Thirdly, could Grouchy really hope to effect anything advantageous by his retreat on Paris? No, unless he saw a chance of persuading Napoleon to put himself at the head of his troops and the Paris garrison, and march out to repeat the strokes of 1814; but on the 22nd Napoleon had abdicated.
Fourthly, could he have effected more by marching south to rally Suchet and Lecourbe? Hardly; since overwhelming armies were approaching on that side, and the fall of Paris would render resistance in the country districts useless.
His case was really hopeless from the first. The allies in their march on Paris would ignore him, and, moving by a much more direct road, would reach the capital first. The triple line of fortresses across the line of advance of the enemy, were expected to bar his approach, but they were weakly garrisoned by ill-disciplined and raw troops, whose whole spirit was shaken by Napoleon’s great defeat.
So far-reaching is the effect of a defeat as great as Waterloo that armies, districts, even capitals, miles from the real theatre of war, possibly in other countries, seem to crumble to dust before the conqueror; but no fall from might and power has ever been so great as Napoleon’s.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Houssaye.
[2] Houssaye.
[3] The Prussians called them “brigades”—but as they varied in strength from 6 to 9 battalions (although the battalions were weak) I have substituted the word “divisions,” as they corresponded to the infantry divisions in the French army.
[4] The French foot batteries contained 8 guns; the horse batteries, 6 guns. The horse battery belonging to Vandamme’s Corps had been detached with Domon’s Light Cavalry Division, to the Left Wing.
[5] Turenne.