But the troops were still further delayed. Their breakfasts were not ready for them, and Vandamme’s Corps did not start until nearly eight o’clock. They had had twelve hours in bivouac at Gembloux, and yet their breakfasts could not be ready by 6 A.M.! Excelmans’ men at Sauvenière, too, were not in the saddle until 6 A.M. Grouchy himself left Gembloux at 8.30 A.M. He overtook Vandamme’s Corps at Walhain at about 10 A.M., and here he dismounted for breakfast, allowing the troops to march on. At half-past ten, Excelmans’ advanced guard came into touch with Thielemann’s rear-guard, on the road to Wavre near La Baraque. This news was sent back to Grouchy, while Excelmans extended his men and engaged the Prussians lightly. At Walhain, Gérard, having ridden ahead of his troops, joined Grouchy, and during their breakfast, the sound of heavy firing in the direction of Mont St Jean was heard from the garden of the house where they had stopped. (This was the opening cannonade of the battle of Waterloo, which began at half-past eleven.)

Gérard at once urged Grouchy to change his direction and march to the sound of the cannonade. But Grouchy refused to take the responsibility of disobeying the orders he had received from Napoleon—“to pursue and attack the Prussians, and on no account to lose sight of them.” Having received, a few minutes before, Excelmans’ report from the front, he considered that he was moving in the right direction. To march across country to join Napoleon would have been contrary to his orders. To send a part of his forces across the Dyle would be to separate his army at a most dangerous moment. But this was just one of those cases when instructions need not have been implicitly obeyed. Circumstances had altered considerably since Grouchy had received his orders from Napoleon. A resolute and capable commander, in Grouchy’s place, would have marched with his whole force by St Géry and Moustier from Gembloux at daybreak on the 18th. Certainly it would have been a mistake to divide his army at this time, but Grouchy should without doubt have taken upon himself the responsibility of digressing from his original instructions, and he would have been justified by the change in circumstances.

At the same time, while blaming Grouchy for his want of foresight and boldness, it must not be forgotten that the state of the roads and of the whole countryside was a very heavy factor against him. It was almost impossible to get the guns through the mud and mire which composed the roads. The infantry had to wade ankle-deep in many places, and for wheeled transport the roads were nearly impassable. Rain had fallen incessantly. Still, much could have been done by the cavalry, which was the arm which should have been relied upon most during these operations; and if the infantry had taken to the fields on either side of the road, they would hardly have marched slower than Vandamme’s men. The Prussians, who were under the necessity of taking with them all their guns, waggons, and trains that they wished to save from the enemy on the same roads that their infantry used, were able to cover nearly 2½ miles an hour. It might be presumed that the French could cover 2 miles an hour.

Vandamme, continuing his march while Grouchy breakfasted at leisure at Walhain, reached Nil St Vincent with his corps at 10.30 A.M. Here, in accordance with Grouchy’s orders on the previous evening, he halted, and awaited fresh instructions. It was one o’clock before Grouchy arrived in person, and gave them to him. Then he and Excelmans, who had met with a Prussian rear-guard near Neuf Sart and La Baraque, were ordered to continue their march on Wavre. An hour later, Vandamme’s advanced guard was attacked by Ledebur’s detachment of Hussars, which had been left at Mont St Guibert. Ledebur had remained at Mont St Guibert, unaware of the proximity of the French, until his patrols caught sight of the troops at Nil St Vincent. Then he was alive to the dangers of his situation; for he was indeed in peril of being cut off. Excelmans’ Dragoons at La Baraque stood across his rear, and Vandamme’s Corps was threatening to cut off his retreat by Corbaix. He, however, was a man of great military instinct, and saw that his only chance of escape lay in attacking the French advanced squadrons. This he did with his Hussars, and, being reinforced from Pirch’s Corps by two battalions, which in addition to the battalions which were with him before, made up his detachment to the strength of a brigade, he boldly attacked the head of Vandamme’s column. Grouchy ordered Excelmans to turn Ledebur’s position by Dion-le-Mont, but before the French Cavalry had developed their movement, the Prussians had retreated through the wood of La Huzelle and had fallen back on Wavre. Vandamme was sent off in pursuit, with orders to follow the Prussians to Wavre, take up a position there, and await instructions.

Grouchy himself, as soon as Ledebur had retired, rode off to Limelette, a village on the left bank of the Dyle, to reconnoitre with his own eyes. It is a pity, for his reputation as a General, that he had not taken upon himself more of this essential duty, during these operations. At Limelette, he heard very plainly the distant roar of the guns at Mont St Jean, and he had no longer any doubts that a big battle was in progress on his left. On his return to La Baraque, towards 4 P.M., he received a letter from Napoleon, written at Le Caillou farm-house at 10 A.M., in which the Emperor ordered him to push on to Wavre, at the same time drawing nearer to the main army, and keeping up the closest communication by Ottignies and Moustier. This letter had the unfortunate effect of confirming Grouchy in his own ideas of the correctness of his movements, while he made no alterations in his dispositions of Gérard’s and Vandamme’s Corps to bring them nearer the Emperor. But he did order Pajol, who had reported from Grand Leez that no trace of the Prussians had been found between that place and Tourinnes, to take his cavalry and Teste’s Division across country to Limale, on the Dyle, where he was to force a passage.

This order given, Grouchy rode off towards Wavre, where the impatient Vandamme was already beginning an attack.

CHAPTER V
BLUCHER MARCHES TOWARDS MONT ST JEAN WITH THE FIRST, SECOND, AND FOURTH CORPS

At nightfall on the 17th, while Grouchy was still at Gembloux, the whole of Blucher’s army (except two Divisions, the Ninth and Thirteenth, and the Reserve Cavalry of Thielemann’s Corps, which were posted as rear-guards to the Third and Fourth Corps) had reached Wavre and its neighbourhood. As explained in the third chapter, the Second and Third Corps bivouacked on the left bank of the Dyle, beyond Wavre, and the First and Fourth on the right bank. Pirch I. was between St Anne and Aisemont; Bulow was at Dion-le-Mont. The rear-guards were posted at Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; these troops fell back next day as the French advanced. On Blucher’s left, patrols scoured the country towards Namur and Louvain; on his right they watched the Dyle and its approaches. Limale was held by a detachment from Zieten’s Corps to protect the right flank, and cavalry patrols rode to and fro over all the valley of the Dyle. The reserve ammunition columns with full supplies reached Wavre in the afternoon of the 17th, and thus all the batteries were replenished. It speaks well for the Prussian arrangements that these supplies should have reached Wavre at so important a moment; when on account of their unexpected retreat to Wavre, all previous arrangements had to be cancelled.

It was only when Blucher had thus made sure of his concentration and of the refilling of his waggons and limbers, that he replied to Wellington:—