMARY OF GROUCHY’S FORCES.

Infantry.Cavalry.Artillery.Engrs.Guns.
Third Corps, Vandamme14,50878214632
Fourth Corps, Gérard12,5892,3661,53820138
Twenty-First Division, Teste2,3161618
Fourth Cav. Division, Pajol1,2341546
Second Cav. Corps, Excelmans’281724612
———————————————
Deducting losses at Ligny29,4136,4172,88134796
3,940907600
———————————————
Totals25,4735,5102,28134796
33,611 men, 96 guns.

It will be seen that Grouchy was given a large proportion of cavalry, although the numbers composing the different units were in most cases very short. Thus the Second Cavalry Corps numbered only 2,817 men, whereas a modern cavalry corps, or rather, two cavalry divisions (as no modern army organises larger bodies of cavalry than divisions), would amount to 9,000 or 10,000 men. The Fourth Cavalry Division (commanded by Soult, brother of the Chief of the Staff, although under the immediate orders of Pajol, commanding the First Cavalry Corps), numbered 1,234 instead of 4,896 men, as the modern British Cavalry Division at war strength would number. The horse batteries consisted of 6 guns, as opposed to 8 in the Prussian horse batteries. The foot batteries contained 8 guns each on both sides. The infantry battalions were weak, averaging from 400 to 500 men. Only Gérard’s Corps was well supplied with cavalry; the remainder of the cavalry was formed in divisions or corps. The idea of cavalry reserves served its purpose on the field of battle in the earlier Napoleonic days, but for such operations as Grouchy was about to carry out, the organisations were too cumbersome.

Grouchy’s men were good soldiers, but without discipline, without confidence in their leaders. This would seem paradoxical; but as far as courage, determination, and tenacity make good soldiers, they were excellent. Houssaye said of Napoleon’s last army: “He had never before handled an instrument of war, which was at once so formidable and so fragile.” Indeed, Ligny proved well enough the impetuosity and dash of the French soldiers, but it was only the influence of victory which impelled them; had they suffered defeat, they would, not improbably, have been panic-stricken. They worshipped the Emperor as their idol, but for their more immediate superiors they had little respect. De Bourmont’s desertion on the 15th June, as the army crossed the frontier, had an injurious effect on the men’s feelings; murmurs rose from the ranks, and mistrust of their generals was everywhere visible. The Republican spirit was in them, but now it needed even more than the personal force of the Emperor to set it blazing again.

At Ligny, the Third (Vandamme’s) and the Fourth (Gérard’s) Corps had borne the brunt of the fighting, and had splendidly attacked the stout-hearted Prussians posted in the villages and on the banks of the stream. The final success of their onslaught against Blucher’s centre and right, where the terrible slaughter gave evidence of the stubbornness of the fight, speaks well for the quality of the men. The cavalry had done little except execute some occasional charges against Thielemann’s Divisions, and seize Tongrenelles and Balâtre: although Milhaud’s Cuirassiers (with whom we are not concerned in this narrative) broke through the centre at Ligny at the close of the day.